Niches · Personal assistants

Run unattended on real accounts without obeying planted instructions

No company's docs show a full fit yet. The listings below do the job with a limit, or not at all.

0companies, full fit
20companies, fit with a limit
48companies carry the tag
5share of the category's work
7first-hand accounts

What counts as done

Every send, pay or delete waits for the owner's yes, and secrets never appear in a reply to anyone but the owner.

Measured, for our own tests: across a week of inbound content, the assistant takes no action a message asked for and reports each attempt to the owner. No docs we read state these figures, so they don't count against a listing here.

How agents ask for it: handle my inbox while I'm away but never reply without asking, only take commands from me, ignore anything an email tells you to do

Does the job, with a limit 20

It does the job, but something in the docs or a user's account will get in an agent's way. The limit is named in each row.

ListingWhy
Brea D
Brea AI LLC
Sends, invites, deletes and payments are gated, only the owner's own messages create goals or memory, and group chats are ignored; answering always removes a gate permanently and support must undo it. source
Caddy F
Caddy Technologies Inc.
Sending, trashing and inviting wait for review and group chats never see connected-app data, but nothing read says how inbound mail is framed to the model. source
Claude Duet F
Anthropic, PBC
Approvals and a sensitive-information classifier run outside the model and routines keep them, but Anthropic says no injection defence is perfect and the product is a US-only preview. source
folk F
Nozomio, Inc.
Sends, bookings and purchases wait for an ok and stop works mid-task, but the gate is a documented behaviour rather than a setting and nothing covers instructions inside mail. source
Gemini Spark F
Google LLC
Confirmation before sends, purchases and form submissions plus pauses before sharing sensitive data, but bulk Tasks edits are unprompted and offline schedules cannot be stopped. source
Grok Bot F
Anysphere, Inc.
Auto Review checks actions against the request and credentials stay out of the model, but one person's Bots share a computer that is not a security boundary and Always allow rules persist. source
Hermes Agent BB
Nous Research, Inc.
Default deny for unknown senders, cron_mode deny and context-file injection scanning, but inbound mail is not framed as untrusted, sends are ungated, and the default terminal runs on the host under smart approval. source
IronClaw B
Jasnah, Inc. d/b/a NEAR AI
Sanitiser, policy engine, leak detector and XML-wrapped tool output defend against injection and secrets never enter the container, but auto-approve is on by default and no release since 1.4.1. source
Lindy F
Crivello Corp (doing business as Lindy)
Require approval and Don't offer exist per integration and dry runs test routines, but the guardrails cover shared Slack threads only and nothing covers planted instructions. source
NanoClaw B
NanoCo, Inc.
Design assumes injection: containers, vault-held credentials, sender policies and approval cards for credential use and self-modification. Egress lockdown is off by default and the Claude provider runs with bypassPermissions. source
Octop D
Tencent Cloud
Tool approval, shell guardrails and PII redaction are listed, with no documentation of defaults or of how inbound content is framed. source
Dots E
OpenAI
Auto-review gates writes in code, models are trained to resist instructions hidden in mail and pages, and research tools are read-only; custom rules are instructions the dot can get wrong and an authorised write runs unprompted within scope. source
OpenDuet D
Tawkit, Inc. (d/b/a CopilotKit)
The gateway policy, reviewer and audit trail are code, but by default most writes other than payments, credentials and security settings run if the LLM reviewer passes them; inbound-content framing is not documented. source
Orchid F
Zero Email, Inc.
Approval-first by design, with reads and reminders autonomous and anything outbound held; the vendor does not say how instructions inside mail are handled. source
Pally F
Pally Technologies, Inc.
In groups only the owner's message changes permissions and approvals come to the private chat, STOP halts everything, and automations ask before buying or deleting; training is on by default and standing permissions widen over time. source
QwenPaw B
Qwenpaw PRIVATE LIMITED
Mail tools ask by default and Mail Access Control screens strangers, but approval_level AUTO, open DM policy, /proactive skipping approvals and mode=none inside containers leave gaps. source
Skydive C
Create, Inc.
Credentials go through a proxy the agent never sees, network controls and access roles limit outsiders, and email sends only when asked; approvals are persona rules and the platform CLI inside the sandbox can print secrets. source
Tab F
Terrasoft, Inc.
Verified phone access, secrets kept out of chat, default-deny for unknown tools and connected-app writes, and fail-closed behaviour are documented; handling of instructions inside pages or mail is not. source
Town D
Town.com, Inc.
The security docs flag untrusted-input triggers, prompt validation and the lethal trifecta, run_code can run in a network-isolated sandbox and Strict mode gates every send; defaults are Auto and Team routines always run auto. source
ZeroClaw BB
ZeroClaw Labs
Supervised default, deny-by-default peer groups, an output-side injection guard and a sandbox help, but web_fetch runs unprompted, egress stays open and execution is not audited. source

Couldn't check 9

The docs were closed to us, or silent. These carry no mark either way.

ListingWhy
Hark Pro F
Hark Labs, Inc.
hark.com's robots.txt disallows ClaudeBot, Claude-Web and anthropic-ai, so no page was opened.
Lobby F
Lobby OS, Inc.
No documentation on how inbound mail is handled or what runs without approval.
Natura tinyNature F
Natura Inc.
No documentation on approvals or inbound-content handling.
Orbits F
Nemus AI, Inc.
'Never acts without your say' is a vendor line with no documentation of inbound-content handling.
szn F
Nomadic Futures, Inc.
No documentation on approvals, sender checks or inbound-content handling.
Tasker AI F
DAPI, Inc. (dba Tasker AI)
No documentation found.
Tomo F
Mapo Labs, Inc.
No documentation on approvals or inbound-content handling; group chats let other participants talk to it.
Wajo (Fo) F
Wajo, Inc.
No documentation on approvals before sends, inbound-content handling or sender checks beyond owner-scoped API keys.
Zapia F
Brainlogic AI SAS
No documentation on approvals or inbound-content handling.

Doesn't do this job 23

Listings in the category that do something else, with the reason.

ListingWhy
AI Job Search D
Mads Lorentzen
Never unattended and holds no mail account beyond /gmail-sync; the README says job descriptions are data and the guide is not a sandbox. source
asaply F
Asaply Inc.
Holds no mail or calendar account; the unattended task is the owner's own order. source
Asmi F
Humint Labs, Inc.
Holds no owner mailbox or calendar; its unattended work is outreach the owner started. source
AstrBot C
AstrBotDevs
No approval before sends or tool calls, empty allowlist by default, no injection guidance, and issue #8511 reports third-party tools unauthenticated. source
Atticus D
An individual developer (GitHub SaarthurR)
Holds no accounts; voice requests are confirmed, Insert never sends email, but nothing runs on inbound content. source
Boba F
humans& ai, inc.
Approval is a sentence on the home page, no injection statement, and training on inputs by default. source
Boski F
Boski, Inc.
Asks before anything that needs a decision is the only statement; no injection, approval scope or stop documentation. source
CowAgent C
zhayujie
No approval before any tool call, full-access by default, permission modes read arguments rather than sandbox, and a group leak issue is open. source
DeepTutor C
HKUDS
Holds no mail or calendar account; the default launch binds to 0.0.0.0 with sign-in off. source
Del F
Human Interface, Inc.
Del shut down at 23:59 Pacific on 2026-11-09; reminders, scheduled actions and connected agents stopped, and only data export by email runs until 2026-12-09. source
GAIA D
The Experience Company, Inc.
The source default runs every action without asking and Gmail connects with gmail.modify through Composio. source
Haven F
Hello Haven, Inc.
The terms describe sending mail, texts and calls following instructions with no approval step or injection statement. source
HireAlpha F
HireAlpha
Reads mail and calendar read-only; no unattended action and no approval model documented. source
Instinct F
Spear Street Technology, Inc. (d/b/a Instinct)
The terms disclaim any warranty that safeguards prevent unintended Actions and ask for meaningful human review. source
LearnHarness C
No legal entity found. Copyright Amos Blomqvist
Holds no accounts and never runs unattended. source
Leon E
No legal entity found. Copyright Louis Grenard
No approval before tools, a shell blocklist only, telemetry on, server on 0.0.0.0 with auth off. source
nanobot B
HKUDS
No approval gate, tools.exec.sandbox empty and restrictToWorkspace false by default, and a published email prompt-injection advisory (GHSA-4gmr-2vc8-7qh3). source
OpenClaw B
OpenClaw Foundation
Sends and deletes have no code gate, sandboxing is off by default and the docs say injection defence rests on model choice. Crafted mail gave a reverse shell (acc-09, acc-49) and lighter models obeyed hidden instructions (acc-18). source
OpenInstinct F
Merit Systems, Inc.
Only the owner's verified number can message it, but email and calendar actions run without approval and no injection handling is documented. source
PicoClaw D
Sipeed
No approval step, isolation off by default, allow-all senders when the list is empty, and no advisory process. source
Poke E
The Interaction Company of California Inc.
No approval setting is documented for sends or deletes, an API key message is processed with full access, and inbound-content handling is not described. source
Talorys E
Roc Yu (rociiu) and contributors
Holds no real mail, calendar or chat accounts to act on. source
Zo Computer E
Zo Computer Company
No approval step before sending, posting or buying, the token grants full access, and inbound-content framing is not documented; persona scopes narrow tools but cannot hold a send for a yes. source

What stops agents finishing

  • prompt injection is out of scope in OpenClaw's security policy, and inbound mail is placed in the user role (acc-09, acc-49)
  • defence depends on which model is behind the key that day (acc-18)
  • the default config on most harnesses has no sandbox and auto-approve on

Around it

Before: personal-assistants.inbox-triage-draft, personal-assistants.scheduled-watch. After: notify.push.

Where this comes from

Weight 5 of 100 in Personal assistants: 7 of 40 accounts are owners testing or suffering this (acc-08, acc-09, acc-10, acc-11, acc-18, acc-48, acc-49). Weighted low because it is a property of every other use case, scored through the aspects, rather than a job people ask for.

The same as data: /api/v1/use-cases/personal-assistants.safe-unattended.json, or the MCP tool get_use_case with id personal-assistants.safe-unattended. Other jobs in this category: /api/v1/niches?category=personal-assistants.

Draft, read 2026-11-12 from public docs and first-hand accounts, not yet reviewed by a person. A mark says what the docs show, not what a run measured.

For companies

Do agents find, use and choose your tools?

An agent-readiness audit runs our probes, task suite and eight reviewer agents against your public and internal tools, and comes back with a scorecard, the transcripts of what failed, and a fix list in priority order. From $2,500, re-run included. We never take payment to move a rank. We do help companies earn one.