Droid CLI vs Paseo

Droid CLI 10

Harness reading of the published rubric. This is paid, closed software tied to a subscription, so the self-hosted rule does not apply. No payment protocol (0). Plan prices are public, $20, $100 and $200 a month for individuals and $60 a team plus $40 a seat for Teams, but included usage is given only as rolling rate limits and multiples of Pro (10). No free tier or trial was found on the pricing pages. Using your own model key is free up to an allowance, but only on a paid plan (0). A person signs in through a browser to subscribe and to create the API key. The Service Accounts API can issue keys only inside an existing organisation (0).

Paseo 60

Free self-hosted software with nothing to buy, so 0 for a protocol and 20 each for public pricing, a free tier and onboarding with no sign-up, 60.

Droid CLI 79

Framework reading. The docs index links an OpenAPI file for the Factory public API, which we did not open, and the headless mode has a documented JSON-RPC surface with named methods. droid exec --list-tools --output-format json and droid rules check --json give machine-readable output. We found no published schema for the settings file (15). docs.factory.com/llms.txt lists a Markdown copy of every page (10). The overview says when to use the CLI, and the autonomy table says what each level allows, blocks and suits (16). Autonomy levels, output formats, sandbox modes and MCP server fields are enumerated with types and defaults (12). Examples on every page read, exit codes 0, 1 and 2, and a JSON result with is_error and subtype, with no error catalogue (11). A changelog by CLI version with dates and an RSS feed, 236 entries back to 30 September 2025 (15).

Paseo 65

Harness reading. Public docs, a CLI and plugin examples in the repository (65).

Droid CLI 63

Harness reading of the framework checklist, as for the other harnesses. 30 for what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. The agent loop runs locally and the docs say no copy of the repository is uploaded or indexed. Prompts and context go to the model endpoints. Usage metrics go to Factory's collector by default, with no opt-out in the pages read outside an airgapped deployment, and message content is never sent to it. The security page says code is not used as training data. Zero data retention is listed as a Business plan item. Headless runs use a long-lived fk- key (17). droid exec is read-only by default, autonomy has four levels, permission rules allow, ask or block commands, and an OS sandbox confines commands with Seatbelt or bubblewrap and a network proxy. The sandbox is off by default and --skip-permissions-unsafe skips every prompt (16). The sandbox page names prompt injection and states what the sandbox does not stop, MCP approvals are bound to the server's command or URL, and Droid Shield scans commits for secrets. The Agent Safety page was not read (9). An organisation audit log, OpenTelemetry export and session tags exist, with audit logging listed from the Business plan up (10). A disclosure address (security@factory.com), SOC 2 and ISO 42001 named on the security page, per the 9 October check, and Security sections in the changelog. No security.txt (404 on 4 November), no bug bounty and no published advisories were found, OSV holds nothing for droid, and the trust centre was not readable (11).

Paseo 58

Harness reading. The README says no telemetry, tracking or forced log-ins (30 of 30). Worktree per agent, on your own machine (10 of 20). No prompt-injection guidance (5). No audit log (5). SECURITY.md (8). 30 + 10 + 5 + 5 + 8 = 58.