NanoClaw vs Zo Computer

NanoClaw

Each session runs in an unprivileged Docker container and API keys stay in a credential gateway on the host, so a manipulated agent cannot read them. Inside the container the agent runs with permission prompts off, network egress is open by default, and it can message any chat it is wired to without approval.

Zo Computer

Zo publishes an OpenAPI file, Markdown docs, plan prices and a named list of the providers that receive user content. One access token grants full access to the workspace, no approval step before sending or buying was found in the reviewed docs, and no status page, rate limit or SLA is published.

NanoClaw

1. Install with git clone and bash nanoclaw.sh. There is no registry package, and setup needs Docker, Node 22 or later and a Claude or Codex credential
2. Set NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true before giving an agent credentials or an audience of strangers. The default leaves egress open
3. Put chats with different audiences in separate agent groups. Every session of a group shares one read-write workspace and memory tree
4. Turn on per-request approval for a secret in the gateway when its use should wait for a person. It is off unless configured
5. On OneCLI installs, move the gateway to 1.42.0 by the upgrade guide before updating to 2026.10.0. The updater stops until that is done

Zo Computer

1. Send POST https://api.zo.computer/zo/ask with Authorization: Bearer zo_sk_... and an input string. The owner creates the token under Settings > Advanced
2. Pass persona_id for a persona with a narrow tool set. The token itself carries every permission the owner has
3. Set memory_mode to off to keep workspace memory out of a request. The field is in the OpenAPI file and absent from the API guide
4. Do not retry /zo/ask blindly after a timeout. No idempotency key is documented and the request may already have sent a message
5. Append .md to any guide or reference URL for Markdown