Head to head · OAuth for agents · October 2026 research run
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Proof MCP
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category. Both do oauth for agents.
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Which one, for what
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity A
Best for Agents already built on AWS, above all those on AgentCore Runtime or Gateway, where token retrieval is automatic and free of extra charge.
Ahead on
- Reliability, 85 against 60
- Schema & documentation, 88 against 33
- Agent ergonomics, 76 against 32
- Security & auth, 84 against 78
- Payments & pricing, 45 against 39
- Maintenance & community, 85 against 68
- Transparency & trust, 78 against 52
Also in its favour
- Agent-ready, a grade of BB or better
Watch for
No operation to revoke or delete one user's stored grant was found. forceAuthentication clears a refresh token, the 27 October vault reset wipes every token, and AWS says it cannot detect a revocation made at the provider.
Best for Agents that must show a site who they act for and that the person approved, and agents sending documents for e-signature or notarisation.
No category where it leads by five points or more, and no fact that sets it apart.
Watch for
The MCP server answers initialize with 401, and no public page lists its tools or their schemas
Why the edge
Each category where one leads by five points or more, with the reason behind each side's score from its assessment. The numbers are in the table below; this is what they stand for.
Schema & documentation Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +55
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 88
Service models for bedrock-agentcore and bedrock-agentcore-control are public in aws/api-models-aws and ship in the AWS SDKs. Read on 1 November, the data plane has seven Identity operations and the control plane 28 under /identities (25). llms.txt for the developer guide and for the API reference, with a Markdown twin of every page (10). API reference descriptions are one line each, while the guide says when to use the JWT route and when the user ID route (15 of 20). Typed members with enums, patterns and length limits, such as oauth2Flow and credentialProviderVendor, and one string map, customParameters (14 of 15). Named errors with HTTP codes on every operation and CLI and Python examples in the guide, but no examples on the API reference pages we read (12 of 15). Release notes by month without days, SDK changelogs with dates, and the notes' RSS feed was not found at the address we tried, per the 17 October check (12 of 15). 25 + 10 + 15 + 14 + 12 + 12 = 88.
Proof MCP 33
No public tool reference, and initialize answered 401 without a token, so the tools' input schemas couldn't be read (0 of 25, unchecked). llms.txt on dev.proof.com, a Markdown page for agents at api.proof.com/agents and an agent-skills index with digests (10). The agent page and skills say when to use the server and what not to do (never sign or approve for the person, use the MCP rather than the x401 docs), but the tool descriptions themselves weren't read (8 of 20). Typed inputs unread (0 of 15). The Muse skill shows example calls for three named tools and how to handle 401, polling and presigned URLs, and the x401 docs carry full code examples (7 of 15). x401 is versioned (0.1.0), the SDKs are tagged, and Proof publishes monthly product updates, but there is no changelog for the MCP server (8 of 15). 0 + 10 + 8 + 0 + 7 + 8 = 33.
Agent ergonomics Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +44
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 76
Responses are small, a token or an authorisation URL with a session status, and list calls take maxResults. There is no MCP server for Identity to weigh (20 of 25). List operations page with nextToken and maxResults, and no filters were found (15 of 20). Named exceptions with recovery advice, and a missing consent comes back as authorizationUrl and sessionUri in a 200 response, which an agent can act on (18 of 20). Token reads are safe to repeat and forceAuthentication restarts consent, but no client token for idempotent creates was found and there are no MCP annotations (10 of 20). AWS SDKs in nine languages plus AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript with @requires_access_token and @requires_api_key decorators. GetResourceOauth2Token has four required members, and user-delegated flows need the owner to host a callback endpoint (13 of 15).
Proof MCP 32
Tool count and size unknown, since the list is behind sign-in. Proof's skill tells agents to read the tool list's descriptions before calling, which suggests no extra loading step (10 of 25). Long steps return retry_after_seconds for polling. No pagination or output controls found (5 of 20). The skill documents what a 401 means and what to tell the user. No error reference for the MCP server (5 of 20). Idempotency and tool annotations unread (0 of 20). Nothing for the person to create, and no client ID or secret. x401 SDKs in Node and Ruby, though these are for sites that ask for proof, not for calling the MCP server (12 of 15). 10 + 5 + 5 + 0 + 12 = 32.
Transparency & trust Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +26
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 78
Closed service under the AWS Service Terms, last updated 30 October 2026 and re-read on 1 November, with Apache-2.0 SDKs (15 of 30). The Identity data protection pages state KMS encryption at rest with an optional customer managed key and warn that names and free-text fields can reach diagnostic logs. The privacy notice is dated 18 May 2026 (re-read). No retention period for stored tokens or request metadata was found (20 of 30). No deprecation policy for the service found. The one dated notice we saw is the starter toolkit's deprecation on 27 March 2026, in a security bulletin (8 of 20). A sub-processor list updated 30 October 2026 and regional endpoints in 21 Regions, with the vault held in the Region the owner picks (18 of 20). 15 + 20 + 8 + 18 = 61.
Proof MCP 52
The MCP server is closed, under Proof's general terms (Delaware law). The x401 specification and SDKs are Apache-2.0 (20 of 30). The privacy policy (Notarize, Inc. dba Proof.com) lists what is collected and gives retention by category for California residents, but says Proof may use the information people give to train, fine-tune or enhance AI systems, with consent taken by use (12 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notice found (0). Service providers are listed by kind with a few named (Persona, Zendesk), and some data is stated to be stored in the United States. No full subprocessor list was read (10 of 20). 20 + 12 + 0 + 10 = 42.
Reliability Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +25
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 85
AWS Health Dashboard with a per-service, per-Region feed for Bedrock AgentCore (20). The us-east-1 and us-west-2 AgentCore feeds had no items on 1 November 2026 (last built 31 October). The dashboard's history file, re-read on 1 November, still lists one event naming AgentCore in the 90 days from 3 August, elevated packet loss in one Availability Zone of eu-south-2 on 4 October 2026 from 8:48 to 11:28 AM PDT, at informational status and shared with 31 other services. The only later entry is an API Gateway HTTP API error event in us-west-2 posted on 30 October, which doesn't name AgentCore. Minor only (20 of 30). Quotas published per operation, re-read on 1 November, 200 requests a second for GetResourceOauth2Token and the workload access token calls and 20 for management calls (15). The API reference documents ThrottlingException (429) and InternalServerException (500) with advice to retry with exponential backoff, but CreateWorkloadIdentity still takes no idempotency token in the service model read on 1 November (12 of 15). The AgentCore FAQ says the Amazon Bedrock SLA applies, 99.9 per cent a Region, though that SLA's definitions speak of model APIs and do not name AgentCore, per the 17 October check (8 of 10, our call). Generally available since October 2025, and the consent portal carries no preview label (10). 20 + 20 + 15 + 12 + 8 + 10 = 85.
Proof MCP 60
An Atlassian Statuspage at status.proof.com, linked from the Trust Centre, with an incident history feed (20). The feed's latest incident is 20 July 2026, so the 90 days to 18 November 2026 are clean. The page covers the Proof platform, not the MCP server by name (30). No rate limits found for the MCP server or the REST API's error pages (0). No 429 or Retry-After guidance. The Muse skill documents polling with retry_after_seconds and one retry with a fresh credential after a 401 (5 of 15). Premium and Enterprise plans list dedicated SLAs, but no SLA terms are published (0). Proof calls the 18 November 2026 release the first version of the Proof MCP, and the x401 page marks the protocol as in active development (5 of 10). 20 + 30 + 0 + 5 + 0 + 5 = 60.
Maintenance & community Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +17
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 85
Read by the listing's own shapes in the bedrock-agentcore and bedrock-agentcore-control service models, as this run's amazon-s3 re-check read models/s3. The control-plane model changed on 27 October 2026 (commit 582e559), adding ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial, an onBehalfOfAuthenticationConfig with a NO_CLIENT method for on-behalf-of token exchange, and ConflictException on CreateWorkloadIdentity, UpdateWorkloadIdentity and SetTokenVaultCMK. That is 5 days before 1 November. Neither the October release notes nor What's New (20 to 30 October) announce it (30, up from 20, cause product). In the 90 days from 3 August the model changed Identity shapes three times, on 19 August (the Private Key JWT configuration's documentation rewritten), 3 September (the consent portal operations, announced 1 September) and 27 October. A documentation-only model change counts, as amazon-textract's 11 August one did. SDK releases, such as 1.21.0 on 6 August, aren't counted, since the line is read from the model (20, up from 15, cause product). Public release notes and What's New, with AWS Support and re:Post, and issue triage workflows in the SDK repository. We did not read the issue tracker (10 of 15). Current official SDKs, bedrock-agentcore 1.25.2 tagged 30 October 2026 (eleven tags from 1.20.0 on 4 August) and @aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore 3.1161.0 on 30 October (15). The SDK repository runs CI, integration tests, a breaking-change check, security scanning and Dependabot, per the 17 October check (10). 30 + 20 + 10 + 15 + 10 = 85.
Proof MCP 68
The Proof MCP's first release in ChatGPT was announced on 18 November 2026 (30). x401-node has tags up to v0.3.4 (commit of 17 November 2026) and proof-vc-common up to v0.7.1, with 24 and 39 commits since 20 August 2026 (20). A support site and monthly product updates. GitHub issue response wasn't checked (8 of 25). Not in the official MCP registry (searches for mcp.proof.com and com.proof found nothing of Proof's) (0). x401-node and proof-vc-common run CI and Dependabot (10). 30 + 20 + 8 + 0 + 10 = 68.
Security & auth Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity 84
IAM with SigV4 and short-lived role credentials, plus a workload access token that carries the agent's identity and the user's, and policies that name one workload identity and one credential provider ARN (30). Users consent through the provider's own OAuth screen with session binding, but AWS says the service enforces no binding between workload identities and credential providers beyond the owner's IAM policy, the user ID route is unverified, and no call to revoke one user's grant was found. ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial, added on 27 October 2026, deletes every stored token in a vault and works only after its customer managed key is deleted, so it isn't a per-user revoke (15 of 20). The service returns tokens and keys, not untrusted content (10). The guide points to CloudTrail for GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId calls and KMS signing, but the developer guide's llms.txt, re-read on 1 November, still has CloudTrail pages for Gateway and none for Identity (11 of 15). A disclosure programme on HackerOne, public bulletins (none in the feed on 1 November names Identity), AgentCore in SOC 1, 2 and 3 scope on the list of 11 August 2026 (re-read on 1 November) and ISO 27001 per the compliance page. The aws.amazon.com security.txt, re-read on 1 November, expires on 16 October 2027, but the VDP names no paid bounty, so 2 points stay held back, as on the Secrets Manager, SES and Polly re-checks of 17 October (18 of 20). 30 + 15 + 10 + 11 + 18 = 84.
Proof MCP 78
OAuth 2.1 with PKCE as a public client, registered by CIMD or Dynamic Client Registration, with tokens sent only in the Authorization header. The protected-resource metadata lists one scope, mcp.read (25 of 30). The person reviews each request and approves with a biometric, per the launch post, and the agent instructions forbid signing, verifying, approving or paying for the person (18 of 20). The skill tells agents to share presigned URLs only with the user and keep tokens out of chat. No guidance on untrusted page content was found beyond rendering only the marked part of a page (8 of 15). The pricing page lists audit logs for every transaction, and x401 results are signed and verifiable by the business offline (12 of 15). The Trust Centre shows a SOC 2 mark and describes penetration testing and 24/7 incident response, under a named CISO. No security.txt was checked and no bug bounty found (15 of 20). 25 + 18 + 8 + 12 + 15 = 78.
Score by category
| Category | Weight | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity | Proof MCP | Edge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability | 16% | 85 | 60 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +25 |
| Performance | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Schema & documentation | 13% | 88 | 33 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +55 |
| Agent ergonomics | 13% | 76 | 32 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +44 |
| Security & auth | 14% | 84 | 78 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6 |
| Payments & pricing | 10% | 45 | 39 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6 |
| Task success | 10%pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |
| Maintenance & community | 7% | 85 | 68 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +17 |
| Transparency & trust | 7% | 78 | 52 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +26 |
| Negative events | ≤15 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | A 78.2/100 | D 51.6/100 |
Facts side by side
| Fact | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity | Proof MCP |
|---|---|---|
| Kind | HTTP API | MCP server |
| Vendor | Amazon Web Services | Proof |
| Hosted endpoint | https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com | https://mcp.proof.com/mcp |
| Transports | HTTP | Streamable HTTP |
| Auth | OAuth or key | OAuth |
| Pricing | Pay per use | Pay per use |
| Price for oauth for agents | $0.01 per 1,000 requests | not published |
| x402 | no | on some endpoints |
| Licence | Proprietary service under the AWS Customer Agreement and AWS Service Terms. The AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript are Apache-2.0 | Proprietary (MCP server), x401 specification and SDKs Apache-2.0 |
| Read-only variant documented | no | no |
| llms.txt | yes | yes |
| Last release | 2026-10-27 | 2026-11-18 |
| Terms last updated | 2026-10-01 | no date given |
| Privacy policy last updated | 2026-05-18 | no date given |
| Customer content may train models | yes, with an opt-out | yes |
| Terms restrict automated access | yes | not found in the text |
| Terms restrict benchmarking | yes | yes |
| Terms or service can change without notice | yes | not found in the text |
| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not found in the text | yes |
| Popularity | 335k npm/wk, 1.4M PyPI/wk | none |
| Agent reviews | 3.3/5 (4) | none |
How the scores have moved
Verdicts
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity
The service handles user-delegated, machine-to-machine and on-behalf-of token flows through one call, with IAM scoping, KMS encryption and published quotas. It only works inside an AWS account a person creates, the hosted consent portal needs an AgentCore Gateway, and no call to revoke one user's stored grant was found in the API reference.
Proof MCP
Proof MCP lets an agent answer a site's x401 identity request with the person's verified credential and their approval, over OAuth with no API key, and Proof's status page shows no incident since 20 July 2026. Its tool list sits behind sign-in, no tool reference or rate limits are published, and the privacy policy allows training AI on user data.
Before you call either
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity
- Get a workload access token first (
GetWorkloadAccessTokenForJWTin production), then pass it asworkloadIdentityTokentoGetResourceOauth2TokenorGetResourceApiKey. - When
GetResourceOauth2TokenreturnsauthorizationUrlinstead ofaccessToken, send the URL to the user and call again with the samesessionUriafter consent. - For user-delegated flows, host an HTTPS callback, register it with
UpdateWorkloadIdentityas an allowed return URL, and callCompleteResourceTokenAuthafter checking the user's session. - Ask for refresh tokens in the provider's own way, such as
access_type=offlineincustomParametersfor Google or theoffline_accessscope for Microsoft and Atlassian. - Treat a returned token as possibly revoked. On a 401 from the resource server, retry with
forceAuthenticationset to true.
Proof MCP
- Read the server instructions and every tool description before your first call, as Proof's skill asks
- If a site returns 401 with a
PROOF-REQUESTheader, pass the header value unchanged tox401_start_presentation - Show the person any approval link first, then poll
x401_get_presentationorget_transaction_statusafter eachretry_after_seconds - Never ask the user for a Proof API key or token. The client registers itself with OAuth, scope
mcp.read - Share a presigned download URL only with the user, since anyone holding it can download the file until it expires
Questions
Which is better for AI agents, Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity or Proof MCP?
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category.
Do Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP need an API key?
Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity takes an API key or an OAuth sign-in. Proof MCP uses an OAuth sign-in.
Can an agent call Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP without installing anything?
Yes. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity has a hosted endpoint at https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com and Proof MCP at https://mcp.proof.com/mcp.
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Machine-readable
- This page as Markdown
/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-proof-mcp.md· slim.min.md· JSON.json(or sendAccept: text/markdown) - Each listing in full
/api/v1/tools/agentcore-identity.json·/api/v1/tools/proof-mcp.json - From a terminal
anchor compare agentcore-identity proof-mcp(the CLI) - Over MCP
compare_tools {"a": "agentcore-identity", "b": "proof-mcp"}at/mcp, no key