NanoClaw vs QwenPaw

NanoClaw

Each session runs in an unprivileged Docker container and API keys stay in a credential gateway on the host, so a manipulated agent cannot read them. Inside the container the agent runs with permission prompts off, network egress is open by default, and it can message any chat it is wired to without approval.

QwenPaw

Mail tools ask for approval by default, automatic mail handling may not delete permanently, and the security docs list what each sandbox backend fails to enforce. Usage data is sent by default, the default approval level passes every tool call no rule flags, and no privacy policy or security advisory is published.

NanoClaw

1. Install with git clone and bash nanoclaw.sh. There is no registry package, and setup needs Docker, Node 22 or later and a Claude or Codex credential
2. Set NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true before giving an agent credentials or an audience of strangers. The default leaves egress open
3. Put chats with different audiences in separate agent groups. Every session of a group shares one read-write workspace and memory tree
4. Turn on per-request approval for a secret in the gateway when its use should wait for a person. It is off unless configured
5. On OneCLI installs, move the gateway to 1.42.0 by the upgrade guide before updating to 2026.10.0. The updater stops until that is done

QwenPaw

1. Set QWENPAW_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=true before qwenpaw init --defaults or qwenpaw app. Both send usage data without asking
2. Set approval_level to STRICT or SMART in agent.json. The default AUTO runs every tool call no guard rule flags
3. Set dm_policy and group_policy to allowlist with allow_from on each channel. Both default to open
4. Set QWENPAW_AUTH_ENABLED=true before binding beyond 127.0.0.1. Requests from localhost skip login even then
5. Keep mail tools on ask for send_message, delete_message and delete_thread, and turn on Mail Access Control with automatic handling