Head to head · Human approval · October 2026 research run
Permit MCP Gateway vs Trigger.dev
Trigger.dev scores 63.3 (B) on agent readiness against Permit MCP Gateway's 57.3 (C), and leads in 5 of 7 scored categories. Permit MCP Gateway leads on security & auth. Both do human approval.
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Which one, for what
Best for A security team that wants approvals and per-user limits on MCP tools across many clients without touching agent code.
Ahead on
- Security & auth, 80 against 75
Also in its favour
- No incidents deducted, where Trigger.dev loses 15 points for them
Watch for
Approvals and on-premises deployment are Enterprise only, priced on request
Best for A TypeScript team that wants an approval pause inside background jobs or AI chat agents, with the reviewer UI built in their own app.
Ahead on
- Reliability, 75 against 55
- Schema & documentation, 91 against 53
- Payments & pricing, 60 against 30
- Maintenance & community, 90 against 28
- Transparency & trust, 82 against 46
Also in its favour
- Runs on your own machine
- Open source
- Rated higher by the reviewer agents, 3.6 against 2.5 out of 5
Watch for
On 1 November 2026 an attacker gained access to environment variables for a subset of organisations on the hosted service
Why the edge
Each category where one leads by five points or more, with the reason behind each side's score from its assessment. The numbers are in the table below; this is what they stand for.
Maintenance & community Trigger.dev +62
Permit MCP Gateway 28
No release notes or changelog for the gateway, and the docs changelog page still says the Canny changelog has no entries after 16 May 2024. The newest gateway capability recorded in the docs repository is the HTTP egress proxy, added on 28 July and extended on 30 July 2026, 97 days before this check (10). The gateway docs changed on 17 and 20 September and 6 October 2026 with rewrites and new answer blocks. Docs commits are not releases or changelog entries, and the release dates of the @permitio/agent-security-cli package could not be read, so no dated release falls in the 90 days from 6 August (0). Closed service with a Slack community and support email (5 of 15). Permit SDKs in six languages for the policy API, none needed for the gateway (10 of 15). The docs repository's only GitHub workflow, an Algolia crawl, was removed on 17 September; a Dependabot config and a Netlify build with link checks remain, and the line keeps its earlier partial value (3 of 10).
Trigger.dev 90
v4.8.3 released on 2026-10-30 (30). Releases from 4 August include v4.5.10 (7 August), v4.6.0 to v4.6.4 (14 to 22 September), v4.7.0 to v4.7.7 (1 to 22 October), v4.8.0 and v4.8.1 (23 October), v4.8.2 (29 October) and v4.8.3 (30 October), from the repository's tags (20). Large, active repository, and we didn't sample reply times (github.com answers 403 in this session) (15 of 25). Current official TypeScript SDK, and the REST API from any language (15). CI workflows, tests and changesets (10). 30 + 20 + 15 + 15 + 10 = 90.
Schema & documentation Trigger.dev +38
Permit MCP Gateway 53
The gateway adds no tools of its own and passes upstream tool schemas through. Permit's management API has an OpenAPI-backed reference (15 of 25). No llms.txt or Markdown copies of the docs found (0). The docs say what the agent sees while waiting, what a rejection returns and what the gateway doesn't cover (15 of 20). Approval rules are toggles and trust levels in the dashboard, with nothing for the agent to type (8 of 15). The waiting message, the rejection error and the 429 body are documented with examples (12 of 15). The product changelog on Canny has no entry after May 2024, and the gateway has no changelog (3 of 15).
Trigger.dev 91
OpenAPI 3.1 for the REST API, including create, list, complete and callback endpoints for waitpoint tokens (25). llms.txt and llms-full.txt under trigger.dev/docs (10). The token docs say what tokens are for, when to use input streams instead and not to call the callback URL from a browser (15 of 20). Typed SDK generics for the token output, typed OpenAPI schemas (13 of 15). Examples for each completion path, and error responses in the spec such as a callback hash mismatch (13 of 15). Changesets changelog per package, a public changelog page and a dated API version (15).
Transparency & trust Trigger.dev +36
Permit MCP Gateway 46
Closed service under terms whose revision list ends on 1 July 2026 (termination and amendment provisions), naming Permit Inc., a Delaware corporation, under Delaware law (15 of 30). The docs say hosted traffic, including tool arguments and upstream responses, passes through Permit's infrastructure, and that customer-controlled or on-premises deployments keep it in your network. The terms let Permit delete data on termination, the trust centre says retention is limited by purpose, contract and legal requirements, and gateway audit logs are kept 7 days on Community (15 of 30). The terms let Permit change the service without notice, and the changelog stopped in May 2024 (0 of 20). The trust centre now lists nine subprocessors with their purposes (AWS, Datadog, Google, Twilio Segment, Mixpanel, Stripe, Sentry, Auth0, WorkOS) and promises at least 14 days' notice of changes, and says hosted services run on AWS, with no locations per provider (15 of 20).
Trigger.dev 82
Apache-2.0 (30). The privacy policy (updated 2025-12-23) keeps personal data 'no longer than necessary', links a public DPA and a subprocessors page, and the docs say payloads over 512 KB sit in object storage, queued runs expire after 14 days and logs are kept 1 to 30 days by plan. No retention period for run data in the policy itself (18 of 30). The v3 retirement notice lists deprecations and the version cut-off for self-hosters but no dates (10 of 20). Self-hosted webapp telemetry and MCP telemetry are disclosed with TRIGGER_TELEMETRY_DISABLED and --skip-telemetry opt-outs, and the sub-processor page (updated 13 October 2026) names 27 sub-processors with purpose and country (20 of 20).
Payments & pricing Trigger.dev +30
Permit MCP Gateway 30
No machine payment protocol (0). The gateway pricing page publishes plan prices, Community at $0, Pro from $25 a month and Enterprise on request, with nothing priced per call (10). Community is free with no credit card, but approvals and on-premises deployment are Enterprise only, so the line keeps its earlier partial value (10). A person signs in through the browser consent flow (0). Re-scored on 13 November 2026 for the new payments rubric (protocol 10, the other three lines 30 each): 20 is 30.
Trigger.dev 60
No machine payment protocol (0). Per-unit prices published without a login and re-read on 2 November, $0.0000338 a second for the default Small 1x machine (0.5 vCPU) up to $0.00068 for Large 2x, plus $0.25 per 10,000 runs (20). Free plan at $0 with $5 of monthly usage, 20 concurrent runs and 1-day logs, and the pricing page says no credit card is required (20). A person signs up in the browser. Since 4.7.0 the CLI can create the first organisation and activate the Free plan, but login still goes through browser authorisation (0). 0 + 20 + 20 + 0 = 40. Re-scored on 13 November 2026 for the new payments rubric (protocol 10, the other three lines 30 each): 40 is 60.
Reliability Trigger.dev +20
Permit MCP Gateway 55
Permit's status page at permit-io.instatus.com lists Backend, OPAL, Frontend, Marketing Website, PDP Deltas and PDP Data, all US East, with no component for the gateway or agent.security. A vendor page with no component for the product takes 15 (15). The incident line is read from the components the gateway depends on. The architecture page says the hosted gateway calls the Cloud PDP on every tool call and that gateway policies update through OPAL. history.atom shows three OPAL US East outages since 6 August, on 27 October (29 minutes), 1 November (9 minutes) and 4 November (15 minutes), each one component for under an hour, so minor (20). The hosted gateway rate-limits per client IP on sign-in, client registration and MCP endpoints, and the docs say they don't publish the numbers (0). A 429 carries a rate_limited JSON body and the docs say to back off and grow the wait on each retry, with no safe-retry guidance for tool calls that write, which this run scores 10 (10). The gateway pricing page lists 99.95 per cent uptime on Pro and 99.99 per cent on Enterprise, and Permit's pricing page an optional 99.99 per cent SLA, but no SLA document was found (0). The gateway carries no beta label, and approvals carry an Enterprise label (10).
Trigger.dev 75
Status page at status.trigger.dev (Better Stack) with components per region and incident history (20). From 4 August to 2 November its feed shows the runs list and API degraded on 24 August (1 hour 24 minutes), about 67 minutes of new run logs and traces lost on 3 September (postmortem of 4 September), run logs dropped for 30 minutes on 28 September, and on 6 October a Vercel integration fault (Deployments component) that cleared some sensitive environment variables for projects that deployed between 12:21 and 15:10 UTC. None took task execution down across the service, so we count them as minor (20 of 30). The 1 November security disclosure on the API component is a breach, not an outage, and is scored under negative events. API limit of 1,500 requests a minute, batch triggers on a token bucket (1,200 runs then 100 every 10 seconds on Free), concurrency and queue sizes by plan, per the 17 October check, not re-read on 2 November (15). The docs name the usual cause of 429s and the fix (batch triggers), and tokens and triggers take idempotency keys, with no Retry-After guidance for the Trigger.dev API itself (10 of 15). No SLA found on the pricing page, re-read on 2 November (0). Waitpoint tokens are GA in v4 (10). 20 + 20 + 15 + 10 + 0 + 10 = 75.
Security & auth Permit MCP Gateway +5
Permit MCP Gateway 80
OAuth 2.1 authorisation server per host with dynamic client registration, consent and a trust ceiling, admin revocation and sessions that end 90 days after the last tool call (30). Trust levels per tool, a maximum per user set by the admin, approval rules per tool, server or level, and a timeout that always rejects (20). The docs state prompt injection is out of scope and should be handled in the client and model, and the gateway doesn't inspect what tools return (5 of 15). Every tool call goes to Permit audit logs, and approval history records the outcome, the deciding admin and the time taken. Audit log retention isn't published (13 of 15). The trust centre states a SOC 2 Type II renewal in January 2026 with sections 1 and 2 public and the full report on request, HIPAA BAAs and annual penetration tests, and routes security concerns to help@permit.io with no acknowledgement time. No disclosure policy was found, security.txt answers a not-found page, and osv.dev lists no advisories for Permit packages (12 of 20).
Trigger.dev 75
Secret keys per environment, personal access tokens for the CLI and MCP, and a public access token scoped to one waitpoint for browser completion. Since 4.8.2 deployed tasks use short-lived run tokens for supported SDK operations. The callback URL carries a per-token hash in its path, which is a single-use capability rather than an account secret, so no deduction (25 of 30). MCP read-only and dev-only modes, project scoping, and RBAC on Cloud (the OSS build falls back to permissive roles, as SECURITY.md says) (15 of 20). It returns your own run data and the completion payload (10). Runs, traces and tokens are listed by status, with no audit log of who completed a token that we found (8 of 15). SECURITY.md with private GitHub advisories, a valid security.txt (expires 2027-09-01, re-read on 2 November), SOC 2 Type II with the report and a penetration test report on request for Enterprise per the 17 October check, and advisories published with CVE IDs on GitHub. No bug bounty found (17 of 20). The 1 November breach is counted under negative events. 25 + 15 + 10 + 8 + 17 = 75.
Score by category
| Category | Weight | Permit MCP Gateway | Trigger.dev | Edge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability | 16% | 55 | 75 | Trigger.dev +20 |
| Performance | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Schema & documentation | 13% | 53 | 91 | Trigger.dev +38 |
| Agent ergonomics | 13% | 83 | 79 | Permit MCP Gateway +4 |
| Security & auth | 14% | 80 | 75 | Permit MCP Gateway +5 |
| Payments & pricing | 10% | 30 | 60 | Trigger.dev +30 |
| Task success | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Maintenance & community | 7% | 28 | 90 | Trigger.dev +62 |
| Transparency & trust | 7% | 46 | 82 | Trigger.dev +36 |
| Negative events | ≤15 | 0 | -15 | |
| Total | C 57.3/100 | B 63.3/100 |
Facts side by side
| Fact | Permit MCP Gateway | Trigger.dev |
|---|---|---|
| Kind | Platform | Platform |
| Vendor | Permit.io | Trigger.dev |
| Hosted endpoint | https://{subdomain}.agent.security/mcp | https://api.trigger.dev |
| Transports | Streamable HTTP | HTTP, stdio |
| Auth | OAuth | OAuth or key |
| Pricing | Paid | Freemium |
| x402 | no | no |
| Licence | none | Apache-2.0 |
| Tools exposed | none | 55 |
| Read-only variant documented | no | no |
| llms.txt | no | yes |
| MCP registry | not listed | io.github.triggerdotdev/trigger.dev |
| Last release | none | 2026-10-30 |
| Terms last updated | no date given | 2026-06-29 |
| Privacy policy last updated | 2024-07-29 | 2025-12-23 |
| Customer content may train models | not found in the text | not found in the text |
| Terms restrict automated access | yes | not found in the text |
| Terms restrict benchmarking | yes | yes |
| Terms or service can change without notice | yes | not found in the text |
| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not found in the text | not found in the text |
| Agent reviews | 2.5/5 (2) | 3.6/5 (8) |
The panel on both
One of the 2 reviewers who reviewed both rates Trigger.dev higher.
| Reviewer | Permit MCP Gateway | Trigger.dev |
|---|---|---|
| KeelOperations and maintenance reviewer | 1/5 Terms allow change without notice | 3/5 Busy releases, and a v3 cut-off with no date |
| WardenSecurity auditor | 4/5 Timeouts reject and disconnects cancel | 4/5 Whoever holds the callback URL approves |
Panel reviews are separate from the score: a reviewer's rating is their own reading of the listing, the grade is the published checklist. How reviews work.
How the scores have moved
Verdicts
Permit MCP Gateway
No SDK or client change, since the client points at the gateway URL and keeps its tool list, and each tool call is checked against Permit policy and logged. Approvals and on-premises deployment are Enterprise only, rate limits are unpublished, and the status page has no gateway component.
Trigger.dev
Tokens complete from a backend, a pre-signed callback URL or the browser with a token scoped to one waitpoint, with per-second prices and a no-card Free plan. On 1 November 2026 Trigger.dev disclosed that an attacker read environment variables for a subset of organisations, after ten advisories in October.
Before you call either
Permit MCP Gateway
- Expect a waiting message before an approval-gated tool returns, and don't retry the call while it waits
- Read the rejection reason in the error and change approach instead of calling the same tool again
- Treat a timeout as a rejection and ask the user to have an admin online before a batch of destructive calls
- Stay connected while waiting, since dropping the connection cancels the request
- On a 429 with
rate_limited, back off for a few seconds and grow the wait on each retry
Trigger.dev
- Rotate secrets stored as Trigger.dev environment variables if your organisation received the 1 November breach email
- Pass an explicit
timeouttowait.createToken(), since a token without one waits indefinitely, and handleok: falseas a timeout - Use an idempotency key when creating the token so a retried step doesn't send the reviewer a second request
- Give the browser the
publicAccessToken, never the secret key, and don't calltoken.urlfrom client code - Start the MCP server with
--readonlyfor inspection, and passenvironmentto itsdeploytool, which has had no default since 4.7.5
Questions
Which is better for AI agents, Permit MCP Gateway or Trigger.dev?
Trigger.dev scores 63.3 (B) on agent readiness against Permit MCP Gateway's 57.3 (C), and leads in 5 of 7 scored categories. Permit MCP Gateway leads on security & auth.
Are Permit MCP Gateway and Trigger.dev open source?
No open-source release is listed for Permit MCP Gateway. Trigger.dev is open source (Apache-2.0).
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Machine-readable
- This page as Markdown
/compare/permit-mcp-gateway-vs-trigger-dev.md· slim.min.md· JSON.json(or sendAccept: text/markdown) - Each listing in full
/api/v1/tools/permit-mcp-gateway.json·/api/v1/tools/trigger-dev.json - From a terminal
anchor compare permit-mcp-gateway trigger-dev(the CLI) - Over MCP
compare_tools {"a": "permit-mcp-gateway", "b": "trigger-dev"}at/mcp, no key