registercheck.de API

# Fix list: registercheck.de API

From Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/registercheck, the October 2026 research run, assessed 21 October 2026. Grade D, 52.1 out of 100.

This is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.

For a coding agent working on registercheck.de API: work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published.

## 1. Reliability, 40 out of 100, up to 12 more on the total

Why it scored 40: Hosted lines. No status page found in the docs, the support page or on the API hosts (0). No incident history to read (5). 60 requests a minute per key, and a monthly allowance of 150,000 requests with a plan or 9,000 without, which each key gets per calendar month and the account's keys share over a rolling 30 days, in the rate-limits guide (15). 429 carries `Retry-After`, the errors guide gives backoff with jitter for 500 and 503, and every POST takes an `Idempotency-Key` replayed for 24 hours (15). No SLA in the docs. The terms on www.registercheck.de were behind a bot check, so none could be confirmed there (0). `/v1` is served and sold, but the full OpenAPI document is versioned `1.0.0-draft.1` and paths were renamed in place in October (5 of 10).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability):

Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.

- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).
- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.
- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.
- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.
- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.
- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.

Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.

- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.
- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.
- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).
- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.
- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.

Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors.

## 2. Security & auth, 40 out of 100, up to 10.5 more on the total

Why it scored 40: Bearer keys only, never in the URL, revocable on the next request. Keys are not scoped and carry the account's full permissions, including deleting lists and monitors. The MCP server uses OAuth 2.1 with five scopes such as `companies:read` and `monitors:write` (20 of 30). No read-only key. The MCP docs page (docs.registercheck.de/docs/mcp) says `delete_monitor` stops a monitor after the assistant asks the user to confirm, and that is the source credited; the tool annotations themselves were not readable without signing in (8 of 20). Company names, purposes and person names are filed by the public and returned verbatim, with no guidance on treating them as untrusted (5 of 15). A usage breakdown by endpoint and key exists, but the docs say it is unreliable and may show empty. `Request-Id` on error responses, and `Registercheck-Credits-Charged` on every response to a call made with a key, whatever its status (7 of 15). Security programme 0 of 20, mostly because we couldn't read the vendor's site. www.registercheck.de, where a security page, disclosure policy or certification would normally be published, answered every request with a bot check, so whether a programme exists there is unchecked, not found missing. What we could check was empty, with no security.txt on the api, docs or mcp hosts and no disclosure route, bug bounty or certification in the docs. Webhooks are signed with HMAC-SHA256 under Standard Webhooks.

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security):

- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.
- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.
- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.
- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.
- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.

Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing.

## 3. Payments & pricing, 30 out of 100, up to 8.8 more on the total

Why it scored 30: No x402, MPP or L402. A balance shortfall answers 402 `insufficient_credits` with no payment route (0). Credit costs are published per endpoint, and overage is 7.5, 2.25 or 0.75 cents a credit by plan. Plan prices and the currency are on www.registercheck.de, which was not readable (15 of 20). No recurring free tier, but a personal account without a plan gets a one-off trial of 50 credits for 30 days. The docs don't say whether a card is needed (15 of 20). Keys are created by a person in the app, and the MCP server needs an OAuth sign-in (0).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments):

The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).

- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.
- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for "contact sales" or prices behind a login.
- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.
- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).

Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.

Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol.

## 4. Transparency & trust, 37 out of 100, up to 5.5 more on the total

Made of editorial 29, provenance 45.

Why it scored 37: Closed service. The OpenAPI document names a proprietary licence, `LicenseRef-Registercheck-Terms`, but the terms on www.registercheck.de were behind a bot check (5 of 30). The docs give a GDPR objection route for people named in the register, say a person's age is computed per request and never stored, and point MCP users to part F of the privacy notice, which could not be read. No retention periods found (10 of 30). Dated sunsets with `Deprecation`, `Sunset` and `Link` headers until 31 December 2026, and a migration guide, but the 15 October change had no transition period (14 of 20). No subprocessors or data locations found in the docs. Response headers show Cloudflare, Vercel, Unkey and Svix-style webhooks (0 of 20).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency):

- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.
- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).
- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.
- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).

The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two.

Provenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts):

- Domain age: registercheck.de, no registry record we could read (0 of 15)
- Terms of service: not found (0 of 10)
- Privacy policy: not found (0 of 10)
- Status page: not found (0 of 10)
- security.txt: not found (0 of 10)

## 5. Schema & documentation, 83 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total

Why it scored 83: A public OpenAPI 3.1 document at api.registercheck.de/v1/openapi.json covers 53 operations, but it is thin (11 schemas, no security scheme, FastAPI's default 422 where the API answers 400). The richer OpenAPI 3.2 document behind the reference (61 operations, 213 schemas, 68 enums) is embedded in the pages and not served as a file (20 of 25). llms.txt, llms-full.txt and per-page Markdown (10). Reference descriptions say when to use an endpoint, what it costs and where coverage ends. Two pages disagree with the API, as the authentication guide gives 400 for a missing key where the API answered 401 on 21 October, and the quickstart prices contact endpoints that are not served (16 of 20). Typed parameters with lengths, ranges and enums such as `register_type` (13 of 15). Examples in seven languages and example responses on reference pages, and a full error code table, less the inconsistencies above (12 of 15). A dated changelog and a migration guide with `Deprecation` and `Sunset` headers, but `/v1` changes in place with no new version (12 of 15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema):

APIs and MCP servers.

- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).
- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.
- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.
- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.
- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.
- 15, versioning and a public changelog.

Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference.

## 6. Maintenance & community, 68 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total

Why it scored 68: Last dated change 17 October 2026, four days before the check (30). Dated changelog entries on 17, 16, 15, 9 and 8 October, 2 and 1 October and 17 September (20). Public changelog, support and sales addresses and a Slack Connect channel for customers, with no public tracker to judge response times (8 of 15). No official SDK, but the remote MCP server is in the official MCP registry under the domain-verified `de.registercheck` namespace since 7 October 2026 (10 of 15). No package to judge (0). `firstReleased` is 17 September 2026, when the `/v1` reference replaced the earlier API, so the current surface is five weeks old.

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance):

- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.
- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.
- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.
- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).
- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.

Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts.

## 7. Agent ergonomics, 84 out of 100, up to 2.6 more on the total

Why it scored 84: Lists take `limit` up to 100, the company record carries a `counts` block so an agent can skip empty sub-resources, and `expand=roles` inlines the first page at no charge. No field selection (18 of 25). One cursor envelope on every list, a structured filter endpoint, and unknown parameters refused with 400 rather than ignored (20). RFC 9457 problem documents with a stable `code`, `errors[]` naming each field, and `required_credits` on 402 (20). `Idempotency-Key` on every POST with documented replay and conflict codes. The MCP docs mark which of the 12 tools change data and say `delete_monitor` asks for confirmation; the tool annotations were not readable without signing in (18 of 20). Search needs only `name`. No official SDK; generated snippets in seven languages and Standard Webhooks libraries for verification (8 of 15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics):

- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).
- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.
- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.
- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.
- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.

Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs.

## Deductions

Each comes off the total. A fixed and documented problem counts for less at the next check.

- October 2026: `/v1` was renamed in place, and every renamed path except three old forms answered 410 `endpoint_retired` from the release on. On 15 October the reference-data lists changed envelope, which the changelog marks breaking, with no transition period and no Deprecation header. Both are documented in the changelog and migration guide, so the deduction is at the low end (-3). https://docs.registercheck.de/docs/changelog

## What we couldn't check

What we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it.

- unchecked: the registercheck.de terms (AGB), imprint, privacy policy and pricing page. Every request to www.registercheck.de and registercheck.de, robots.txt included, answered a Vercel Security Checkpoint on 21 October 2026
- unchecked: the privacy policy. The MCP docs link to https://www.registercheck.de/rechtliches/datenschutz, which the bot check kept us from reading, so `provenance.privacy` is left empty
- unchecked: any security page, disclosure policy, bug bounty or certification on www.registercheck.de, behind the same bot check. The security programme score is 0 for that reason, not because one was found missing
- Whether the terms allow customers to store, redistribute or resell register data, and whether any SLA is offered
- Plan prices for Starter, Business and Scale, and the currency of the overage rates
- Whether the free account needs a card
- The founder's launch post claims 5.8M+ companies and 500M+ real-time data points. The docs measured 5,796,418 records on 15 September 2026 (half of them deleted entries) and say changes are typically visible within a day or two and monitoring is not for real-time decisions. The post itself was not read first-hand, so no deduction
- The docs do not name handelsregister.de as the source of the register index. The Registerportal describes its structured data as a non-binding service that can differ from the current printout
- When the earlier `/api` surface, now retired, was first released. `firstReleased` is the earliest first-hand date for `/v1`

## Weaknesses

- A person has to sign in to the app to create an API key
- Keys are not scoped. Each one can delete the account's lists and monitors
- October renames broke `/v1` in place, and the 15 October change had no transition period
- No status page, SLA or security.txt found
- Terms, privacy policy and plan prices on www.registercheck.de were behind a bot check

## What costs an agent a turn today

The notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need.

- Send the key as `Authorization: Bearer rc_live_…`. Query-string keys and `X-API-Key` are refused
- Search first at 1 credit, check `counts` on the company record, then spend 10 credits only on sub-resources that have data
- Branch on the problem document's `code`, wait the full `Retry-After` on 429, and stop when a 429 has no `Retry-After`
- Send a fresh `Idempotency-Key` UUID on every POST and reuse it on retries
- Read `last_register_entry_date` and each shareholding's `source.date`. Shareholder lists can be years old

## What the review panel asked for

- programmatic key issuance
- payable 402 responses
- state plan prices and currency in the docs
- a machine payment route on 402
- serve the OpenAPI 3.2 file
- publish MCP tool definitions
- scoped read-only API keys
- security.txt and disclosure route

## When it's done

Send what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `"kind": "dispute"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.