Mirror CLI vs T3 Code

Mirror CLI 47

0.1.0 on 16 October 2026 per the PyPI page read on 17 October, not re-read on 4 November (PyPI doesn't resolve from our shell), 19 days old (30). The 90-day line needs three dated releases. 0.1.0 (16 October) and the mirror-agent-v0.1.8 tag on the same commit, f938033, are one release day, and 0.1.1 has an undated changelog entry and a version bump in the 22 October sync with no CLI tag and no readable PyPI date, so fewer than three are confirmed (0, flagged). External contributions aren't accepted for now, and the issue tracker couldn't be read (5, unchecked). An official PyPI package, but no SDK, and the extension API is early beta (5 of 15). CI on push and pull request, locked Cargo and uv dependencies and pinned toolchains (7 of 10).

T3 Code 75

Commits and nightly tags on 6 November 2026 (30). More than three releases in 90 days (20). GitHub issues and pull requests weren't read (GitHub's pages refuse these sessions), so that line is scored absent (0). Current official apps and install script (15). CI on push (10). 30 + 20 + 0 + 15 + 10 = 75.

Mirror CLI 58

Framework reading (telemetry defaults, approvals, guardrails, sandboxing), five lines. Provider keys come from the environment or a saved file readable only by the user, and are kept out of commands the agent runs. MCP definitions name environment variables rather than holding secrets, and remote MCP sign-in uses OAuth. Debug logs contain the API key, which the docs warn about, and analytics are on by default (18 of 30). Manual approval by default for every shell command, write and MCP tool call. Project extensions ask with Disable preselected, and MCP servers can't be added by a cloned repository. Auto mode, once chosen, applies in every directory (15 of 20). SECURITY.md and the folder-trust notice warn that repository files, tool output and model responses can carry prompt injection and recommend a container or VM. The microVM sandbox is opt-in and covers file and shell tools only (9 of 15). Conversations with their tool calls are kept in ~/.mirror/state.db with per-conversation logs and a file of remembered approvals, but there's no export or audit view (9 of 15). SECURITY.md gives a private email and a report scope, but there's no security.txt, bug bounty or published advisory (7 of 20). Judgement call, written by an agent on Claude, on the checklist the other harnesses got.

T3 Code 35

Harness reading. Product usage events go by default to ingest.t3.codes and PostHog, with hashed identifiers for your T3 Connect, OpenAI and Claude accounts, and relay traces to Axiom, which can include machine names and error text. Off with T3CODE_TELEMETRY_ENABLED=false or a managed policy. Disclosed in docs/user/telemetry.md, not the README (10 of 30). Permission modes and managed policies (12 of 20). No prompt-injection guidance (5). No audit log (5). No security policy file found (3). 10 + 12 + 5 + 5 + 3 = 35.

Mirror CLI 75

Framework reading. The agent protocol is published as protobuf definitions in protocols/, and mirror acp speaks the Agent Client Protocol, but no JSON Schema for config.json or the MCP definition files was found (15 of 25). llms.txt with a Markdown copy of every page (10). The pages say what each mode is for and when not to rely on it, such as that approval isn't a sandbox and auto suits a repository under version control (15 of 20). Launch options, --api providers, effort levels, approval modes, view modes, web providers and log levels are enumerated, and MCP definition fields are typed (11 of 15). Examples on every page and a 401 troubleshooting step, but exec exit codes aren't documented (9 of 15). Versions with a stated tag scheme (reflection-mirror-vX.Y.Z for the CLI, mirror-agent-vX.Y.Z for the agent) and a public CHANGELOG.md in the repository since 22 October 2026 (15).

T3 Code 55

Harness reading. User docs in the repository (managed policy, handoffs, providers, telemetry), AGENTS.md for contributors, a server other clients connect to (55).

Mirror CLI 66

Apache-2.0, with NOTICE and third-party licences in the repository (30). The README and SECURITY.md say what leaves the machine (conversation context to the chosen provider, tool requests to MCP servers) and list every local file, memory is off by default and local, and the CLI reference now lists what usage analytics send and never send. Reflection's privacy policy is on reflection.ai, whose robots.txt now disallows our crawler, so its 17 October reading is struck, and the first-run notice still calls the data anonymous while each event carries a persistent random install ID (15 of 30, partial kept, flagged). No deprecation policy, only the early-beta warning that commands may change (2 of 20). Analytics go to Statsig and are on by default, now documented in the CLI reference with the fields sent and not sent, the five-day limit on unsent events, and an opt-out in /settings or "analytics": false. Kiro CLI's 15 for listed telemetry types on by default, plus the destination and field list, gives 16 of 20, held off 20 by the default and the anonymous wording.

T3 Code 51

MIT (30). docs/user/telemetry.md lists what is sent and what isn't, but includes hashed third-party account identifiers and the README doesn't mention it (15 of 30). No deprecation policy (5). Disclosed with an opt-out, on by default (12 of 20). 30 + 15 + 5 + 12 = 62.