GitHub MCP Server by GitHub

# Fix list: GitHub MCP Server

From Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/github-mcp-server, the October 2026 research run, assessed 1 October 2026. Grade BB, 70.5 out of 100.

This is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.

For a coding agent working on GitHub MCP Server: work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published.

## 1. Reliability, 60 out of 100, up to 8 more on the total

Why it scored 60: Scored as a hosted MCP server, since the remote endpoint is the default install. githubstatus.com is a Statuspage with component history (20). The feed from 18 August to 1 October lists 24 incidents, including a roughly 19-hour incident on 24 September touching API Requests, Projects and GitHub Apps and a roughly two-hour multi-service incident on 13 September that included API Requests. The MCP server calls those APIs, so several majors (0). None names the MCP server. REST limits are published (5,000 an hour per user, 15,000 for Enterprise Cloud, 900 points a minute secondary) (15). 403 and 429 responses carry `retry-after` or `x-ratelimit-reset`, with advice to wait a minute and back off exponentially (15). The SLA page returned a server error, so we score it absent (0). Versioned 1.x with no preview label on the README or remote-server docs (10).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability):

Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.

- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).
- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.
- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.
- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.
- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.
- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.

Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.

- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.
- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.
- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).
- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.
- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.

Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors.

## 2. Payments & pricing, 40 out of 100, up to 7.5 more on the total

Why it scored 40: No x402, MPP or L402 (0). The server costs nothing and says so in public (20). A free GitHub account needs no card (20). An agent can't get access without a person creating an account and approving OAuth or minting a PAT (0).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments):

The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).

- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.
- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for "contact sales" or prices behind a login.
- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.
- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).

Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.

Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol.

## 3. Agent ergonomics, 78 out of 100, up to 3.6 more on the total

Why it scored 78: 92 documented tools across 22 toolsets, about 121,000 characters or 30,000 tokens with everything on. The default five toolsets load 45 tools, about 13,600 tokens (5). Toolsets, per-tool selection, `/readonly` URLs, `X-MCP-Toolsets` headers and scope-based hiding of tools a PAT can't use add back 10. Page, cursor and `perPage` paging, plus a `fields` parameter on list and search tools to trim responses. Issue #3236 says `pull_request_read` `get_files` always returns full patches (18). Errors are tool results with GitHub's message, and OAuth calls get a scope challenge instead of a bare 403 (16). Every tool sets `readOnlyHint`, eight write tools set `destructiveHint: true`, but 27 of 35 write tools leave `destructiveHint` unset (open issue #3281) and no read tool sets `idempotentHint`. `merge_pull_request` takes an `expectedHeadSha` guard (14). Default toolsets, `owner` and `repo` as the usual required pair, and official Octokit SDKs in several languages (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics):

- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).
- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.
- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.
- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.
- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.

Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs.

## 4. Schema & documentation, 83 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total

Why it scored 83: Every tool has a JSON Schema input, snapshotted in the repository for review (25). docs.github.com/llms.txt exists per the 30 September check, and the server docs are Markdown (10). Descriptions are short (median 82 characters) and mostly state purpose. Some say when to use them (`search_code` for exact symbols) or point elsewhere (`label_write` names `update_issue`), most don't (12). Enums for state, order and merge method, `perPage` bounded 1 to 100, required fields marked. Three tools take free-form objects (`create_repository_ruleset`, `actions_run_trigger`, `projects_write`) (12). The README lists every parameter per tool. Errors come back as tool results with GitHub's message, and the error-handling doc is aimed at contributors, not models (9). Semver releases with notes, and a tool-renaming doc with a table of 25 deprecated aliases that still resolve (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema):

APIs and MCP servers.

- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).
- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.
- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.
- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.
- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.
- 15, versioning and a public changelog.

Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference.

## 5. Security & auth, 84 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total

Why it scored 84: OAuth with scopes is the remote default, with fine-grained PATs and GitHub App tokens for headless use, all in the `Authorization` header. v1.11.0 added per-call OAuth scope challenges (30). `--read-only`, `/readonly` URLs and `X-MCP-Readonly` drop write tools. `delete_repository` asks the user to type the full repository name through elicitation. `delete_file` and the other destructive tools run without a confirmation step (17). Lockdown mode filters public-repository content from authors without push access, and the README says plainly it's a best-effort filter, not a boundary. July 2026 commits made lockdown fail closed (13). MCP calls show in GitHub's audit log as ordinary API calls, and the governance doc says MCP-specific audit logs aren't available yet (8). SECURITY.md with coordinated disclosure, GitHub's bug bounty (open-source repositories are out of scope for rewards), two advisories published in public in 2026, and github.com's security.txt expired per the 30 September check (16).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security):

- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.
- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.
- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.
- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.
- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.

Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing.

## 6. Transparency & trust, 86 out of 100, up to 1.2 more on the total

Made of editorial 77, provenance 95.

Why it scored 86: MIT, with third-party licences listed per platform (30). Data handling falls under GitHub's general privacy statement and DPA. There's no MCP-specific statement of what the remote server logs or keeps (20). Renamed tools keep working through aliases listed in docs/tool-renaming.md, but the table has no removal dates (12). The local server's metrics sink is a no-op. The hosted server records `fields` usage and payload sizes, which the source shows and the docs don't mention (15).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency):

- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.
- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).
- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.
- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).

The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two.

Provenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts):

- security.txt: published but past its Expires date (5 of 10)

## 7. Maintenance & community, 93 out of 100, up to 0.6 more on the total

Why it scored 93: v1.13.0 on 1 October 2026 (30). Eleven releases since 3 July, from v1.6.0 to v1.13.0 (20). 159 open issues on the run date. September issues carry triage labels within days, and an AI triage workflow and an inactive-issue closer run. We couldn't read reply times (18). Listed in the official MCP registry as io.github.github/github-mcp-server, published by a release workflow (15). Go CI, lint, code scanning, licence checks and a tool-diff check on pull requests (10).

The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance):

- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.
- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.
- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.
- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).
- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.

Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts.

## Deductions

Each comes off the total. A fixed and documented problem counts for less at the next check.

- 2026-06-09: GHSA-pjp5-fpmr-3349 (moderate), a lockdown-mode singleton in the HTTP server could give one user's request another user's GraphQL client. Fixed and published, so the deduction is reduced (https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server/security).
- 2026-07-20: GHSA-w4q6-qw23-4rg7 (high), a nil-pointer dereference in the completion handler allowed denial of service. Fixed and published (https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server/security).

## What we couldn't check

What we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it.

- unchecked: the GitHub Online Services SLA (the page returned a server error) and whether it covers the hosted MCP endpoint
- unchecked: what the hosted MCP server logs and for how long, beyond GitHub's general privacy statement
- unchecked: reply times on issues (the issue list showed labels but no comment counts)
- Whether GHSA-pjp5-fpmr-3349 affected the GitHub-hosted endpoint or only self-hosted HTTP deployments

## Weaknesses

- 92 tools and about 30,000 tokens with everything enabled; the default set alone is 45 tools
- 27 of 35 write tools leave `destructiveHint` unset, and read tools don't set `idempotentHint` (issue #3281 is open)
- Two advisories in 2026, one of them cross-user GraphQL client confusion in HTTP mode, both fixed
- The hosted endpoint shares GitHub's API incidents, including a roughly 19-hour one on 24 September 2026
- No MCP-specific audit log; calls appear as ordinary API calls

## What costs an agent a turn today

The notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need.

- Connect to `https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/x/<toolset>/readonly` for read tasks; write tools are absent rather than discouraged
- Send `X-MCP-Toolsets: repos,issues,pull_requests` to trim the tool list instead of loading 45 or more tools
- Pass `fields` on list and search calls to cut response size, and page with `perPage` up to 100
- On 403 or 429 read `retry-after` or `x-ratelimit-reset`, and wait at least a minute if neither is set
- Expect an elicitation prompt from `delete_repository`; a client without elicitation can't delete

## What the review panel asked for

- set destructiveHint on all write tools
- add when-to-use lines to descriptions
- destructiveHint on every write tool
- MCP-specific audit log

## When it's done

Send what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `"kind": "dispute"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.