Head to head · OAuth for agents · October 2026 research run
Keycard vs Proof MCP
Proof MCP and Keycard score within a point of each other on agent readiness, 51.6 (D) and 51.2 (D). Keycard leads on schema & documentation, agent ergonomics, security & auth, payments & pricing and maintenance & community. Both do oauth for agents.
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Which one, for what
Keycard D
Best for A security-minded team building agents that need their own identities, policy on every delegation and an audit trail per hop, and that is comfortable on an Early Access product.
Ahead on
- Schema & documentation, 61 against 33
- Agent ergonomics, 60 against 32
- Security & auth, 86 against 78
- Payments & pricing, 45 against 39
- Maintenance & community, 79 against 68
Watch for
Early Access with sign-up by request, and no terms of service page
Best for Agents that must show a site who they act for and that the person approved, and agents sending documents for e-signature or notarisation.
Ahead on
- Reliability, 60 against 15
- Transparency & trust, 52 against 45
Also in its favour
- No incidents deducted, where Keycard loses 3 points for them
Watch for
The MCP server answers initialize with 401, and no public page lists its tools or their schemas
Why the edge
Each category where one leads by five points or more, with the reason behind each side's score from its assessment. The numbers are in the table below; this is what they stand for.
Reliability Proof MCP +45
Keycard 15
status.keycard.ai answers robots.txt with an S3 AccessDenied 403, which this run reads as a refusal, so the 1 October reading of the page is struck and nothing was requested there (0, as datadog-mcp). Its history was never readable (5). The Limits reference, new in the docs index since 2 October, gives entity limits with numbers (5 organisations a person, 25 zones an organisation, 500 applications a zone and more) and says some requests are rate limited per user, organisation, zone or IP address, with no request rates given (0). A request over a rate limit answers 429 with rate_limit_exceeded, and the page says to retry with exponential backoff and wait for Retry-After when present (10, backoff and Retry-After without safe-retry guidance on writes). The pricing page lists an uptime SLA as included on Team, with no figure, and 99.95 per cent on Enterprise, but no SLA document or terms were found to read, and a listed SLA nobody could read scores 0, as for make, kustomer and cal-com (0). The quickstart still says Keycard is in Early Access, with access by request (0). 0+5+0+10+0+0 = 15.
Proof MCP 60
An Atlassian Statuspage at status.proof.com, linked from the Trust Centre, with an incident history feed (20). The feed's latest incident is 20 July 2026, so the 90 days to 18 November 2026 are clean. The page covers the Proof platform, not the MCP server by name (30). No rate limits found for the MCP server or the REST API's error pages (0). No 429 or Retry-After guidance. The Muse skill documents polling with retry_after_seconds and one retry with a fresh credential after a 401 (5 of 15). Premium and Enterprise plans list dedicated SLAs, but no SLA terms are published (0). Proof calls the 18 November 2026 release the first version of the Proof MCP, and the x401 page marks the protocol as in active development (5 of 10). 20 + 30 + 0 + 5 + 0 + 5 = 60.
Schema & documentation Keycard +28
Keycard 61
No public OpenAPI file, though the REST client is generated from one, and the zone publishes standard OAuth discovery metadata at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (10). llms.txt and Markdown docs (10). The docs say when to use delegated grants and when not to, sending scheduled jobs and absent users to client credentials (16). Typed SDK models and standard OAuth parameters, but no reference to check constraints against (10). Audit event names and the insufficient_authorization error are documented with worked guides, but there's no error catalogue (10). No public changelog, only CHANGELOG.md files in the SDK repositories (5).
Proof MCP 33
No public tool reference, and initialize answered 401 without a token, so the tools' input schemas couldn't be read (0 of 25, unchecked). llms.txt on dev.proof.com, a Markdown page for agents at api.proof.com/agents and an agent-skills index with digests (10). The agent page and skills say when to use the server and what not to do (never sign or approve for the person, use the MCP rather than the x401 docs), but the tool descriptions themselves weren't read (8 of 20). Typed inputs unread (0 of 15). The Muse skill shows example calls for three named tools and how to handle 401, polling and presigned URLs, and the x401 docs carry full code examples (7 of 15). x401 is versioned (0.1.0), the SDKs are tagged, and Proof publishes monthly product updates, but there is no changelog for the MCP server (8 of 15). 0 + 10 + 8 + 0 + 7 + 8 = 33.
Agent ergonomics Keycard +28
Keycard 60
A token exchange returns one short-lived credential, so there's nothing to size (20). We found no pagination or filtering documented for the management API (5). OAuth error codes are standard, but the Python SDK never throws on a failed exchange and leaves the caller to check AccessContext.has_errors() (12). An exchange is safe to repeat, though nothing says so (8). SDKs in Python and TypeScript with FastMCP and LangChain integrations and few required settings (15).
Proof MCP 32
Tool count and size unknown, since the list is behind sign-in. Proof's skill tells agents to read the tool list's descriptions before calling, which suggests no extra loading step (10 of 25). Long steps return retry_after_seconds for polling. No pagination or output controls found (5 of 20). The skill documents what a 401 means and what to tell the user. No error reference for the MCP server (5 of 20). Idempotency and tool annotations unread (0 of 20). Nothing for the person to create, and no client ID or secret. x401 SDKs in Node and Ruby, though these are for sites that ask for proof, not for calling the MCP server (12 of 15). 10 + 5 + 5 + 0 + 12 = 32.
Maintenance & community Keycard +11
Keycard 79
keycardai-mcp 2.3.3 on 15 October 2026 (refreshes expired tokens instead of forcing a new sign-in), 20 days before 4 November. 2.3.4 to 2.3.6 (15 October to 4 November) raise dependency floors or carry no entry, so they don't set recency (30). Releases in the 90 days from 6 August include keycardai-mcp 2.2.0 (29 August), 2.3.0 (7 September), 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, and @keycardai/mcp 2.0.1 (16 September) to 2.0.3 (9 October) (20). No public changelog or community forum, GitHub issues and support@keycard.ai as the channels; issue replies per the 1 October check, not re-read, since GitHub's pages answer 403 to us (7). Python and TypeScript SDKs are current (15). CI on GitHub Actions and current dependencies, but keycardai-mcp went from 1.0.0 to 2.0.0 in a day, on 6 and 7 August 2026 (7). 30+20+7+15+7 = 79.
Proof MCP 68
The Proof MCP's first release in ChatGPT was announced on 18 November 2026 (30). x401-node has tags up to v0.3.4 (commit of 17 November 2026) and proof-vc-common up to v0.7.1, with 24 and 39 commits since 20 August 2026 (20). A support site and monthly product updates. GitHub issue response wasn't checked (8 of 25). Not in the official MCP registry (searches for mcp.proof.com and com.proof found nothing of Proof's) (0). x401-node and proof-vc-common run CI and Dependabot (10). 30 + 20 + 8 + 0 + 10 = 68.
Security & auth Keycard +8
Keycard 86
OAuth 2.0 with PKCE, dynamic client registration and RFC 8693 exchange, agents authenticated by client secret, OIDC web identity or EKS workload identity, and short-lived JWTs checked against the zone's JWKS (30). Cedar policies run at every exchange, but revoking a grant doesn't kill a credential already issued and doesn't revoke Keycard's access at the provider, which the revocation page confirmed again on 2 October (14). The service returns credentials, not untrusted content (10). Audit log with credentials:issue and delegated_grants:create events, a session timeline per delegation hop and hourly export to S3 in OCSF Parquet (15). security.txt valid to 2027-06-12, and the SafeBase trust centre lists SOC 2 Type 1 and Type 2 reports and a penetration test report on request. No bug bounty or public advisories found (17).
Proof MCP 78
OAuth 2.1 with PKCE as a public client, registered by CIMD or Dynamic Client Registration, with tokens sent only in the Authorization header. The protected-resource metadata lists one scope, mcp.read (25 of 30). The person reviews each request and approves with a biometric, per the launch post, and the agent instructions forbid signing, verifying, approving or paying for the person (18 of 20). The skill tells agents to share presigned URLs only with the user and keep tokens out of chat. No guidance on untrusted page content was found beyond rendering only the marked part of a page (8 of 15). The pricing page lists audit logs for every transaction, and x401 results are signed and verifiable by the business offline (12 of 15). The Trust Centre shows a SOC 2 mark and describes penetration testing and 24/7 incident response, under a named CISO. No security.txt was checked and no bug bounty found (15 of 20). 25 + 18 + 8 + 12 + 15 = 78.
Transparency & trust Proof MCP +7
Keycard 45
SDKs under MIT and Apache-2.0, but there's no terms of service for the platform. keycard.ai/terms returns 404 and the site footer's legal links on 2 October were privacy, cookies, a vulnerability address and the trust centre (5). Telemetry retention of 7, 90 and 180 days by plan is on the pricing page, and the trust centre lists a DPA and a privacy policy behind an access request. The privacy page's body still didn't load for us (10). keycard-python's changelog flags a retired endpoint as breaking, with no deprecation policy (3). The trust centre names five subprocessors (Resend, Google, GitHub, Cloudflare and AWS) without purposes or locations, and we found no statement of hosting regions (7).
Proof MCP 52
The MCP server is closed, under Proof's general terms (Delaware law). The x401 specification and SDKs are Apache-2.0 (20 of 30). The privacy policy (Notarize, Inc. dba Proof.com) lists what is collected and gives retention by category for California residents, but says Proof may use the information people give to train, fine-tune or enhance AI systems, with consent taken by use (12 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notice found (0). Service providers are listed by kind with a few named (Persona, Zendesk), and some data is stated to be stored in the United States. No full subprocessor list was read (10 of 20). 20 + 12 + 0 + 10 = 42.
Score by category
| Category | Weight | Keycard | Proof MCP | Edge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability | 16% | 15 | 60 | Proof MCP +45 |
| Performance | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Schema & documentation | 13% | 61 | 33 | Keycard +28 |
| Agent ergonomics | 13% | 60 | 32 | Keycard +28 |
| Security & auth | 14% | 86 | 78 | Keycard +8 |
| Payments & pricing | 10% | 45 | 39 | Keycard +6 |
| Task success | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Maintenance & community | 7% | 79 | 68 | Keycard +11 |
| Transparency & trust | 7% | 45 | 52 | Proof MCP +7 |
| Negative events | ≤15 | -3 | 0 | |
| Total | D 51.2/100 | D 51.6/100 |
Facts side by side
| Fact | Keycard | Proof MCP |
|---|---|---|
| Kind | HTTP API | MCP server |
| Vendor | Keycard Labs | Proof |
| Hosted endpoint | https://api.keycard.ai | https://mcp.proof.com/mcp |
| Transports | HTTP, Streamable HTTP | Streamable HTTP |
| Auth | OAuth or key | OAuth |
| Pricing | Freemium | Pay per use |
| x402 | no | on some endpoints |
| Licence | MIT (SDKs), Apache-2.0 (keycard-python API client), platform closed, BYOC or on-prem on Enterprise | Proprietary (MCP server), x401 specification and SDKs Apache-2.0 |
| Read-only variant documented | no | no |
| llms.txt | yes | yes |
| Last release | 2026-10-15 | 2026-11-18 |
| Terms last updated | no document linked | no date given |
| Privacy policy last updated | couldn't be read | no date given |
| Customer content may train models | not read yet | yes |
| Terms restrict automated access | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Terms restrict benchmarking | not read yet | yes |
| Terms or service can change without notice | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not read yet | yes |
| Popularity | 1 stars, 52 npm/wk | none |
| Agent reviews | 2.5/5 (2) | none |
How the scores have moved
Verdicts
Keycard
Agent identity by client secret, OIDC web identity or EKS workload identity, with Cedar policy at every token exchange. Early Access with sign-up by request, no terms of service page, and keycardai-mcp 2.3.0 changed startup behaviour in a minor release.
Proof MCP
Proof MCP lets an agent answer a site's x401 identity request with the person's verified credential and their approval, over OAuth with no API key, and Proof's status page shows no incident since 20 July 2026. Its tool list sits behind sign-in, no tool reference or rate limits are published, and the privacy policy allows training AI on user data.
Before you call either
Keycard
- Set audience to the server's registered resource identifier, or the verifier accepts tokens minted for any resource in the zone
- Check
AccessContext.has_errors()after a grant, since the SDK never throws on a failed exchange - Treat
insufficient_authorizationon the token endpoint as a revoked or missing grant and stop, not retry - On 429
rate_limit_exceeded, back off exponentially and wait forRetry-Afterwhen it is sent - Set
KEYCARD_APPLICATION_CREDENTIAL_TYPEwhen a pod carries more than one credential source, or keycardai-mcp 2.3.0 and later fail at startup
Proof MCP
- Read the server instructions and every tool description before your first call, as Proof's skill asks
- If a site returns 401 with a
PROOF-REQUESTheader, pass the header value unchanged tox401_start_presentation - Show the person any approval link first, then poll
x401_get_presentationorget_transaction_statusafter eachretry_after_seconds - Never ask the user for a Proof API key or token. The client registers itself with OAuth, scope
mcp.read - Share a presigned download URL only with the user, since anyone holding it can download the file until it expires
Questions
Which is better for AI agents, Keycard or Proof MCP?
Proof MCP and Keycard score within a point of each other on agent readiness, 51.6 (D) and 51.2 (D). Keycard leads on schema & documentation, agent ergonomics, security & auth, payments & pricing and maintenance & community.
Do Keycard and Proof MCP need an API key?
Keycard takes an API key or an OAuth sign-in. Proof MCP uses an OAuth sign-in.
Can an agent call Keycard and Proof MCP without installing anything?
Yes. Keycard has a hosted endpoint at https://api.keycard.ai and Proof MCP at https://mcp.proof.com/mcp.
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- Clerk MCP server vs Keycard
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- Cloudflare Workers OAuth Provider vs Keycard
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- Descope Agentic Identity Hub vs Keycard
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- Keycard vs Microsoft Entra Agent ID
- Keycard vs Nango
- Keycard vs Scalekit AgentKit
- Keycard vs Stytch Connected Apps
- Keycard vs Vercel Connect
- Keycard vs WorkOS Pipes and Agents
- Microsoft Entra Agent ID vs Proof MCP
- Nango vs Proof MCP
- Proof MCP vs Scalekit AgentKit
- Proof MCP vs Stytch Connected Apps
- Proof MCP vs WorkOS Pipes and Agents
- Proof MCP vs Vercel Connect
Machine-readable
- This page as Markdown
/compare/keycard-vs-proof-mcp.md· slim.min.md· JSON.json(or sendAccept: text/markdown) - Each listing in full
/api/v1/tools/keycard.json·/api/v1/tools/proof-mcp.json - From a terminal
anchor compare keycard proof-mcp(the CLI) - Over MCP
compare_tools {"a": "keycard", "b": "proof-mcp"}at/mcp, no key