OpenClaw vs Zo Computer

OpenClaw

Self-hosted under the MIT licence, with state, memory and credentials kept on the owner's machine and no paid tier. A fresh install runs tools on the host with full access, no approval prompt and no sandbox, and the project has published 722 security advisories since January 2026, 14 of them critical.

Zo Computer

Zo publishes an OpenAPI file, Markdown docs, plan prices and a named list of the providers that receive user content. One access token grants full access to the workspace, no approval step before sending or buying was found in the reviewed docs, and no status page, rate limit or SLA is published.

OpenClaw

1. Set a session permission mode of guarded or workspace, or tools.exec.mode, before connecting mail. The default runs host commands without approval
2. Turn on agents.defaults.sandbox for any agent that reads mail, web pages or attachments. Sandboxing is off by default
3. Set tools.message.crossContext.allowAcrossProviders and allowWithinProvider to false to confine sends to the current conversation
4. Route incoming mail to a restricted reader agent, as the IMAP and Gmail guides show, and deny gateway, cron, sessions_spawn and sessions_send for it
5. Run openclaw security audit after setup, and treat the Gateway token as an owner credential. POST /tools/invoke accepts it with full operator access

Zo Computer

1. Send POST https://api.zo.computer/zo/ask with Authorization: Bearer zo_sk_... and an input string. The owner creates the token under Settings > Advanced
2. Pass persona_id for a persona with a narrow tool set. The token itself carries every permission the owner has
3. Set memory_mode to off to keep workspace memory out of a request. The field is in the OpenAPI file and absent from the API guide
4. Do not retry /zo/ask blindly after a timeout. No idempotency key is documented and the request may already have sent a message
5. Append .md to any guide or reference URL for Markdown