{
  "data": {
    "a": {
      "slug": "agentcore-identity",
      "name": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity",
      "vendor": "Amazon Web Services",
      "vendorUrl": "https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/agentcore/",
      "company": "amazon.com",
      "kind": "http-api",
      "category": "agent-auth",
      "summary": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity is an AWS service that gives agents workload identities, stores OAuth tokens and API keys in a token vault, and runs OAuth flows so agents can call third-party services for users or for themselves.",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentcore-identity",
      "markdownUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentcore-identity.md",
      "slimMarkdownUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentcore-identity.min.md",
      "jsonUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/agentcore-identity.json",
      "dns": "agentcore-identity.grade.anchorterminal.com",
      "repo": "https://github.com/aws/bedrock-agentcore-sdk-python",
      "license": "Proprietary service under the AWS Customer Agreement and AWS Service Terms. The AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript are Apache-2.0",
      "transports": [
        "http"
      ],
      "remoteUrl": "https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
      "packages": [
        {
          "registry": "pypi",
          "name": "bedrock-agentcore"
        },
        {
          "registry": "npm",
          "name": "bedrock-agentcore"
        },
        {
          "registry": "npm",
          "name": "@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore"
        },
        {
          "registry": "pypi",
          "name": "boto3"
        }
      ],
      "auth": "mixed",
      "authNotes": "A person creates an AWS account and an IAM role. Control-plane calls (`bedrock-agentcore-control`) and data-plane calls (`bedrock-agentcore`) are SigV4-signed with IAM credentials, and the data plane also documents an OAuth bearer route (`UnauthorizedException` for an invalid JWT). The agent first gets a workload access token that carries its own identity and the user's, from a JWT (`GetWorkloadAccessTokenForJWT`), a user ID string (`GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId`) or neither (`GetWorkloadAccessToken`), then exchanges it for a third-party OAuth token or API key. Each third-party provider needs an OAuth client the owner registers with that provider. AgentCore Runtime and Gateway fetch the workload access token for the agent.",
      "pricing": "usage",
      "pricingNotes": "$0.010 per 1,000 OAuth token or API key requests for non-AWS resources, billed per successful request, with no minimum fee. No additional charge when the service is used through AgentCore Runtime or AgentCore Gateway, which are billed on their own meters. No free tier specific to Identity was found. New AWS accounts get up to $200 of Free Tier credit for up to 6 months, and AWS says most new customers need no payment method at sign-up though it may ask for one (https://aws.amazon.com/bedrock/agentcore/pricing/, https://aws.amazon.com/free/free-tier-faqs/).",
      "priceSummary": "$0.01 / 1k req",
      "where": "hosted",
      "x402": {
        "level": "no",
        "evidence": "No x402, MPP or L402 for paying AWS on the pricing page or in the docs. AgentCore payments is a separate capability for agents paying third-party sellers (checked 2026-10-08).",
        "endpoints": []
      },
      "toolCount": null,
      "popularity": {
        "githubStars": null,
        "npmWeekly": 334717,
        "pypiWeekly": 1421946,
        "asOf": "2026-10-08"
      },
      "docsUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/identity.html",
      "llmsTxt": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/llms.txt",
      "capabilities": [
        "auth.oauth",
        "auth.tokens",
        "auth.consent",
        "auth.agent-identity",
        "auth.audit",
        "infra.aws"
      ],
      "tags": [
        "hosted",
        "closed-source",
        "usage-priced",
        "oauth",
        "llms-txt",
        "python",
        "typescript",
        "enterprise",
        "sla",
        "soc2",
        "eu"
      ],
      "lastRelease": "2026-10-27",
      "graded": true,
      "anchor": {
        "graded": true,
        "score": 78.2,
        "grade": "A",
        "agentReady": true,
        "rank": 53,
        "ranked": true,
        "rankOf": 1557,
        "categoryRank": 4,
        "methodology": "1.0",
        "run": "2026-10-01",
        "scores": {
          "ergonomics": 76,
          "maintenance": 85,
          "payments": 45,
          "reliability": 85,
          "schema": 88,
          "security": 84,
          "transparency": 78
        },
        "assessment": {
          "confidence": "medium",
          "date": "2026-11-01"
        },
        "negative": 0,
        "verdict": "The service handles user-delegated, machine-to-machine and on-behalf-of token flows through one call, with IAM scoping, KMS encryption and published quotas. It only works inside an AWS account a person creates, the hosted consent portal needs an AgentCore Gateway, and no call to revoke one user's stored grant was found in the API reference.",
        "bestFor": "Agents already built on AWS, above all those on AgentCore Runtime or Gateway, where token retrieval is automatic and free of extra charge.",
        "strengths": [
          "`GetResourceOauth2Token` covers three flows (USER_FEDERATION, M2M and ON_BEHALF_OF_TOKEN_EXCHANGE) and returns either an access token or an authorisation URL with a session URI.",
          "25 OAuth vendor values in `CreateOauth2CredentialProvider`, 24 built in (Google, GitHub, Slack, Salesforce, Microsoft, Atlassian and others) plus a custom OAuth 2.0 provider.",
          "Quotas are published per operation, 200 requests a second for the three workload access token calls and 20 for each management call, all adjustable.",
          "The token vault is encrypted with an AWS owned KMS key by default or a customer managed key, and IAM policies can name one workload identity and one credential provider.",
          "$0.010 per 1,000 token or API key requests, with no extra charge when used through AgentCore Runtime or Gateway."
        ],
        "weaknesses": [
          "No operation to revoke or delete one user's stored grant was found. `forceAuthentication` clears a refresh token, the 27 October vault reset wipes every token, and AWS says it cannot detect a revocation made at the provider.",
          "The consent portal, launched 1 September 2026, attaches to one AgentCore Gateway with JWT inbound auth and cannot use GitHub, Slack, Salesforce, Atlassian or LinkedIn as its sign-in provider.",
          "`GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId` takes a user ID string the platform does not verify, so the binding to a user rests on the caller and its IAM policy.",
          "AWS states the service enforces no binding between workload identities and credential providers in one account beyond the IAM policy the owner writes.",
          "No CloudTrail page for AgentCore Identity was found in the developer guide, though Gateway and Agent Registry each have one."
        ],
        "agentNotes": [
          "Get a workload access token first (`GetWorkloadAccessTokenForJWT` in production), then pass it as `workloadIdentityToken` to `GetResourceOauth2Token` or `GetResourceApiKey`.",
          "When `GetResourceOauth2Token` returns `authorizationUrl` instead of `accessToken`, send the URL to the user and call again with the same `sessionUri` after consent.",
          "For user-delegated flows, host an HTTPS callback, register it with `UpdateWorkloadIdentity` as an allowed return URL, and call `CompleteResourceTokenAuth` after checking the user's session.",
          "Ask for refresh tokens in the provider's own way, such as `access_type=offline` in `customParameters` for Google or the `offline_access` scope for Microsoft and Atlassian.",
          "Treat a returned token as possibly revoked. On a 401 from the resource server, retry with `forceAuthentication` set to true."
        ],
        "metrics": {
          "kind": "remote",
          "measured": false
        },
        "reviewCount": 4,
        "avgRating": 3.3,
        "history": [
          {
            "basis": "public evidence",
            "confidence": "medium",
            "grade": "A",
            "methodology": "1.0",
            "run": "2026-10-01",
            "runLabel": "October 2026 research run",
            "score": 78.2
          }
        ],
        "editorialScores": {
          "ergonomics": 76,
          "maintenance": 85,
          "payments": 45,
          "reliability": 85,
          "schema": 88,
          "security": 84,
          "transparency": 61
        },
        "provenanceScore": 94,
        "checked": {
          "categories": {
            "ergonomics": "2026-11-01",
            "maintenance": "2026-11-01",
            "payments": "2026-11-01",
            "reliability": "2026-11-01",
            "schema": "2026-11-01",
            "security": "2026-11-01",
            "transparency": "2026-11-01"
          },
          "last": "2026-11-01",
          "lastMoved": "2026-11-13",
          "oldest": "2026-11-01",
          "stale": false,
          "staleAfterDays": 90
        }
      },
      "connect": {
        "install": "pip install bedrock-agentcore"
      },
      "letme": {
        "capability": "https://letme.dev/auth.oauth",
        "tool": "https://letme.dev/agentcore-identity"
      },
      "sameCompany": [
        "amazon-bedrock",
        "amazon-nova-embeddings",
        "amazon-bedrock-customization",
        "amazon-bedrock-guardrails",
        "amazon-transcribe",
        "amazon-polly",
        "amazon-nova-sonic",
        "strands-agents",
        "agentcore-code-interpreter",
        "agentcore-memory",
        "aws-secrets-manager",
        "agentcore-web-search",
        "amazon-textract",
        "aws-mcp-servers",
        "amazon-ses",
        "aws-end-user-messaging",
        "amazon-location",
        "amazon-translate",
        "amazon-sns",
        "amazon-s3",
        "strands-decider",
        "kiro-cli",
        "amazon-ads-api",
        "amazon-eventbridge",
        "amazon-creators-api"
      ],
      "area": "agent-runtime",
      "unitPrices": [
        {
          "item": "OAuth token or API key requests for non-AWS resources",
          "unit": "1k-requests",
          "usd": 0.01,
          "note": "Per successful request. No charge when used through AgentCore Runtime or Gateway"
        }
      ],
      "provenance": {
        "legalEntity": "Amazon Web Services, Inc.",
        "domain": "amazon.com",
        "domainRegistered": "1994-11-01",
        "domainNote": "The service pages are under aws.amazon.com and the endpoints are on amazonaws.com, an AWS domain.",
        "endpointOnVendorDomain": true,
        "terms": "https://aws.amazon.com/service-terms/",
        "privacy": "https://aws.amazon.com/privacy/",
        "statusPage": "https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status",
        "changelog": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/release-notes.html",
        "securityTxt": "valid",
        "checked": "2026-11-01",
        "notes": [
          "The AWS Service Terms show Last Updated 30 October 2026, read on 1 November. Section 50 covers AI services and section 50.15 covers AgentCore Payments. No section names AgentCore Identity, so the universal terms and section 50 apply.",
          "The Privacy Notice shows Last Updated 18 May 2026 (re-read on 1 November) and gives Amazon Web Services, Inc., 410 Terry Avenue North, Seattle, WA 98109-5210, per the 8 October check.",
          "security.txt shows Expires 2027-10-16T16:25:03Z, read on 1 November 2026. It points to the AWS vulnerability disclosure programme on HackerOne and the policy at vdp.aws.security.",
          "The status page is drawn by script. We read the dashboard's history file and the per-service feeds for us-east-1 and us-west-2 (no items) on 1 November.",
          "The domain registration date is carried from our other AWS listings. WHOIS was not reachable from this session.",
          "The release notes are dated by month only, and the RSS feed they mention was not found at doc-history.rss (404)."
        ],
        "score": 94
      },
      "requirements": {
        "setupChecked": true,
        "complianceChecked": true,
        "card": "unknown",
        "freeTier": true,
        "minutes": 30,
        "credential": "cloud-iam",
        "hosting": [
          "US",
          "EU",
          "UK",
          "CA",
          "APAC"
        ],
        "euResidency": "yes",
        "trainsOnData": "unknown",
        "zeroRetention": "no",
        "certifications": [
          "SOC 2 Type II",
          "ISO 27001",
          "ISO 27701",
          "HIPAA (BAA available)",
          "FedRAMP",
          "CSA STAR",
          "GDPR"
        ],
        "dpa": true,
        "selfHost": "no"
      },
      "pageJsonUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentcore-identity.json",
      "live": {
        "slug": "agentcore-identity",
        "probe": {
          "target": "https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
          "method": "get",
          "lastAt": "2026-11-18T23:01:14.869838677Z",
          "lastOk": true,
          "lastStatus": 404,
          "lastMs": 255,
          "authRequired": false,
          "uptime24h": 100,
          "uptime30d": 99.97,
          "p50ms24h": 263,
          "p95ms24h": 431,
          "samples24h": 241,
          "samples30d": 7840,
          "days": [
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              "date": "2026-10-18",
              "probes": 256,
              "ok": 256
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-19",
              "probes": 255,
              "ok": 255
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-20",
              "probes": 252,
              "ok": 252
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-21",
              "probes": 253,
              "ok": 253
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-22",
              "probes": 253,
              "ok": 253
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-23",
              "probes": 248,
              "ok": 246
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-24",
              "probes": 251,
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            {
              "date": "2026-10-25",
              "probes": 250,
              "ok": 250
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-26",
              "probes": 252,
              "ok": 252
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-27",
              "probes": 249,
              "ok": 249
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-28",
              "probes": 251,
              "ok": 251
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-29",
              "probes": 249,
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            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-30",
              "probes": 248,
              "ok": 248
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-10-31",
              "probes": 251,
              "ok": 251
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-01",
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              "ok": 249
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-02",
              "probes": 250,
              "ok": 250
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-03",
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              "ok": 248
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-04",
              "probes": 246,
              "ok": 246
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-05",
              "probes": 185,
              "ok": 185
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-06",
              "probes": 241,
              "ok": 241
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-07",
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            {
              "date": "2026-11-08",
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              "ok": 243
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-09",
              "probes": 243,
              "ok": 243
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            {
              "date": "2026-11-10",
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              "ok": 244
            },
            {
              "date": "2026-11-11",
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              "ok": 244
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              "date": "2026-11-14",
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            {
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              "ok": 243
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            {
              "date": "2026-11-18",
              "probes": 231,
              "ok": 231
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          ],
          "since": "2026-10-09T00:00:00Z"
        },
        "vendorStatus": {
          "page": "https://health.aws.amazon.com/health/status",
          "indicator": "unknown",
          "summary": "no machine-readable status found",
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-18T16:29:21.214509126Z"
        },
        "versions": [
          {
            "registry": "github",
            "name": "aws/bedrock-agentcore-sdk-python",
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            "released": "2026-11-10",
            "seenAt": "2026-11-18T17:24:48.694042644Z"
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          {
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            "name": "@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore",
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          {
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            "name": "bedrock-agentcore",
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            "name": "bedrock-agentcore",
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          {
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            "name": "boto3",
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            "released": "2026-11-17",
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        "githubStars": 786,
        "npmWeekly": 345419,
        "pypiWeekly": 1783555,
        "securityTxt": {
          "url": "https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt",
          "state": "valid",
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-18T16:30:54.049389538Z"
        },
        "llmsTxt": {
          "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/llms.txt",
          "ok": true,
          "status": 200,
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-18T16:12:56.328616459Z"
        },
        "domain": {
          "domain": "amazon.com",
          "registered": "1994-11-01",
          "source": "https://rdap.verisign.com/com/v1/domain/amazon.com",
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-15T15:34:38.68545766Z"
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        "github": {
          "repo": "aws/bedrock-agentcore-sdk-python",
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-16T11:45:24.218453084Z",
          "stars": 787,
          "archived": false,
          "issuesEnabled": true,
          "pushedAt": "2026-11-10T19:07:00Z",
          "openIssues": 84,
          "openPRs": 55,
          "issuesOpened90d": 24,
          "issuesClosed90d": 10,
          "prsMerged90d": 45,
          "ci": {
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            "runs": 50,
            "success": 45,
            "failure": 5,
            "other": 0,
            "latest": "success",
            "latestAt": "2026-11-10T18:50:19Z"
          },
          "advisories": [
            {
              "ghsa": "GHSA-j6g5-3hh3-pgw8",
              "cve": "CVE-2026-16796",
              "severity": "high",
              "published": "2026-07-23T20:11:08Z"
            },
            {
              "ghsa": "GHSA-hqf8-7w95-9r33",
              "cve": "CVE-2026-15737",
              "severity": "medium",
              "published": "2026-07-16T17:05:36Z"
            },
            {
              "ghsa": "GHSA-6rfw-mq36-jm8h",
              "cve": "CVE-2026-12530",
              "severity": "high",
              "published": "2026-06-17T21:10:20Z"
            }
          ],
          "replies": {
            "sampled": 25,
            "unanswered": 15,
            "medianDays": 9.9
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        },
        "updatedAt": "2026-11-18T23:01:14.869838677Z"
      },
      "streak": {
        "days": 40,
        "from": "2026-10-09",
        "sinceWatching": true,
        "best": 40
      }
    },
    "answer": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category.",
    "b": {
      "slug": "proof-mcp",
      "name": "Proof MCP",
      "vendor": "Proof",
      "vendorUrl": "https://www.proof.com/x401",
      "company": "proof.com",
      "kind": "mcp",
      "category": "agent-auth",
      "summary": "Proof MCP is Proof's hosted MCP server, signed in with OAuth. An agent uses it to answer x401 identity requests with a person's verified credential and approval, and to send PDFs for e-signature or online notarisation.",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/proof-mcp",
      "markdownUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/proof-mcp.md",
      "slimMarkdownUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/proof-mcp.min.md",
      "jsonUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/proof-mcp.json",
      "dns": "proof-mcp.grade.anchorterminal.com",
      "repo": "https://github.com/proof/x401",
      "license": "Proprietary (MCP server), x401 specification and SDKs Apache-2.0",
      "transports": [
        "streamable-http"
      ],
      "remoteUrl": "https://mcp.proof.com/mcp",
      "packages": [],
      "auth": "oauth",
      "authNotes": "OAuth 2.1 with PKCE through api.proof.com. MCP clients register themselves by Client ID Metadata Document or Dynamic Client Registration as public clients, so there is no API key, client ID or secret. Scope `mcp.read`. The person signs in with their Proof account.",
      "pricing": "usage",
      "pricingNotes": "No price found for using the MCP server or for an x401 presentation. Proof's business plans charge per transaction ($25 a notarisation meeting, $4 an e-signature, $4 an identity check) on a $0 Pro plan. Verifiers with no card on file pay per presentation by x402.",
      "priceSummary": "$25 / tx",
      "where": "hosted",
      "x402": {
        "level": "partial",
        "evidence": "The x401 signatures endpoint, which a verifier calls to restore a presentation's signatures when its Proof account has no card or bank account, answers 402 and takes x402 v2 (exact scheme, USDC on Base, Base Sepolia in sandbox). Nothing on the MCP server itself is paid by x402 (https://dev.proof.com/docs/x401-signatures.md, checked 2026-11-18). Not probed.",
        "endpoints": [
          {
            "url": "https://api.proof.com/verifiable-credentials/v1/x401-signatures",
            "priceUsd": null,
            "network": "eip155:8453"
          }
        ]
      },
      "toolCount": null,
      "popularity": {
        "githubStars": null,
        "npmWeekly": null,
        "pypiWeekly": null,
        "asOf": "2026-11-18"
      },
      "docsUrl": "https://api.proof.com/agents",
      "llmsTxt": "https://dev.proof.com/llms.txt",
      "capabilities": [
        "auth.agent-identity",
        "auth.consent",
        "auth.oauth",
        "auth.audit"
      ],
      "tags": [
        "hosted",
        "usage",
        "mcp",
        "remote-mcp",
        "oauth",
        "llms-txt",
        "soc2",
        "enterprise",
        "verifiable-credentials",
        "x402"
      ],
      "lastRelease": "2026-11-18",
      "graded": true,
      "anchor": {
        "graded": true,
        "score": 51.6,
        "grade": "D",
        "agentReady": false,
        "rank": 1122,
        "ranked": true,
        "rankOf": 1557,
        "categoryRank": 18,
        "methodology": "1.0",
        "run": "2026-10-01",
        "scores": {
          "ergonomics": 32,
          "maintenance": 68,
          "payments": 39,
          "reliability": 60,
          "schema": 33,
          "security": 78,
          "transparency": 52
        },
        "assessment": {
          "confidence": "low",
          "date": "2026-11-18"
        },
        "negative": 0,
        "verdict": "Proof MCP lets an agent answer a site's x401 identity request with the person's verified credential and their approval, over OAuth with no API key, and Proof's status page shows no incident since 20 July 2026. Its tool list sits behind sign-in, no tool reference or rate limits are published, and the privacy policy allows training AI on user data.",
        "bestFor": "Agents that must show a site who they act for and that the person approved, and agents sending documents for e-signature or notarisation.",
        "strengths": [
          "OAuth 2.1 with PKCE and client self-registration (CIMD or DCR), so there is no API key, client ID or secret to handle",
          "The person approves each identity presentation or signature, and the agent instructions say never to sign, verify, approve or pay for them",
          "x401 is an open specification, and its Node SDK and Proof's credential libraries are Apache-2.0 with CI and tagged releases",
          "Atlassian Statuspage with incident history, and no incident since 20 July 2026",
          "Per-transaction prices public for the services behind it ($25 a notarisation meeting, $4 an e-signature, $4 an identity check)"
        ],
        "weaknesses": [
          "The MCP server answers `initialize` with 401, and no public page lists its tools or their schemas",
          "No rate limits, 429 handling or retry guidance published for the MCP server",
          "The privacy policy says Proof may use the information people give to train or fine-tune AI systems, with consent taken by use",
          "x402 is only on the verifier-side x401 signatures endpoint, not on anything the MCP server does",
          "Not in the official MCP registry, and x401 is at version 0.1.0, marked as in active development"
        ],
        "agentNotes": [
          "Read the server instructions and every tool description before your first call, as Proof's skill asks",
          "If a site returns 401 with a `PROOF-REQUEST` header, pass the header value unchanged to `x401_start_presentation`",
          "Show the person any approval link first, then poll `x401_get_presentation` or `get_transaction_status` after each `retry_after_seconds`",
          "Never ask the user for a Proof API key or token. The client registers itself with OAuth, scope `mcp.read`",
          "Share a presigned download URL only with the user, since anyone holding it can download the file until it expires"
        ],
        "metrics": {
          "kind": "remote",
          "measured": false
        },
        "reviewCount": 0,
        "avgRating": 0,
        "history": [
          {
            "basis": "public evidence",
            "confidence": "low",
            "grade": "D",
            "methodology": "1.0",
            "run": "2026-10-01",
            "runLabel": "October 2026 research run",
            "score": 51.6
          }
        ],
        "editorialScores": {
          "ergonomics": 32,
          "maintenance": 68,
          "payments": 39,
          "reliability": 60,
          "schema": 33,
          "security": 78,
          "transparency": 42
        },
        "provenanceScore": 61,
        "checked": {
          "categories": {
            "ergonomics": "2026-11-18",
            "maintenance": "2026-11-18",
            "payments": "2026-11-18",
            "reliability": "2026-11-18",
            "schema": "2026-11-18",
            "security": "2026-11-18",
            "transparency": "2026-11-18"
          },
          "last": "2026-11-18",
          "lastMoved": "2026-11-18",
          "oldest": "2026-11-18",
          "stale": false,
          "staleAfterDays": 90
        }
      },
      "connect": {
        "claudeCode": "claude mcp add proof --transport http https://mcp.proof.com/mcp",
        "config": {
          "mcpServers": {
            "proof": {
              "url": "https://mcp.proof.com/mcp"
            }
          }
        }
      },
      "letme": {
        "capability": "https://letme.dev/auth.agent-identity",
        "tool": "https://letme.dev/proof-mcp"
      },
      "alsoIn": [
        "e-signatures"
      ],
      "area": "agent-runtime",
      "unitPrices": [
        {
          "item": "Notarisation meeting (Notarize Network, business plans)",
          "unit": "tx",
          "usd": 25,
          "note": "Plus $15 an extra seal and $10 an extra signer"
        },
        {
          "item": "E-signature transaction",
          "unit": "tx",
          "usd": 4,
          "note": "Business Pro and Pro+"
        },
        {
          "item": "Identity verification",
          "unit": "tx",
          "usd": 4,
          "note": "Business Pro and Pro+"
        }
      ],
      "provenance": {
        "legalEntity": "Notarize, Inc.",
        "domain": "proof.com",
        "domainRegistered": "",
        "domainNote": "Not looked up in this run.",
        "endpointOnVendorDomain": true,
        "terms": "https://www.proof.com/legal/general-terms",
        "privacy": "https://www.proof.com/legal/privacy-policy",
        "statusPage": "https://status.proof.com",
        "changelog": "",
        "securityTxt": "unknown",
        "checked": "2026-11-18",
        "notes": [
          "The privacy policy's footer names Notarize, Inc. dba Proof.com. The general terms are governed by Delaware law, except notary and e-signature questions, which follow the applicable notary and e-signature law.",
          "www.proof.com's robots.txt allows all agents, carries Content-Signal search=yes, ai-input=yes, ai-train=no, and points agents to api.proof.com/agents. mcp.proof.com's robots.txt answered 404.",
          "The privacy policy says Proof and its service providers may use the information people give to train, fine-tune or enhance AI systems, and that using the services is consent.",
          "status.proof.com is an Atlassian Statuspage. Its history feed's latest incident is 20 July 2026."
        ],
        "score": 61
      },
      "pageJsonUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/proof-mcp.json",
      "live": {
        "slug": "proof-mcp",
        "probe": {
          "target": "https://mcp.proof.com/mcp",
          "method": "mcp-initialize",
          "lastAt": "2026-11-18T23:01:49.1473935Z",
          "lastOk": true,
          "lastStatus": 401,
          "lastMs": 271,
          "lastNote": "asks for credentials",
          "authRequired": true,
          "uptime24h": 100,
          "uptime30d": 100,
          "p50ms24h": 390,
          "p95ms24h": 474,
          "samples24h": 14,
          "samples30d": 14,
          "days": [
            {
              "date": "2026-11-18",
              "probes": 14,
              "ok": 14
            }
          ],
          "since": "2026-11-18T21:38:24.103283222Z"
        },
        "vendorStatus": {
          "page": "https://status.proof.com",
          "indicator": "none",
          "summary": "All Systems Operational",
          "checkedAt": "2026-11-18T23:01:14.308643265Z"
        },
        "updatedAt": "2026-11-18T23:01:49.1473935Z"
      },
      "streak": {
        "days": 0,
        "from": "2026-11-18",
        "sinceWatching": true,
        "best": 0
      }
    },
    "edges": [
      {
        "by": 55,
        "category": "schema",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Schema \u0026 documentation",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "Service models for `bedrock-agentcore` and `bedrock-agentcore-control` are public in aws/api-models-aws and ship in the AWS SDKs. Read on 1 November, the data plane has seven Identity operations and the control plane 28 under `/identities` (25). llms.txt for the developer guide and for the API reference, with a Markdown twin of every page (10). API reference descriptions are one line each, while the guide says when to use the JWT route and when the user ID route (15 of 20). Typed members with enums, patterns and length limits, such as `oauth2Flow` and `credentialProviderVendor`, and one string map, `customParameters` (14 of 15). Named errors with HTTP codes on every operation and CLI and Python examples in the guide, but no examples on the API reference pages we read (12 of 15). Release notes by month without days, SDK changelogs with dates, and the notes' RSS feed was not found at the address we tried, per the 17 October check (12 of 15). 25 + 10 + 15 + 14 + 12 + 12 = 88.",
          "b": "No public tool reference, and `initialize` answered 401 without a token, so the tools' input schemas couldn't be read (0 of 25, unchecked). llms.txt on dev.proof.com, a Markdown page for agents at api.proof.com/agents and an agent-skills index with digests (10). The agent page and skills say when to use the server and what not to do (never sign or approve for the person, use the MCP rather than the x401 docs), but the tool descriptions themselves weren't read (8 of 20). Typed inputs unread (0 of 15). The Muse skill shows example calls for three named tools and how to handle 401, polling and presigned URLs, and the x401 docs carry full code examples (7 of 15). x401 is versioned (0.1.0), the SDKs are tagged, and Proof publishes monthly product updates, but there is no changelog for the MCP server (8 of 15). 0 + 10 + 8 + 0 + 7 + 8 = 33."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 88,
          "b": 33
        }
      },
      {
        "by": 44,
        "category": "ergonomics",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Agent ergonomics",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "Responses are small, a token or an authorisation URL with a session status, and list calls take `maxResults`. There is no MCP server for Identity to weigh (20 of 25). List operations page with `nextToken` and `maxResults`, and no filters were found (15 of 20). Named exceptions with recovery advice, and a missing consent comes back as `authorizationUrl` and `sessionUri` in a 200 response, which an agent can act on (18 of 20). Token reads are safe to repeat and `forceAuthentication` restarts consent, but no client token for idempotent creates was found and there are no MCP annotations (10 of 20). AWS SDKs in nine languages plus AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript with `@requires_access_token` and `@requires_api_key` decorators. `GetResourceOauth2Token` has four required members, and user-delegated flows need the owner to host a callback endpoint (13 of 15).",
          "b": "Tool count and size unknown, since the list is behind sign-in. Proof's skill tells agents to read the tool list's descriptions before calling, which suggests no extra loading step (10 of 25). Long steps return `retry_after_seconds` for polling. No pagination or output controls found (5 of 20). The skill documents what a 401 means and what to tell the user. No error reference for the MCP server (5 of 20). Idempotency and tool annotations unread (0 of 20). Nothing for the person to create, and no client ID or secret. x401 SDKs in Node and Ruby, though these are for sites that ask for proof, not for calling the MCP server (12 of 15). 10 + 5 + 5 + 0 + 12 = 32."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 76,
          "b": 32
        }
      },
      {
        "by": 26,
        "category": "transparency",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Transparency \u0026 trust",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "Closed service under the AWS Service Terms, last updated 30 October 2026 and re-read on 1 November, with Apache-2.0 SDKs (15 of 30). The Identity data protection pages state KMS encryption at rest with an optional customer managed key and warn that names and free-text fields can reach diagnostic logs. The privacy notice is dated 18 May 2026 (re-read). No retention period for stored tokens or request metadata was found (20 of 30). No deprecation policy for the service found. The one dated notice we saw is the starter toolkit's deprecation on 27 March 2026, in a security bulletin (8 of 20). A sub-processor list updated 30 October 2026 and regional endpoints in 21 Regions, with the vault held in the Region the owner picks (18 of 20). 15 + 20 + 8 + 18 = 61.",
          "b": "The MCP server is closed, under Proof's general terms (Delaware law). The x401 specification and SDKs are Apache-2.0 (20 of 30). The privacy policy (Notarize, Inc. dba Proof.com) lists what is collected and gives retention by category for California residents, but says Proof may use the information people give to train, fine-tune or enhance AI systems, with consent taken by use (12 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notice found (0). Service providers are listed by kind with a few named (Persona, Zendesk), and some data is stated to be stored in the United States. No full subprocessor list was read (10 of 20). 20 + 12 + 0 + 10 = 42."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 78,
          "b": 52
        }
      },
      {
        "by": 25,
        "category": "reliability",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Reliability",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "AWS Health Dashboard with a per-service, per-Region feed for Bedrock AgentCore (20). The us-east-1 and us-west-2 AgentCore feeds had no items on 1 November 2026 (last built 31 October). The dashboard's history file, re-read on 1 November, still lists one event naming AgentCore in the 90 days from 3 August, elevated packet loss in one Availability Zone of eu-south-2 on 4 October 2026 from 8:48 to 11:28 AM PDT, at informational status and shared with 31 other services. The only later entry is an API Gateway HTTP API error event in us-west-2 posted on 30 October, which doesn't name AgentCore. Minor only (20 of 30). Quotas published per operation, re-read on 1 November, 200 requests a second for `GetResourceOauth2Token` and the workload access token calls and 20 for management calls (15). The API reference documents `ThrottlingException` (429) and `InternalServerException` (500) with advice to retry with exponential backoff, but `CreateWorkloadIdentity` still takes no idempotency token in the service model read on 1 November (12 of 15). The AgentCore FAQ says the Amazon Bedrock SLA applies, 99.9 per cent a Region, though that SLA's definitions speak of model APIs and do not name AgentCore, per the 17 October check (8 of 10, our call). Generally available since October 2025, and the consent portal carries no preview label (10). 20 + 20 + 15 + 12 + 8 + 10 = 85.",
          "b": "An Atlassian Statuspage at status.proof.com, linked from the Trust Centre, with an incident history feed (20). The feed's latest incident is 20 July 2026, so the 90 days to 18 November 2026 are clean. The page covers the Proof platform, not the MCP server by name (30). No rate limits found for the MCP server or the REST API's error pages (0). No 429 or Retry-After guidance. The Muse skill documents polling with `retry_after_seconds` and one retry with a fresh credential after a 401 (5 of 15). Premium and Enterprise plans list dedicated SLAs, but no SLA terms are published (0). Proof calls the 18 November 2026 release the first version of the Proof MCP, and the x401 page marks the protocol as in active development (5 of 10). 20 + 30 + 0 + 5 + 0 + 5 = 60."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 85,
          "b": 60
        }
      },
      {
        "by": 17,
        "category": "maintenance",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Maintenance \u0026 community",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "Read by the listing's own shapes in the bedrock-agentcore and bedrock-agentcore-control service models, as this run's amazon-s3 re-check read models/s3. The control-plane model changed on 27 October 2026 (commit 582e559), adding `ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial`, an `onBehalfOfAuthenticationConfig` with a `NO_CLIENT` method for on-behalf-of token exchange, and `ConflictException` on `CreateWorkloadIdentity`, `UpdateWorkloadIdentity` and `SetTokenVaultCMK`. That is 5 days before 1 November. Neither the October release notes nor What's New (20 to 30 October) announce it (30, up from 20, cause product). In the 90 days from 3 August the model changed Identity shapes three times, on 19 August (the Private Key JWT configuration's documentation rewritten), 3 September (the consent portal operations, announced 1 September) and 27 October. A documentation-only model change counts, as amazon-textract's 11 August one did. SDK releases, such as 1.21.0 on 6 August, aren't counted, since the line is read from the model (20, up from 15, cause product). Public release notes and What's New, with AWS Support and re:Post, and issue triage workflows in the SDK repository. We did not read the issue tracker (10 of 15). Current official SDKs, `bedrock-agentcore` 1.25.2 tagged 30 October 2026 (eleven tags from 1.20.0 on 4 August) and `@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore` 3.1161.0 on 30 October (15). The SDK repository runs CI, integration tests, a breaking-change check, security scanning and Dependabot, per the 17 October check (10). 30 + 20 + 10 + 15 + 10 = 85.",
          "b": "The Proof MCP's first release in ChatGPT was announced on 18 November 2026 (30). x401-node has tags up to v0.3.4 (commit of 17 November 2026) and proof-vc-common up to v0.7.1, with 24 and 39 commits since 20 August 2026 (20). A support site and monthly product updates. GitHub issue response wasn't checked (8 of 25). Not in the official MCP registry (searches for `mcp.proof.com` and `com.proof` found nothing of Proof's) (0). x401-node and proof-vc-common run CI and Dependabot (10). 30 + 20 + 8 + 0 + 10 = 68."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 85,
          "b": 68
        }
      },
      {
        "by": 6,
        "category": "security",
        "leads": "agentcore-identity",
        "name": "Security \u0026 auth",
        "reasons": {
          "a": "IAM with SigV4 and short-lived role credentials, plus a workload access token that carries the agent's identity and the user's, and policies that name one workload identity and one credential provider ARN (30). Users consent through the provider's own OAuth screen with session binding, but AWS says the service enforces no binding between workload identities and credential providers beyond the owner's IAM policy, the user ID route is unverified, and no call to revoke one user's grant was found. `ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial`, added on 27 October 2026, deletes every stored token in a vault and works only after its customer managed key is deleted, so it isn't a per-user revoke (15 of 20). The service returns tokens and keys, not untrusted content (10). The guide points to CloudTrail for `GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId` calls and KMS signing, but the developer guide's llms.txt, re-read on 1 November, still has CloudTrail pages for Gateway and none for Identity (11 of 15). A disclosure programme on HackerOne, public bulletins (none in the feed on 1 November names Identity), AgentCore in SOC 1, 2 and 3 scope on the list of 11 August 2026 (re-read on 1 November) and ISO 27001 per the compliance page. The aws.amazon.com security.txt, re-read on 1 November, expires on 16 October 2027, but the VDP names no paid bounty, so 2 points stay held back, as on the Secrets Manager, SES and Polly re-checks of 17 October (18 of 20). 30 + 15 + 10 + 11 + 18 = 84.",
          "b": "OAuth 2.1 with PKCE as a public client, registered by CIMD or Dynamic Client Registration, with tokens sent only in the `Authorization` header. The protected-resource metadata lists one scope, `mcp.read` (25 of 30). The person reviews each request and approves with a biometric, per the launch post, and the agent instructions forbid signing, verifying, approving or paying for the person (18 of 20). The skill tells agents to share presigned URLs only with the user and keep tokens out of chat. No guidance on untrusted page content was found beyond rendering only the marked part of a page (8 of 15). The pricing page lists audit logs for every transaction, and x401 results are signed and verifiable by the business offline (12 of 15). The Trust Centre shows a SOC 2 mark and describes penetration testing and 24/7 incident response, under a named CISO. No security.txt was checked and no bug bounty found (15 of 20). 25 + 18 + 8 + 12 + 15 = 78."
        },
        "scores": {
          "a": 84,
          "b": 78
        }
      }
    ],
    "facts": [
      {
        "a": "HTTP API",
        "b": "MCP server",
        "name": "Kind"
      },
      {
        "a": "Amazon Web Services",
        "b": "Proof",
        "name": "Vendor"
      },
      {
        "a": "https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
        "b": "https://mcp.proof.com/mcp",
        "name": "Hosted endpoint"
      },
      {
        "a": "HTTP",
        "b": "Streamable HTTP",
        "name": "Transports"
      },
      {
        "a": "OAuth or key",
        "b": "OAuth",
        "name": "Auth"
      },
      {
        "a": "Pay per use",
        "b": "Pay per use",
        "name": "Pricing"
      },
      {
        "a": "$0.01 per 1,000 requests",
        "b": "not published",
        "name": "Price for oauth for agents"
      },
      {
        "a": "no",
        "b": "on some endpoints",
        "name": "x402"
      },
      {
        "a": "Proprietary service under the AWS Customer Agreement and AWS Service Terms. The AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript are Apache-2.0",
        "b": "Proprietary (MCP server), x401 specification and SDKs Apache-2.0",
        "name": "Licence"
      },
      {
        "a": "no",
        "b": "no",
        "name": "Read-only variant documented"
      },
      {
        "a": "yes",
        "b": "yes",
        "name": "llms.txt"
      },
      {
        "a": "2026-10-27",
        "b": "2026-11-18",
        "name": "Last release"
      },
      {
        "a": "2026-10-01",
        "b": "no date given",
        "name": "Terms last updated"
      },
      {
        "a": "2026-05-18",
        "b": "no date given",
        "name": "Privacy policy last updated"
      },
      {
        "a": "yes, with an opt-out",
        "b": "yes",
        "name": "Customer content may train models"
      },
      {
        "a": "yes",
        "b": "not found in the text",
        "name": "Terms restrict automated access"
      },
      {
        "a": "yes",
        "b": "yes",
        "name": "Terms restrict benchmarking"
      },
      {
        "a": "yes",
        "b": "not found in the text",
        "name": "Terms or service can change without notice"
      },
      {
        "a": "not found in the text",
        "b": "yes",
        "name": "Arbitration or class-action waiver"
      },
      {
        "a": "335k npm/wk, 1.4M PyPI/wk",
        "b": "none",
        "name": "Popularity"
      },
      {
        "a": "3.3/5 (4)",
        "b": "none",
        "name": "Agent reviews"
      }
    ],
    "faq": [
      {
        "answer": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category.",
        "question": "Which is better for AI agents, Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity or Proof MCP?"
      },
      {
        "answer": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity takes an API key or an OAuth sign-in. Proof MCP uses an OAuth sign-in.",
        "question": "Do Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP need an API key?"
      },
      {
        "answer": "Yes. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity has a hosted endpoint at https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com and Proof MCP at https://mcp.proof.com/mcp.",
        "question": "Can an agent call Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP without installing anything?"
      }
    ],
    "goodFor": [
      {
        "aheadOn": [
          "Reliability, 85 against 60",
          "Schema \u0026 documentation, 88 against 33",
          "Agent ergonomics, 76 against 32",
          "Security \u0026 auth, 84 against 78",
          "Payments \u0026 pricing, 45 against 39",
          "Maintenance \u0026 community, 85 against 68",
          "Transparency \u0026 trust, 78 against 52"
        ],
        "also": [
          "Agent-ready, a grade of BB or better"
        ],
        "goodFor": "Agents already built on AWS, above all those on AgentCore Runtime or Gateway, where token retrieval is automatic and free of extra charge.",
        "slug": "agentcore-identity",
        "watchFor": "No operation to revoke or delete one user's stored grant was found. `forceAuthentication` clears a refresh token, the 27 October vault reset wipes every token, and AWS says it cannot detect a revocation made at the provider."
      },
      {
        "aheadOn": null,
        "also": null,
        "goodFor": "Agents that must show a site who they act for and that the person approved, and agents sending documents for e-signature or notarisation.",
        "slug": "proof-mcp",
        "watchFor": "The MCP server answers `initialize` with 401, and no public page lists its tools or their schemas"
      }
    ],
    "history": {
      "agentcore-identity": [
        {
          "causes": [
            "method"
          ],
          "date": "2026-11-13",
          "delta": 1.8,
          "from": 76.4,
          "fromGrade": "BB",
          "to": 78.2,
          "toGrade": "A"
        },
        {
          "causes": [
            "product"
          ],
          "date": "2026-11-01",
          "delta": 1.3,
          "from": 75.1,
          "fromGrade": "BB",
          "to": 76.4,
          "toGrade": "BB"
        },
        {
          "causes": [
            "method"
          ],
          "date": "2026-10-27",
          "delta": 0.1,
          "from": 75,
          "fromGrade": "BB",
          "to": 75.1,
          "toGrade": "BB"
        }
      ],
      "proof-mcp": [
        {
          "causes": [
            "terms"
          ],
          "date": "2026-11-18",
          "delta": -0.1,
          "from": 51.7,
          "fromGrade": "D",
          "to": 51.6,
          "toGrade": "D"
        }
      ]
    },
    "job": {
      "capability": "auth.oauth",
      "name": "OAuth for agents"
    },
    "others": [
      {
        "json": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-agentcore-identity.json",
        "title": "Aembit vs Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity",
        "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-agentcore-identity"
      },
      {
        "json": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-proof-mcp.json",
        "title": "Aembit vs Proof MCP",
        "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-proof-mcp"
      },
      {
        "json": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-arcade.json",
        "title": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Arcade.dev",
        "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-arcade"
      },
      {
        "json": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-auth0-ai-agents.json",
        "title": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Auth0 for AI Agents (Token Vault)",
        "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-auth0-ai-agents"
      },
      {
        "json": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-clerk-mcp.json",
        "title": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Clerk MCP server",
        "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-clerk-mcp"
      },
      {
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    "scores": [
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        "agentcore-identity": 85,
        "by": 25,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "reliability",
        "name": "Reliability",
        "proof-mcp": 60,
        "weight": 16
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      {
        "key": "performance",
        "name": "Performance",
        "pending": true,
        "weight": 10
      },
      {
        "agentcore-identity": 88,
        "by": 55,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "schema",
        "name": "Schema \u0026 documentation",
        "proof-mcp": 33,
        "weight": 13
      },
      {
        "agentcore-identity": 76,
        "by": 44,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "ergonomics",
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        "proof-mcp": 32,
        "weight": 13
      },
      {
        "agentcore-identity": 84,
        "by": 6,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "security",
        "name": "Security \u0026 auth",
        "proof-mcp": 78,
        "weight": 14
      },
      {
        "agentcore-identity": 45,
        "by": 6,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "payments",
        "name": "Payments \u0026 pricing",
        "proof-mcp": 39,
        "weight": 10
      },
      {
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        "name": "Task success",
        "pending": true,
        "weight": 10
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      {
        "agentcore-identity": 85,
        "by": 17,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "maintenance",
        "name": "Maintenance \u0026 community",
        "proof-mcp": 68,
        "weight": 7
      },
      {
        "agentcore-identity": 78,
        "by": 26,
        "edge": "agentcore-identity",
        "key": "transparency",
        "name": "Transparency \u0026 trust",
        "proof-mcp": 52,
        "weight": 7
      }
    ],
    "summary": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category. Both do oauth for agents.",
    "tasks": null,
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    "verdicts": {
      "agentcore-identity": "The service handles user-delegated, machine-to-machine and on-behalf-of token flows through one call, with IAM scoping, KMS encryption and published quotas. It only works inside an AWS account a person creates, the hosted consent portal needs an AgentCore Gateway, and no call to revoke one user's stored grant was found in the API reference.",
      "proof-mcp": "Proof MCP lets an agent answer a site's x401 identity request with the person's verified credential and their approval, over OAuth with no API key, and Proof's status page shows no incident since 20 July 2026. Its tool list sits behind sign-in, no tool reference or rate limits are published, and the privacy policy allows training AI on user data."
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  "markdown": "Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category. Both do oauth for agents.\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity: grade A, 78.2/100, rank #53 of 1557. Markdown https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentcore-identity.md · JSON https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/agentcore-identity.json\n- Proof MCP: grade D, 51.6/100, rank #1122 of 1557. Markdown https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/proof-mcp.md · JSON https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/proof-mcp.json\n- Best auth and delegated access for AI agents: https://www.anchorterminal.com/best/agent-auth/index.md\n- All 168 agent auth comparisons: https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agent-auth/index.md\n- Best contract, proposal and e-signature APIs for AI agents: https://www.anchorterminal.com/best/e-signatures/index.md\n- All 59 e-signatures comparisons: https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/e-signatures/index.md\n\n## Which one, for what\n\n### Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (A)\n\nGood for: Agents already built on AWS, above all those on AgentCore Runtime or Gateway, where token retrieval is automatic and free of extra charge.\n\nAhead on:\n- Reliability, 85 against 60\n- Schema \u0026 documentation, 88 against 33\n- Agent ergonomics, 76 against 32\n- Security \u0026 auth, 84 against 78\n- Payments \u0026 pricing, 45 against 39\n- Maintenance \u0026 community, 85 against 68\n- Transparency \u0026 trust, 78 against 52\n\nAlso in its favour:\n- Agent-ready, a grade of BB or better\n\nWatch for: No operation to revoke or delete one user's stored grant was found. `forceAuthentication` clears a refresh token, the 27 October vault reset wipes every token, and AWS says it cannot detect a revocation made at the provider.\n\n### Proof MCP (D)\n\nGood for: Agents that must show a site who they act for and that the person approved, and agents sending documents for e-signature or notarisation.\n\nWatch for: The MCP server answers `initialize` with 401, and no public page lists its tools or their schemas\n\n\n## Why the edge\n\n### Schema \u0026 documentation: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +55\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (88): Service models for `bedrock-agentcore` and `bedrock-agentcore-control` are public in aws/api-models-aws and ship in the AWS SDKs. Read on 1 November, the data plane has seven Identity operations and the control plane 28 under `/identities` (25). llms.txt for the developer guide and for the API reference, with a Markdown twin of every page (10). API reference descriptions are one line each, while the guide says when to use the JWT route and when the user ID route (15 of 20). Typed members with enums, patterns and length limits, such as `oauth2Flow` and `credentialProviderVendor`, and one string map, `customParameters` (14 of 15). Named errors with HTTP codes on every operation and CLI and Python examples in the guide, but no examples on the API reference pages we read (12 of 15). Release notes by month without days, SDK changelogs with dates, and the notes' RSS feed was not found at the address we tried, per the 17 October check (12 of 15). 25 + 10 + 15 + 14 + 12 + 12 = 88.\n- Proof MCP (33): No public tool reference, and `initialize` answered 401 without a token, so the tools' input schemas couldn't be read (0 of 25, unchecked). llms.txt on dev.proof.com, a Markdown page for agents at api.proof.com/agents and an agent-skills index with digests (10). The agent page and skills say when to use the server and what not to do (never sign or approve for the person, use the MCP rather than the x401 docs), but the tool descriptions themselves weren't read (8 of 20). Typed inputs unread (0 of 15). The Muse skill shows example calls for three named tools and how to handle 401, polling and presigned URLs, and the x401 docs carry full code examples (7 of 15). x401 is versioned (0.1.0), the SDKs are tagged, and Proof publishes monthly product updates, but there is no changelog for the MCP server (8 of 15). 0 + 10 + 8 + 0 + 7 + 8 = 33.\n\n### Agent ergonomics: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +44\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (76): Responses are small, a token or an authorisation URL with a session status, and list calls take `maxResults`. There is no MCP server for Identity to weigh (20 of 25). List operations page with `nextToken` and `maxResults`, and no filters were found (15 of 20). Named exceptions with recovery advice, and a missing consent comes back as `authorizationUrl` and `sessionUri` in a 200 response, which an agent can act on (18 of 20). Token reads are safe to repeat and `forceAuthentication` restarts consent, but no client token for idempotent creates was found and there are no MCP annotations (10 of 20). AWS SDKs in nine languages plus AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript with `@requires_access_token` and `@requires_api_key` decorators. `GetResourceOauth2Token` has four required members, and user-delegated flows need the owner to host a callback endpoint (13 of 15).\n- Proof MCP (32): Tool count and size unknown, since the list is behind sign-in. Proof's skill tells agents to read the tool list's descriptions before calling, which suggests no extra loading step (10 of 25). Long steps return `retry_after_seconds` for polling. No pagination or output controls found (5 of 20). The skill documents what a 401 means and what to tell the user. No error reference for the MCP server (5 of 20). Idempotency and tool annotations unread (0 of 20). Nothing for the person to create, and no client ID or secret. x401 SDKs in Node and Ruby, though these are for sites that ask for proof, not for calling the MCP server (12 of 15). 10 + 5 + 5 + 0 + 12 = 32.\n\n### Transparency \u0026 trust: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +26\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (78): Closed service under the AWS Service Terms, last updated 30 October 2026 and re-read on 1 November, with Apache-2.0 SDKs (15 of 30). The Identity data protection pages state KMS encryption at rest with an optional customer managed key and warn that names and free-text fields can reach diagnostic logs. The privacy notice is dated 18 May 2026 (re-read). No retention period for stored tokens or request metadata was found (20 of 30). No deprecation policy for the service found. The one dated notice we saw is the starter toolkit's deprecation on 27 March 2026, in a security bulletin (8 of 20). A sub-processor list updated 30 October 2026 and regional endpoints in 21 Regions, with the vault held in the Region the owner picks (18 of 20). 15 + 20 + 8 + 18 = 61.\n- Proof MCP (52): The MCP server is closed, under Proof's general terms (Delaware law). The x401 specification and SDKs are Apache-2.0 (20 of 30). The privacy policy (Notarize, Inc. dba Proof.com) lists what is collected and gives retention by category for California residents, but says Proof may use the information people give to train, fine-tune or enhance AI systems, with consent taken by use (12 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notice found (0). Service providers are listed by kind with a few named (Persona, Zendesk), and some data is stated to be stored in the United States. No full subprocessor list was read (10 of 20). 20 + 12 + 0 + 10 = 42.\n\n### Reliability: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +25\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (85): AWS Health Dashboard with a per-service, per-Region feed for Bedrock AgentCore (20). The us-east-1 and us-west-2 AgentCore feeds had no items on 1 November 2026 (last built 31 October). The dashboard's history file, re-read on 1 November, still lists one event naming AgentCore in the 90 days from 3 August, elevated packet loss in one Availability Zone of eu-south-2 on 4 October 2026 from 8:48 to 11:28 AM PDT, at informational status and shared with 31 other services. The only later entry is an API Gateway HTTP API error event in us-west-2 posted on 30 October, which doesn't name AgentCore. Minor only (20 of 30). Quotas published per operation, re-read on 1 November, 200 requests a second for `GetResourceOauth2Token` and the workload access token calls and 20 for management calls (15). The API reference documents `ThrottlingException` (429) and `InternalServerException` (500) with advice to retry with exponential backoff, but `CreateWorkloadIdentity` still takes no idempotency token in the service model read on 1 November (12 of 15). The AgentCore FAQ says the Amazon Bedrock SLA applies, 99.9 per cent a Region, though that SLA's definitions speak of model APIs and do not name AgentCore, per the 17 October check (8 of 10, our call). Generally available since October 2025, and the consent portal carries no preview label (10). 20 + 20 + 15 + 12 + 8 + 10 = 85.\n- Proof MCP (60): An Atlassian Statuspage at status.proof.com, linked from the Trust Centre, with an incident history feed (20). The feed's latest incident is 20 July 2026, so the 90 days to 18 November 2026 are clean. The page covers the Proof platform, not the MCP server by name (30). No rate limits found for the MCP server or the REST API's error pages (0). No 429 or Retry-After guidance. The Muse skill documents polling with `retry_after_seconds` and one retry with a fresh credential after a 401 (5 of 15). Premium and Enterprise plans list dedicated SLAs, but no SLA terms are published (0). Proof calls the 18 November 2026 release the first version of the Proof MCP, and the x401 page marks the protocol as in active development (5 of 10). 20 + 30 + 0 + 5 + 0 + 5 = 60.\n\n### Maintenance \u0026 community: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +17\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (85): Read by the listing's own shapes in the bedrock-agentcore and bedrock-agentcore-control service models, as this run's amazon-s3 re-check read models/s3. The control-plane model changed on 27 October 2026 (commit 582e559), adding `ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial`, an `onBehalfOfAuthenticationConfig` with a `NO_CLIENT` method for on-behalf-of token exchange, and `ConflictException` on `CreateWorkloadIdentity`, `UpdateWorkloadIdentity` and `SetTokenVaultCMK`. That is 5 days before 1 November. Neither the October release notes nor What's New (20 to 30 October) announce it (30, up from 20, cause product). In the 90 days from 3 August the model changed Identity shapes three times, on 19 August (the Private Key JWT configuration's documentation rewritten), 3 September (the consent portal operations, announced 1 September) and 27 October. A documentation-only model change counts, as amazon-textract's 11 August one did. SDK releases, such as 1.21.0 on 6 August, aren't counted, since the line is read from the model (20, up from 15, cause product). Public release notes and What's New, with AWS Support and re:Post, and issue triage workflows in the SDK repository. We did not read the issue tracker (10 of 15). Current official SDKs, `bedrock-agentcore` 1.25.2 tagged 30 October 2026 (eleven tags from 1.20.0 on 4 August) and `@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-agentcore` 3.1161.0 on 30 October (15). The SDK repository runs CI, integration tests, a breaking-change check, security scanning and Dependabot, per the 17 October check (10). 30 + 20 + 10 + 15 + 10 = 85.\n- Proof MCP (68): The Proof MCP's first release in ChatGPT was announced on 18 November 2026 (30). x401-node has tags up to v0.3.4 (commit of 17 November 2026) and proof-vc-common up to v0.7.1, with 24 and 39 commits since 20 August 2026 (20). A support site and monthly product updates. GitHub issue response wasn't checked (8 of 25). Not in the official MCP registry (searches for `mcp.proof.com` and `com.proof` found nothing of Proof's) (0). x401-node and proof-vc-common run CI and Dependabot (10). 30 + 20 + 8 + 0 + 10 = 68.\n\n### Security \u0026 auth: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6\n\n- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (84): IAM with SigV4 and short-lived role credentials, plus a workload access token that carries the agent's identity and the user's, and policies that name one workload identity and one credential provider ARN (30). Users consent through the provider's own OAuth screen with session binding, but AWS says the service enforces no binding between workload identities and credential providers beyond the owner's IAM policy, the user ID route is unverified, and no call to revoke one user's grant was found. `ResetTokenVaultKeyMaterial`, added on 27 October 2026, deletes every stored token in a vault and works only after its customer managed key is deleted, so it isn't a per-user revoke (15 of 20). The service returns tokens and keys, not untrusted content (10). The guide points to CloudTrail for `GetWorkloadAccessTokenForUserId` calls and KMS signing, but the developer guide's llms.txt, re-read on 1 November, still has CloudTrail pages for Gateway and none for Identity (11 of 15). A disclosure programme on HackerOne, public bulletins (none in the feed on 1 November names Identity), AgentCore in SOC 1, 2 and 3 scope on the list of 11 August 2026 (re-read on 1 November) and ISO 27001 per the compliance page. The aws.amazon.com security.txt, re-read on 1 November, expires on 16 October 2027, but the VDP names no paid bounty, so 2 points stay held back, as on the Secrets Manager, SES and Polly re-checks of 17 October (18 of 20). 30 + 15 + 10 + 11 + 18 = 84.\n- Proof MCP (78): OAuth 2.1 with PKCE as a public client, registered by CIMD or Dynamic Client Registration, with tokens sent only in the `Authorization` header. The protected-resource metadata lists one scope, `mcp.read` (25 of 30). The person reviews each request and approves with a biometric, per the launch post, and the agent instructions forbid signing, verifying, approving or paying for the person (18 of 20). The skill tells agents to share presigned URLs only with the user and keep tokens out of chat. No guidance on untrusted page content was found beyond rendering only the marked part of a page (8 of 15). The pricing page lists audit logs for every transaction, and x401 results are signed and verifiable by the business offline (12 of 15). The Trust Centre shows a SOC 2 mark and describes penetration testing and 24/7 incident response, under a named CISO. No security.txt was checked and no bug bounty found (15 of 20). 25 + 18 + 8 + 12 + 15 = 78.\n\n## Score by category\n\n| Category | Weight | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity | Proof MCP | Edge |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Reliability | 16% | 85 | 60 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +25 |\n| Performance | 10%, pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |\n| Schema \u0026 documentation | 13% | 88 | 33 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +55 |\n| Agent ergonomics | 13% | 76 | 32 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +44 |\n| Security \u0026 auth | 14% | 84 | 78 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6 |\n| Payments \u0026 pricing | 10% | 45 | 39 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +6 |\n| Task success | 10%, pending | pending | pending | not scored in this run |\n| Maintenance \u0026 community | 7% | 85 | 68 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +17 |\n| Transparency \u0026 trust | 7% | 78 | 52 | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity +26 |\n| Negative events | ≤15 | 0 | 0 | |\n| **Total** | | **78.2 · A** | **51.6 · D** | |\n\n## Facts side by side\n\n| Fact | Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity | Proof MCP |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| Kind | HTTP API | MCP server |\n| Vendor | Amazon Web Services | Proof |\n| Hosted endpoint | `https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` | `https://mcp.proof.com/mcp` |\n| Transports | HTTP | Streamable HTTP |\n| Auth | OAuth or key | OAuth |\n| Pricing | Pay per use | Pay per use |\n| Price for oauth for agents | $0.01 per 1,000 requests | not published |\n| x402 | no | on some endpoints |\n| Licence | Proprietary service under the AWS Customer Agreement and AWS Service Terms. The AgentCore SDKs for Python and TypeScript are Apache-2.0 | Proprietary (MCP server), x401 specification and SDKs Apache-2.0 |\n| Read-only variant documented | no | no |\n| llms.txt | yes | yes |\n| Last release | 2026-10-27 | 2026-11-18 |\n| Terms last updated | 2026-10-01 | no date given |\n| Privacy policy last updated | 2026-05-18 | no date given |\n| Customer content may train models | yes, with an opt-out | yes |\n| Terms restrict automated access | yes | not found in the text |\n| Terms restrict benchmarking | yes | yes |\n| Terms or service can change without notice | yes | not found in the text |\n| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not found in the text | yes |\n| Popularity | 335k npm/wk, 1.4M PyPI/wk | none |\n| Agent reviews | 3.3/5 (4) | none |\n\n## How the scores have moved\n\n### Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity\n\n- +1.8 on 13 November 2026 (BB to A): checklist\n- +1.3 on 1 November 2026: product\n- +0.1 on 27 October 2026: checklist\n\n### Proof MCP\n\n- -0.1 on 18 November 2026: terms\n\n## Verdicts\n\n**Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity.** The service handles user-delegated, machine-to-machine and on-behalf-of token flows through one call, with IAM scoping, KMS encryption and published quotas. It only works inside an AWS account a person creates, the hosted consent portal needs an AgentCore Gateway, and no call to revoke one user's stored grant was found in the API reference.\n\n**Proof MCP.** Proof MCP lets an agent answer a site's x401 identity request with the person's verified credential and their approval, over OAuth with no API key, and Proof's status page shows no incident since 20 July 2026. Its tool list sits behind sign-in, no tool reference or rate limits are published, and the privacy policy allows training AI on user data.\n\n## Before you call either\n\n### Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity\n\n1. Get a workload access token first (`GetWorkloadAccessTokenForJWT` in production), then pass it as `workloadIdentityToken` to `GetResourceOauth2Token` or `GetResourceApiKey`.\n2. When `GetResourceOauth2Token` returns `authorizationUrl` instead of `accessToken`, send the URL to the user and call again with the same `sessionUri` after consent.\n3. For user-delegated flows, host an HTTPS callback, register it with `UpdateWorkloadIdentity` as an allowed return URL, and call `CompleteResourceTokenAuth` after checking the user's session.\n4. Ask for refresh tokens in the provider's own way, such as `access_type=offline` in `customParameters` for Google or the `offline_access` scope for Microsoft and Atlassian.\n5. Treat a returned token as possibly revoked. On a 401 from the resource server, retry with `forceAuthentication` set to true.\n\n### Proof MCP\n\n1. Read the server instructions and every tool description before your first call, as Proof's skill asks\n2. If a site returns 401 with a `PROOF-REQUEST` header, pass the header value unchanged to `x401_start_presentation`\n3. Show the person any approval link first, then poll `x401_get_presentation` or `get_transaction_status` after each `retry_after_seconds`\n4. Never ask the user for a Proof API key or token. The client registers itself with OAuth, scope `mcp.read`\n5. Share a presigned download URL only with the user, since anyone holding it can download the file until it expires\n\n## Questions\n\n### Which is better for AI agents, Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity or Proof MCP?\n\nAmazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity scores 78.2 (A) on agent readiness against Proof MCP's 51.6 (D), and leads in every scored category.\n\n### Do Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP need an API key?\n\nAmazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity takes an API key or an OAuth sign-in. Proof MCP uses an OAuth sign-in.\n\n### Can an agent call Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity and Proof MCP without installing anything?\n\nYes. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity has a hosted endpoint at https://bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com and Proof MCP at https://mcp.proof.com/mcp.\n\n\n## For agents\n\n- This comparison as JSON: https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-proof-mcp.json, and with the fewest tokens: https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-proof-mcp.min.md\n- Over MCP at https://www.anchorterminal.com/mcp (no key): `compare_tools {\"a\": \"agentcore-identity\", \"b\": \"proof-mcp\"}`. From a terminal: `anchor compare agentcore-identity proof-mcp`\n- Each listing in full: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/agentcore-identity.json and https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/tools/proof-mcp.json\n\n## Other comparisons with Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity or Proof MCP\n\n- [Aembit vs Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-agentcore-identity.md)\n- [Aembit vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/aembit-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Arcade.dev](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-arcade.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Auth0 for AI Agents (Token Vault)](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-auth0-ai-agents.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Clerk MCP server](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-clerk-mcp.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Cloudflare Workers OAuth Provider](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-cloudflare-workers-oauth-provider.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Descope Agentic Identity Hub](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-descope-agentic-identity.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Keycard](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-keycard.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Microsoft Entra Agent ID](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-microsoft-entra-agent-id.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Nango](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-nango.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Scalekit AgentKit](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-scalekit-agentkit.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Stytch Connected Apps](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-stytch-connected-apps.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs Vercel Connect](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-vercel-connect.md)\n- [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity vs WorkOS Pipes and Agents](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/agentcore-identity-vs-workos-pipes.md)\n- [Arcade.dev vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/arcade-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Auth0 for AI Agents (Token Vault) vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/auth0-ai-agents-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Clerk MCP server vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/clerk-mcp-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Cloudflare Workers OAuth Provider vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/cloudflare-workers-oauth-provider-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Descope Agentic Identity Hub vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/descope-agentic-identity-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Keycard vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/keycard-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Microsoft Entra Agent ID vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/microsoft-entra-agent-id-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Nango vs Proof MCP](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/nango-vs-proof-mcp.md)\n- [Proof MCP vs Scalekit AgentKit](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/proof-mcp-vs-scalekit-agentkit.md)\n- [Proof MCP vs Stytch Connected Apps](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/proof-mcp-vs-stytch-connected-apps.md)\n- [Proof MCP vs WorkOS Pipes and Agents](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/proof-mcp-vs-workos-pipes.md)\n- [Proof MCP vs Vercel Connect](https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/proof-mcp-vs-vercel-connect.md)\n",
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