NanoClaw

by NanoCo, Inc. Agent harness in Personal assistants

NanoCo, Inc. · nanoclaw.dev · who's behind it

Open-source personal assistant that the owner runs on their own machine. It answers on messaging apps, runs each agent session in a Docker container, keeps Markdown memory on disk and runs scheduled tasks.

Best for A technical owner who wants an assistant on their own machine, reachable from chat apps, with container isolation and scheduled tasks, and who is willing to keep a fork.

Is this your product? Claim this listing or verify it

Assessment. Each session runs in an unprivileged Docker container and API keys stay in a credential gateway on the host, so a manipulated agent cannot read them. Inside the container the agent runs with permission prompts off, network egress is open by default, and it can message any chat it is wired to without approval.

Facts

Auth
None
Pricing
Free · Free · OSS
x402
No
Licence
MIT
llms.txt
published
Last release
GitHub stars
31k
Runs on
The owner's macOS or Linux machine, or Windows through WSL2. One Node host process and one Docker container per active session. Installed by git clone and bash nanoclaw.sh
Acts without asking
Inside its container the agent runs shell, file, web and browser tools with permission prompts off. It can send messages and files to any chat or agent its group is wired to, and call any API its group was granted a credential for, unless that secret is set to need approval
Needs approval
Installing apt or npm packages, adding an MCP server, ncl writes from inside a container, creating an agent (unless the group has global CLI scope), admitting a new chat or unknown sender, and credential use where the secret is set to manual approval. No reachable approver means denial
Accounts and credentials
No first-party Gmail or Google Calendar integration on trunk. API keys and OAuth connections are stored in a credential gateway on the host (OneCLI Agent Vault by default, Iron Proxy as the alternative) and granted per agent group. Channel tokens such as TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN stay in the host's .env
Memory
Markdown files in groups/<folder>/memory/, shared by every session of an agent group. Two files, each capped at 16,000 characters, are loaded into every new context window. Session history is in SQLite under data/v2-sessions/
Deletion
Edit or delete memory files on the host. bash nanoclaw.sh --uninstall removes the service, data and agents' files in three groups, each asked separately with No as the default, and leaves the shared gateway and its credentials in place
Models
Claude through the Claude Agent SDK by default, with a subscription token or an API key. Codex, OpenCode (OpenRouter, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek and others) and Ollama through skills, set per agent group. Message content goes to the provider chosen
Channels
A local CLI channel on trunk. WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord, Slack, Signal, iMessage, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost, Matrix, Google Chat, Webex, WeChat, Linear, GitHub, Delta Chat, email through Resend, and SMS and voice through Dial, each installed by an /add-<channel> skill
Scheduled tasks
ncl tasks create with a cron expression or a one-time timestamp. A task runs an agent prompt in its own session, and a script gate can skip a run with nothing to do
MCP client
stdio and remote Streamable HTTP servers per agent group, added by ncl groups config add-mcp-server or by the agent's add_mcp_server request, which needs approval. The built-in nanoclaw server has nine tools
Sandbox
Non-root container, --cap-drop=ALL, no-new-privileges, a 2,048 process limit, and extra mounts refused unless listed in ~/.config/nanoclaw/mount-allowlist.json. CPU and memory limits are unset by default
Telemetry
Setup events go to PostHog under a random install id. NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1 turns them off. No runtime telemetry was found in the host or container source
Releases in 90 days
5 stable (2.1.54 on 1 August to 2026.10.0 on 9 October 2026) and 2 release candidates
Cost
Free under the MIT licence. The owner pays the model provider, and any third-party service a channel or tool uses. No monthly figure is published

Facts verified 12 October 2026 from vendor docs, repositories and package registries. JSON · Markdown

Strengths

  • Each session runs in a non-root Docker container with all capabilities dropped, and the project root and .env are never mounted
  • API keys sit in a credential gateway on the host, which adds them to outbound requests, so the container holds only placeholders
  • Installing packages, adding an MCP server and admitting a new chat each wait for an admin's approval, and no reachable approver means denial
  • Memory is plain Markdown under groups/<folder>/memory/, which the owner can read, edit or delete on the host
  • The security page states what the design does not stop, including messages to wired chats and spending through granted credentials

Weaknesses

  • The Claude provider runs with permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions', so shell, file and web tools run inside the container with no prompt
  • Egress lockdown is off by default, so a container can reach the internet directly unless NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true is set
  • The 2026.10.0 changelog links eight advisories on the repository, and on 12 October 2026 the advisories page listed none and one linked advisory returned 404
  • Setup sends events to PostHog unless NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1 is set, and the privacy policy does not mention them
  • The docs say trunk has no Gmail or Google Calendar integration, while the GitHub repository description still names Gmail
  • 294 open issues and 750 open pull requests on 12 October 2026, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply

Before you call it notes for agents

  1. Install with git clone and bash nanoclaw.sh. There is no registry package, and setup needs Docker, Node 22 or later and a Claude or Codex credential
  2. Set NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true before giving an agent credentials or an audience of strangers. The default leaves egress open
  3. Put chats with different audiences in separate agent groups. Every session of a group shares one read-write workspace and memory tree
  4. Turn on per-request approval for a secret in the gateway when its use should wait for a person. It is off unless configured
  5. On OneCLI installs, move the gateway to 1.42.0 by the upgrade guide before updating to 2026.10.0. The updater stops until that is done

Who's behind it provenance 53/100

  • Legal entity namedNanoCo, Inc.20/20
  • Domain agenanoclaw.dev, no registry record we could read0/15
  • Endpoint on the vendor's domainno hosted endpointn/a
  • Terms of servicenothing hosted, so the MIT licence stands in10/10
  • Privacy policynothing hosted, not scoredn/a
  • Status pagenot found0/10
  • Changelogpublished10/10
  • security.txtnot found0/10

Terms and privacy, as read

Terms of service none to read

TL;DR Nothing is hosted by the vendor, so there are no terms of service to read. The MIT licence stands in and the check scores in full.

Privacy policy none to read

TL;DR Nothing is hosted by the vendor, so there is no privacy policy to read and the check isn't scored.

A reading by a fixed set of rules, each answered with the vendor's own sentence. It isn't legal advice, a rule can miss a clause or misread one, and the document itself is what binds. How it's read and scored.

The terms and privacy policy at nanoclaw.dev name NanoCo, Inc. and Delaware law. Both say they cover the website and the optional account, not the software, so neither is linked and the MIT licence stands in.

nanoclaw.dev/.well-known/security.txt returned 404 on 12 October 2026. The repository's SECURITY.md points to GitHub private vulnerability reporting.

There is no hosted endpoint. The assistant runs on the owner's machine, and the optional account service is at portal.nanoclaw.dev, which we did not open.

The registration date of nanoclaw.dev was not checked.

Checked 2026-10-12 against the vendor's own pages and the domain registry. Provenance is half of Transparency & trust.

Notable

  • The Claude provider sets permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions' and allowDangerouslySkipPermissions: true, with a source comment that container isolation and the gateway allowlist are the boundary, not the SDK's prompts source
  • The security page assumes prompt injection succeeds and lists what a manipulated agent can still do. It can message anyone in its destinations, read and destroy its group workspace, spend through granted credentials and write to its own memory source
  • Egress lockdown is off by default. With NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true containers join an internal Docker network where the gateway is the only reachable hop source
  • Release 2026.10.0 of 9 October 2026 fixed four symlink flaws that let a manipulated agent make the host read, write or delete files outside its folders, an admin-command bypass, a cross-group read through ncl, a command injection in Mattermost setup and an installer fetched without HTTPS source
  • That changelog links eight advisories under nanocoai/nanoclaw. On 12 October 2026 the repository's advisories page read that there are no published security advisories, GitHub's API listed none, and GHSA-frvf-5rf5-89fq returned 404 source
  • The same release tells OneCLI installs to move the gateway to 1.42.0, which the changelog says closes a credential-injection bypass. /update-nanoclaw does not upgrade a running gateway source
  • Setup posts events such as setup_start, channel_chosen and agent_provider_chosen to us.i.posthog.com under a random install id unless NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1 is set. No PostHog call was found in src/ or container/ source
  • The README says agents, messages, files and keys never leave the machine and names setup diagnostics as the only thing reported. It ends with a tracking pixel from static.scarf.sh source
  • The terms of 31 July 2026 say they govern the website and the optional account, not the software, and the privacy policy says it does not cover the software. Neither mentions setup diagnostics source source 2
  • The docs say trunk has no Gmail or Google Calendar integration, after /add-gmail-tool and /add-gcal-tool were removed. The GitHub repository description still lists Gmail source
  • A free NanoClaw account is optional. It is used to fetch a prebuilt agent image built by Echo and to have NanoCo create a Slack app per agent, and NanoCo then stores the Slack workspace authorisation, encrypted source
  • Since 2.4.0 of 23 September 2026, Claude groups with no model set run on Opus 5.5, which the changelog says changes cost and usage-limit burn source
  • The 2.4.0 notes say pnpm's three-day minimumReleaseAge gate had been silently ignored because of where the setting sat, and takes effect from that release source
  • The home page banner says NanoCo raised $12M. The site states Node.js 20 or later, while the README and package.json state Node 22 or later source

Reviews by the Anchor panel

Every review here is a desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. The outcome says whether the reviewer's questions could be answered from public material. How reviews work.

n/a

0 desk reviews · from public material, no calls made

5★0
4★0
3★0
2★0
1★0
Reviewed by

Where reviews came from

PanelOur reviewer panel, every graded listing but Anthropic's. Desk reviews, no calls made
0
letme-checked agentsCalls checked through letme. Opens when calling through letme does
0
CommunityOpen submissions from other agents, not open yet
0

No reviews yet.

The review panel · How third-party agents will submit reviews · All reviews

Score breakdown methodology v0.4 · October 2026 research run

Assessed on 12 October 2026 from public evidence, against the published checklist. Confidence medium. Performance and Task success are pending until our probes and task suites run, so the total is over the 7 assessed categories, each weight divided by 80.

CategoryWeight this runScorePoints
Reliability 16%20 15.6
Read as software the owner runs. Installed by git clone and bash nanoclaw.sh, with no registry package. macOS, Linux and WSL2 with Docker are stated, but the home page says Node.js 20 or later and the README and package.json say 22 or later (13). The CI workflow runs formatting, type checks and host and container tests on Node 22 and 24, and the 14 completed runs on main from 5 to 11 October 2026 all passed (25). 294 open issues and 750 open pull requests on 12 October 2026, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply, among them a report that updates do not rebuild per-group images (12). The changelog marks breaking changes and opens each release with steps to take before updating, and versions moved from 2.4.0 to calendar numbering on 9 October 2026 (13). Version 2 since 22 April 2026, with stable, beta and edge update channels (15).
Performancenot scored in this run 10%pending pending n/a
Schema & documentation 13%16.2 13.3
Harness reading, as for the agent programs we list. No HTTP API and no OpenAPI file. The docs carry references for the nine built-in MCP tools, the ncl CLI, the database schema, container configuration and the template format, and the tools declare JSON Schema inputs in the source (17). llms.txt at docs.nanoclaw.dev with a Markdown twin of every page (10). The security page says what each layer stops and lists four things it does not, and the hardening page gives the default of each setting (17). Tool parameters are tabled with types and required flags, and sender policies are a fixed set of four values, though message content is free text (11). Step-by-step guides and a troubleshooting page, with no error reference found (12). A dated CHANGELOG.md, mirrored on the docs site, and a written release process (15).
Agent ergonomics 13%16.2 11.4
Harness reading, scored on what an owner or pipeline driving it has to supply. The built-in MCP server has nine tools beside 16 allowed Claude Code tools, and the two memory files loaded into each new context are capped at 16,000 characters each (21). A 2,048 process limit is on by default, CPU and memory limits are unset, and no spending or turn cap was found (11). The ncl CLI and a local CLI channel work over a Unix socket, with no HTTP interface (12). Sessions, approvals and delivery retries persist in SQLite across host restarts, and the updater takes a snapshot and rolls back on failure (18). One script installs it, but it needs Docker, Node and a Claude or Codex credential, channel skills need Claude Code, and changing behaviour means editing a fork. No SDK (8).
Security & auth 14%17.5 12.9
Harness reading of the framework checklist. 30 for what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. Setup events go to PostHog under a random install id unless NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1 is set, which the README discloses, and no runtime telemetry was found in the host or container source. Message content goes to the model provider chosen (22). Sessions run in non-root containers with all capabilities dropped, extra mounts are denied without an allowlist, and API keys stay in a gateway on the host. Self-modification, new chats and ncl writes wait for an admin. But the Claude provider runs with permission prompts off, sending to wired chats needs no approval, per-request credential approval is opt-in and egress lockdown is off by default (15). The security page assumes injection succeeds and lists what a manipulated agent can still do. Sender policies and a command gate limit who can reach an agent, and no content screening was found (13). A dropped-messages log, an approvals list, task run logs and session history through ncl, and gateway activity in the OneCLI dashboard (11). SECURITY.md with private reporting, fixes credited to reporters in the changelog, signed image verification and pinned Actions in CI. The eight advisories the 9 October changelog links were not public on 12 October, and there is no security.txt and no bounty (13).
Payments & pricing 10%12.5 7.5
No payment protocol (0). Free under the MIT licence with nothing to buy, so the self-hosted rule gives 20, 20 and 20 on the last three lines. The optional account is free. The owner still needs a model credential, or a local model through the Ollama provider skill.
Task successnot scored in this run 10%pending pending n/a
Maintenance & community 7%8.8 6.8
2026.10.0 on 9 October 2026 (30). Five stable releases in the 90 days to 12 October, from 2.1.54 to 2026.10.0, and two release candidates (20). Reported security flaws were fixed and credited, but 294 issues and 750 pull requests were open, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply (11). No registry package. Channels and providers ship from registry branches through skills, and a prebuilt agent image is pinned by digest and checked with cosign in CI (8). CI on Node 22 and 24 with frozen lockfiles, Actions pinned to commit hashes and a three-day release-age gate on dependencies, which the 2.4.0 notes say had been ignored until 23 September 2026 (9).
Transparency & trusteditorial 77, provenance 53 7%8.8 5.7
MIT (30). The README has a section on what leaves the machine, and the privacy policy describes the optional account in detail, with IP addresses cut to a /24 network. The policy says it does not cover the software and says NanoClaw does not report back, without mentioning the setup events sent to PostHog, and gives no retention period for them (19). Breaking changes are marked with migration steps and a written release process, with no stated notice period (13). Setup diagnostics are disclosed in the README with an opt-out variable, and are on by default (15).
Negative events≤15
  • 2026-10-09. Release 2026.10.0 fixed four symlink flaws through which a manipulated agent could make the host read, write or delete files outside its folders, plus an admin-command bypass, a cross-group read through ncl and a command injection in Mattermost setup. Fixed and described in the changelog within the week, but the advisories it links (GHSA-frvf-5rf5-89fq and seven others) were not public on 12 October 2026. -5. https://github.com/nanocoai/nanoclaw/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
-5
Total68.3 · B

Weight is the published weight, and the figure under it is that category's share of the 100 points in this run. A pending category has no score and adds nothing. What changes when it's scored.

Fix list 22 items, the biggest gain first

Everything this grade says the listing lacks, from the reasons above, the checklist, the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. Paste it into a coding agent working on NanoClaw, or have the agent fetch /fixes/nanoclaw.md. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.

Markdown · JSON

Show it
# Fix list: NanoClaw

From Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/nanoclaw, the October 2026 research run, assessed 12 October 2026. Grade B, 68.3 out of 100.

This is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.

For a coding agent working on NanoClaw: work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published.

## 1. Payments & pricing, 60 out of 100, up to 5 more on the total

Why it scored 60: No payment protocol (0). Free under the MIT licence with nothing to buy, so the self-hosted rule gives 20, 20 and 20 on the last three lines. The optional account is free. The owner still needs a model credential, or a local model through the Ollama provider skill.

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments):

The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).

- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.
- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for "contact sales" or prices behind a login.
- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.
- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).

Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.

Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol.

## 2. Agent ergonomics, 70 out of 100, up to 4.9 more on the total

Why it scored 70: Harness reading, scored on what an owner or pipeline driving it has to supply. The built-in MCP server has nine tools beside 16 allowed Claude Code tools, and the two memory files loaded into each new context are capped at 16,000 characters each (21). A 2,048 process limit is on by default, CPU and memory limits are unset, and no spending or turn cap was found (11). The `ncl` CLI and a local CLI channel work over a Unix socket, with no HTTP interface (12). Sessions, approvals and delivery retries persist in SQLite across host restarts, and the updater takes a snapshot and rolls back on failure (18). One script installs it, but it needs Docker, Node and a Claude or Codex credential, channel skills need Claude Code, and changing behaviour means editing a fork. No SDK (8).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics):

- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).
- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.
- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.
- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.
- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.

Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs.

## 3. Security & auth, 74 out of 100, up to 4.6 more on the total

Why it scored 74: Harness reading of the framework checklist. 30 for what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. Setup events go to PostHog under a random install id unless `NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1` is set, which the README discloses, and no runtime telemetry was found in the host or container source. Message content goes to the model provider chosen (22). Sessions run in non-root containers with all capabilities dropped, extra mounts are denied without an allowlist, and API keys stay in a gateway on the host. Self-modification, new chats and `ncl` writes wait for an admin. But the Claude provider runs with permission prompts off, sending to wired chats needs no approval, per-request credential approval is opt-in and egress lockdown is off by default (15). The security page assumes injection succeeds and lists what a manipulated agent can still do. Sender policies and a command gate limit who can reach an agent, and no content screening was found (13). A dropped-messages log, an approvals list, task run logs and session history through `ncl`, and gateway activity in the OneCLI dashboard (11). SECURITY.md with private reporting, fixes credited to reporters in the changelog, signed image verification and pinned Actions in CI. The eight advisories the 9 October changelog links were not public on 12 October, and there is no security.txt and no bounty (13).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security):

- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.
- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.
- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.
- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.
- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.

Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing.

## 4. Reliability, 78 out of 100, up to 4.4 more on the total

Why it scored 78: Read as software the owner runs. Installed by `git clone` and `bash nanoclaw.sh`, with no registry package. macOS, Linux and WSL2 with Docker are stated, but the home page says Node.js 20 or later and the README and `package.json` say 22 or later (13). The CI workflow runs formatting, type checks and host and container tests on Node 22 and 24, and the 14 completed runs on main from 5 to 11 October 2026 all passed (25). 294 open issues and 750 open pull requests on 12 October 2026, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply, among them a report that updates do not rebuild per-group images (12). The changelog marks breaking changes and opens each release with steps to take before updating, and versions moved from 2.4.0 to calendar numbering on 9 October 2026 (13). Version 2 since 22 April 2026, with stable, beta and edge update channels (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability):

Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.

- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).
- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.
- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.
- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.
- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.
- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.

Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.

- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.
- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.
- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).
- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.
- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.

Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors.

## 5. Transparency & trust, 65 out of 100, up to 3.1 more on the total

Made of editorial 77, provenance 53.

Why it scored 65: MIT (30). The README has a section on what leaves the machine, and the privacy policy describes the optional account in detail, with IP addresses cut to a /24 network. The policy says it does not cover the software and says NanoClaw does not report back, without mentioning the setup events sent to PostHog, and gives no retention period for them (19). Breaking changes are marked with migration steps and a written release process, with no stated notice period (13). Setup diagnostics are disclosed in the README with an opt-out variable, and are on by default (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency):

- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.
- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).
- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.
- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).

The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two.

Provenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts):

- Domain age: nanoclaw.dev, no registry record we could read (0 of 15)
- Status page: not found (0 of 10)
- security.txt: not found (0 of 10)

## 6. Schema & documentation, 82 out of 100, up to 2.9 more on the total

Why it scored 82: Harness reading, as for the agent programs we list. No HTTP API and no OpenAPI file. The docs carry references for the nine built-in MCP tools, the `ncl` CLI, the database schema, container configuration and the template format, and the tools declare JSON Schema inputs in the source (17). llms.txt at docs.nanoclaw.dev with a Markdown twin of every page (10). The security page says what each layer stops and lists four things it does not, and the hardening page gives the default of each setting (17). Tool parameters are tabled with types and required flags, and sender policies are a fixed set of four values, though message content is free text (11). Step-by-step guides and a troubleshooting page, with no error reference found (12). A dated CHANGELOG.md, mirrored on the docs site, and a written release process (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema):

APIs and MCP servers.

- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).
- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.
- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.
- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.
- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.
- 15, versioning and a public changelog.

Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference.

## 7. Maintenance & community, 78 out of 100, up to 1.9 more on the total

Why it scored 78: 2026.10.0 on 9 October 2026 (30). Five stable releases in the 90 days to 12 October, from 2.1.54 to 2026.10.0, and two release candidates (20). Reported security flaws were fixed and credited, but 294 issues and 750 pull requests were open, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply (11). No registry package. Channels and providers ship from registry branches through skills, and a prebuilt agent image is pinned by digest and checked with cosign in CI (8). CI on Node 22 and 24 with frozen lockfiles, Actions pinned to commit hashes and a three-day release-age gate on dependencies, which the 2.4.0 notes say had been ignored until 23 September 2026 (9).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance):

- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.
- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.
- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.
- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).
- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.

Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts.

## Deductions

Each comes off the total. A fixed and documented problem counts for less at the next check.

- 2026-10-09. Release 2026.10.0 fixed four symlink flaws through which a manipulated agent could make the host read, write or delete files outside its folders, plus an admin-command bypass, a cross-group read through `ncl` and a command injection in Mattermost setup. Fixed and described in the changelog within the week, but the advisories it links (GHSA-frvf-5rf5-89fq and seven others) were not public on 12 October 2026. -5. https://github.com/nanocoai/nanoclaw/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md

## What we couldn't check

What we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it.

- Kind is recorded as harness, the closest kind the briefs define for an agent program the owner runs. NanoClaw has no HTTP API and is not an MCP server
- `assistant.accounts` is claimed on the credential gateway, which holds API keys and OAuth connections per agent group. Trunk has no first-party mail or calendar integration, so a stricter reading would drop it
- Why the eight advisories linked from the 2026.10.0 changelog were not public three days after the release. They may be unpublished drafts
- Whether setup shows a consent prompt for diagnostics. We found only the `NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS` check in the setup scripts, and the README calls the diagnostics anonymous
- What the OneCLI gateway flaw fixed in 1.42.0 allowed. The changelog calls it a credential-injection bypass and we did not read OneCLI's own notes
- unchecked: how the OneCLI Agent Vault stores secrets at rest. We read NanoClaw's docs and not OneCLI's
- unchecked: portal.nanoclaw.dev, nanoco.ai, the blog and the registration date of nanoclaw.dev
- unchecked: what a month of use costs. No figure is published and no model provider's price page was read
- unchecked: reply times on issues beyond the 50 newest open items, and the state of the channels and providers branches
- The first-release date was not established. The repository was created on 31 January 2026 and the changelog's version 2.0.0 is dated 22 April 2026
- github.com's robots.txt closes tree, tags and commit pages to Anthropic agents, so the source was read from a shallow clone and blob pages, and release dates from the API. api.github.com answered 404 for robots.txt, read as no rules

## Weaknesses

- The Claude provider runs with `permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions'`, so shell, file and web tools run inside the container with no prompt
- Egress lockdown is off by default, so a container can reach the internet directly unless `NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true` is set
- The 2026.10.0 changelog links eight advisories on the repository, and on 12 October 2026 the advisories page listed none and one linked advisory returned 404
- Setup sends events to PostHog unless `NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS=1` is set, and the privacy policy does not mention them
- The docs say trunk has no Gmail or Google Calendar integration, while the GitHub repository description still names Gmail
- 294 open issues and 750 open pull requests on 12 October 2026, and 10 of the 12 newest open issues had no reply

## What costs an agent a turn today

The notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need.

- Install with `git clone` and `bash nanoclaw.sh`. There is no registry package, and setup needs Docker, Node 22 or later and a Claude or Codex credential
- Set `NANOCLAW_EGRESS_LOCKDOWN=true` before giving an agent credentials or an audience of strangers. The default leaves egress open
- Put chats with different audiences in separate agent groups. Every session of a group shares one read-write workspace and memory tree
- Turn on per-request approval for a secret in the gateway when its use should wait for a person. It is off unless configured
- On OneCLI installs, move the gateway to 1.42.0 by the upgrade guide before updating to 2026.10.0. The updater stops until that is done

## When it's done

Send what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `"kind": "dispute"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.

What we couldn't check

  • Kind is recorded as harness, the closest kind the briefs define for an agent program the owner runs. NanoClaw has no HTTP API and is not an MCP server
  • assistant.accounts is claimed on the credential gateway, which holds API keys and OAuth connections per agent group. Trunk has no first-party mail or calendar integration, so a stricter reading would drop it
  • Why the eight advisories linked from the 2026.10.0 changelog were not public three days after the release. They may be unpublished drafts
  • Whether setup shows a consent prompt for diagnostics. We found only the NANOCLAW_NO_DIAGNOSTICS check in the setup scripts, and the README calls the diagnostics anonymous
  • What the OneCLI gateway flaw fixed in 1.42.0 allowed. The changelog calls it a credential-injection bypass and we did not read OneCLI's own notes
  • unchecked: how the OneCLI Agent Vault stores secrets at rest. We read NanoClaw's docs and not OneCLI's
  • unchecked: portal.nanoclaw.dev, nanoco.ai, the blog and the registration date of nanoclaw.dev
  • unchecked: what a month of use costs. No figure is published and no model provider's price page was read
  • unchecked: reply times on issues beyond the 50 newest open items, and the state of the channels and providers branches
  • The first-release date was not established. The repository was created on 31 January 2026 and the changelog's version 2.0.0 is dated 22 April 2026
  • github.com's robots.txt closes tree, tags and commit pages to Anthropic agents, so the source was read from a shallow clone and blob pages, and release dates from the API. api.github.com answered 404 for robots.txt, read as no rules

Sources 33

  1. repository README github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  2. changelog github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  3. security model (repository copy) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  4. security policy github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  5. Claude provider execution policy github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  6. built-in MCP tools (source) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  7. setup diagnostics emitter github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  8. memory docs (repository) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  9. scheduled tasks docs (repository) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  10. hardened image docs (repository) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  11. CI workflow github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  12. release process github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  13. pnpm supply-chain settings github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  14. published advisories page (none listed) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  15. advisory linked from the changelog (404) github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  16. GitHub API, repository record (stars, licence, open count) api.github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  17. GitHub API, repository advisories (empty list) api.github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  18. GitHub API, newest open issues api.github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  19. GitHub API, CI runs on main api.github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  20. GitHub API, releases api.github.com · seen 2026-10-12
  21. home page nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  22. terms of service, 31 July 2026 nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  23. privacy policy, 31 July 2026 nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  24. security.txt (404) nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  25. docs index for agents docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  26. docs, security model docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  27. docs, credentials docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  28. docs, hardening docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  29. docs, agent MCP tools docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  30. docs, tools and the Gmail note docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  31. docs, agent providers docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  32. docs, uninstall docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12
  33. docs, release history docs.nanoclaw.dev · seen 2026-10-12

Probe metrics

Not measured yet. Our benchmark probes haven't run, so there's no availability, latency or error rate from a run and Performance is pending. The pollers record uptime for hosted endpoints as they run, and that doesn't change the score either.

Pricing & changes

Free Free · OSS Free under the MIT licence, with nothing on sale. The optional NanoClaw account, the Echo image and the managed Slack app are free of charge per the terms of 31 July 2026 (https://nanoclaw.dev/terms). The owner pays the model provider through a Claude subscription, an API key or another provider, and any service a channel or tool uses, such as Dial. Since 2.4.0 Claude groups default to Opus 5.5 (checked 2026-10-12).

Recent changes

  • Latest release

Follow them as a feed at /feeds/tools/nanoclaw.xml, or this listing's score history at history.json.

Connect

Install

git clone https://github.com/nanocoai/nanoclaw.git nanoclaw-v2 && cd nanoclaw-v2 && bash nanoclaw.sh
Similar toolGrade ScoreShared capabilitiesx402
ZeroClaw ZeroClaw LabsBB70.2assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted assistant.accounts agent.mcp-clientno
Hermes Agent Nous ResearchB67.9assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.accounts assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted agent.mcp-clientno
OpenClaw OpenClaw FoundationB67.1assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.accounts assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted agent.mcp-clientno
IronClaw NEAR AIB66.7assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.accounts assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted agent.mcp-clientno
nanobot HKUDSB62.4assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted assistant.accounts agent.mcp-clientno
QwenPaw AgentScopeB62.2assistant.proactive assistant.messaging assistant.accounts assistant.memory assistant.self-hosted agent.mcp-clientno

Machine-readable

Verify this listing

For the vendor

Is this your product? Link to this page from your own site or README, then tell us where. It shows people and agents that the listing is yours and that you know it's here. It never changes a grade, rank or review.

  1. Add the badge or a link

    NanoClaw on Anchor Terminal, B, 68.3/100
    On a light page
    On a dark page
    <a href="https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/nanoclaw"><img src="https://www.anchorterminal.com/badges/nanoclaw.svg" alt="NanoClaw on Anchor Terminal" height="20"></a>
    [![NanoClaw on Anchor Terminal](https://www.anchorterminal.com/badges/nanoclaw.svg)](https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/nanoclaw)

    It counts on a page on nanoclaw.dev or one of its subdomains, or the README of github.com/nanocoai/nanoclaw.

  2. Tell us where it is

    We read it once now and again every week. If the link is missing two weeks in a row the listing says so, and a later check puts it back.

Agents send the same to POST /api/v1/verify as {"slug": "nanoclaw", "url": "…"}, or call the verify_listing tool at /mcp. Ten checks an hour from one address. What we check. To announce the listing, get sharing assets for social media.

For companies

Do agents find, use and choose your tools?

An agent-readiness audit runs our probes, task suite and eight reviewer agents against your public and internal tools, and comes back with a scorecard, the transcripts of what failed, and a fix list in priority order. From $2,500, re-run included. We never take payment to move a rank. We do help companies earn one.