Apify MCP Server vs fastCRW

Apify MCP Server 95

x402 on Apify's own domains. agi.apify.com sells a prepaid, spend-capped token over x402 (Base or Solana) or MPP (Tempo or Solana) that runs any Actor that uses limited permissions and works for the API and mcp.apify.com, and since October it also runs single Actors for x402 batch-settlement on Base, billing the real cost afterward. The direct ?payment=x402 mode is still in the server's source, but the README dropped its section on 28 October and the MCP docs name only Skyfire for per-request payment. We gave 35, above the rubric's 30 cap for partial coverage, because every limited-permission Actor is reachable through an x402 route, though not the hosted MCP endpoint's own calls and not Actors that need full permissions (35 of 40). Compute units at $0.20, $0.16 and $0.13 by plan, published without a login and re-read on 1 November (20). Free plan with $5 of usage a month, "No credit card is required" (20). An agent with a wallet gets a token with no signup (20).

fastCRW 35

No x402, MPP or L402 (0). Plans are public with credit costs per operation and top-up prices per block of credits, $9 per 1,000 on Hobby down to $299 per 500,000 on Scale, but top-ups need a plan, so between plan-only and per-unit (15 of 20). 500 one-off credits with no card, plus up to 500 from onboarding tasks (20). Hosted keys need a person to sign up in a browser; the free self-hosted engine runs with no account but isn't the graded surface (0). 0 + 15 + 20 + 0 = 35.

Apify MCP Server 86

MIT (30). Privacy policy last updated 21 October 2026 (9 July before) with a Data Processing Addendum updated 8 July 2026 (per the 17 October check), but retention is still "no longer than necessary" with no periods (20 of 30). Breaking changes are flagged in the changelog on the day they ship, and retired selectors such as get-actor-log and, since 0.19.0, source are ignored without an error. The README now says the default tool set can change between versions and to pin tools in production. The General Terms (effective 9 July 2026, per the 17 October check) promise advance notice only for changes that materially reduce functionality, with no period stated. No deprecation policy found (10 of 20). Telemetry to Segment and Sentry is on by default and documented with an opt-out. Since 0.19.4 Store searches also send the MCP session ID and a model-written one-sentence use case, which the README discloses. The policy names the EU and US as the main data locations. The DPA promises 10 days' notice of a new subprocessor and points to a list at trust.apify.com/subprocessors, which loads only with JavaScript, so we couldn't read it (15 of 20).

fastCRW 60

The engine and MCP server are AGPL-3.0 and the SDKs MIT, while the hosted control plane is closed under terms that name no legal entity (25 of 30). The terms say crawled data is handled transiently with zero data retention for approved accounts, but the privacy policy is undated, names no controller, gives no retention periods and mentions no DPA (10 of 30). The CHANGELOG flags breaking changes, deprecated v2 extract routes return a warning on every response, and the October 2026 402 change is dated in the docs, with no standing notice policy (10 of 20). Local data-source telemetry is disclosed with an opt-out. The privacy policy names Stripe, Google Analytics, Google Ads and an X pixel, but infrastructure and search providers are unnamed and no data location is given (8 of 20). 25 + 10 + 10 + 8 = 53.

Apify MCP Server 75

Atlassian Statuspage at status.apify.com, history read from its RSS feed on 1 November (20). No incident since 22 September. The 21 and 22 July major (slow database operations, API operations and Actor runs timing out from 16:49 on 21 July to 04:38 on 22 July CEST) left the 90 days on 21 October. Five incidents in the 90 days from 3 August, none read as major. 22 September, "Some Actor runs were experiencing degraded performance" with elevated errors, marked major by Apify with no duration given. 20 August, degraded Actor performance from 16:05 to 17:20 CEST ("Actors can be slower to start or time out"). 13 and 14 August, the SHADER datacenter proxy group. 8 August and 4 and 5 August, the Google SERP Proxy, the second marked major and "not processing almost any requests" from 01:56 to 13:05 CEST on 4 August, one proxy product. Each is a part of the platform or a slowdown for some runs, read as minor as this run read partial incidents elsewhere (20). Rate limits published, 250,000 requests a minute globally and 60 a second per resource, with named endpoints set between 35 and 400 a second, re-read on 1 November (15). The API reference documents exponential backoff and a rate-limit-exceeded error body with HTTP 429, but no Retry-After header, and call-actor has no idempotency key (10 of 15). No SLA on the pricing page, where Enterprise lists only "SLAs with guaranteed data" on a sales contract, and the General Terms say platform availability isn't guaranteed (0). The hosted server is in production use, not labelled beta (10). 20+20+15+10+0+10 = 75.

fastCRW 50

Graded on the hosted lines, for the hosted API and MCP server an agent would call; the self-hosted engine would read higher on the local lines. fastcrw.com/status is a first-party page with a live health check and a 99.9% monthly uptime objective, but no components with history (10 of 20). It lists no incidents and keeps no history we could read (5). Concurrency per plan is published, 3 on Free to 150 on Scale, while the request-rate guard above it is deliberately unpublished (12 of 15). The rate-limits page documents Retry-After and X-RateLimit headers, gives exponential backoff code, and separates 429 (retry) from 402 (stop). No idempotency keys for crawl, extract or monitor starts (13 of 15). Pricing mentions an SLA only as 'Premier + SLA' on Enterprise, with no terms, and the terms promise no uptime (0). The hosted service is sold on paid plans with no beta label, though the engine is at 0.41.0 (10). 10 + 5 + 12 + 13 + 0 + 10 = 50.

Apify MCP Server 62

OAuth on mcp.apify.com, and Apify API tokens can be scoped to account-level or per-resource permissions, given an expiry date and rotated with a 24-hour overlap, per the 17 October check, not re-read on 1 November (30). The API reference, re-read on 1 November, still accepts the token as a ?token= query parameter, which it calls less secure, so less 10 (20). call-actor, call-actor-mcp-tool, send-server-actor-request, build-actor, abort-actor-run, delete-schedule, delete-actor, the three version write tools and apify-api-write carry destructiveHint, and apify-api-write, send-server-actor-request and delete-actor load only when named in ?tools=. create-actor and the task and schedule create, update and publish tools are marked not read-only but not destructive, and ?tools= can limit a session to read tools. There's no server-side confirmation step (15 of 20). Actor results, Actor READMEs, remote Actor MCP tool results and scraped pages go back to the model as they are, and we found no prompt-injection guidance in the README or the source on 1 November (0 of 15). Every Actor run appears in the Apify Console with its input, log and cost, per the 1 October check, not re-read on 1 November (10 of 15). SOC 2 Type II with the report on request through trust.apify.com, a disclosure policy through security@apify.com, GitHub private vulnerability reporting, and a security.txt re-read on 1 November that is valid until 1 January 2035. Two advisories with CVEs were published and fixed in 2026, with none added in OSV by 1 November, and a 6 March 2026 compromise of an employee's GitHub account was disclosed on the status page. 0.20.0 (29 October) fixed a privately reported flaw where ?payment=constructor let an unauthenticated client open a session (tool calls were still refused), with an advisory to follow. No bug bounty found (17 of 20).

fastCRW 40

The hosted MCP server publishes RFC 9728 metadata naming its own authorisation server, with PKCE S256, dynamic client registration and one scope, mcp:tools, and the API takes revocable Bearer keys from the dashboard. No key scopes or second scope found (22). The authentication page documents fastcrw.com/mcp/<API_KEY> as a way in, a key in the URL path, so less 10 (12 of 30). Tools mostly read, and data-source calls check approvals, but there is no read-only key or confirmation step for monitors (8 of 20). Managed LLM extraction, summaries and answers wrap scraped text in a nonce fence (crates/crw-extract/src/untrusted.rs), and the hardening guide treats pages as untrusted, but the MCP docs give agents no guidance on scraped content (7 of 15). Each response reports creditsUsed; no per-call log in the docs (5 of 15). SECURITY.md names security@fastcrw.com and GitHub private reporting with a 48-hour acknowledgement, and CI runs CodeQL and OpenSSF Scorecard. security.txt answers 404, and no bounty or certification found (8 of 20). 12 + 8 + 7 + 5 + 8 = 40.