fone.me vs Vocily AI

fone.me 31

MCP reading, since the MCP server is what an outside agent calls. No tool arguments or input schemas are published in llms.txt, the guide pages or the GitHub README, and robots.txt disallows /mcp, so no session was opened and tools/list was not read. Per-link A2A agent cards are machine-readable JSON (protocol 0.3.0, JSONRPC, input and output modes, skills with examples) and server.json names the remote, but neither types the MCP tools (8 of 25). llms.txt is a real document for agents covering the MCP server, A2A, the search API and the widget (10). Each tool has a one-line purpose in llms.txt and the README, and the how-it-works page states what the agent will and won't do; nothing says when not to use a tool (6 of 20). No typed inputs, enums, constraints or required fields published (0 of 15). Example prompts in the README, per-skill examples in agent cards and widget code for eight site builders; no error response is documented (4 of 15). server.json and the agent cards carry version 1.0.0 and the cards a protocol version; no changelog (3 of 15). 8+10+6+0+4+3 = 31.

Vocily AI 90

A public OpenAPI 3.1 file, linked from llms.txt, with 60 operations on 4 November (54 on 8 October) at docs.vocily.ai/developers/openapi.json (25). llms.txt, llms-full.txt and a Markdown copy of every page (10). Pages say what each route is for and what to use instead, such as webhooks over polling and dashboard batches over a loop of calls, though some operation titles are generated names such as Create Kb (16 of 20). Bodies refuse unknown fields and carry ranges and enums, but list filters such as status are plain strings and variables and metadata are free-form (12 of 15). 234 example entries in the spec, a reason-code table by status and a 422 that lists every invalid field (15). The /v1 prefix and a dated API changes page from 23 September 2026, which records removals made under /v1 (23 and 25 September, 10 and 30 October) against the reference's own rule that fields are never removed within a version (12 of 15). 25 + 10 + 16 + 12 + 15 + 12 = 90.

fone.me 29

MCP reading. Four tools named in llms.txt, a small set, but their definitions were not read, so short of full marks (18 of 25). find_agents searches by what someone does and the search API takes a query; no limit, paging or output-size controls are documented (3 of 20). No error codes or messages documented for the MCP server, the search API or A2A (0 of 20). No readOnlyHint or destructiveHint seen and no idempotency key; the three lookups are read-only by name and description, while message_agent writes to a real person's inbox and continues the conversation across calls (2 of 20). No credentials, no configuration beyond the URL, and few stated inputs; no SDK in any language (6 of 15). 18+3+0+2+6 = 29.

Vocily AI 84

List calls take limit from 1 to 100, default 20, and return the transcript only with include=transcript (20 of 25). Every growing list uses the same cursor envelope, and calls filter by agent, status, direction, origin and date. The bounded lists return bare arrays (18 of 20). Errors carry a machine-readable detail.code, a field path on validation failures and an X-Request-ID (20). Idempotency-Key is required on call creation, agent edits accept If-Match on a document revision, and the bulk memory erase previews unless dry_run is false. Other writes have no idempotency key (18 of 20). A call needs only agent_id and to_number and an agent only name. No SDK was found in the docs, on npm or on PyPI (8 of 15). 20 + 18 + 20 + 18 + 8 = 84.

fone.me 23

Closed service. The newest dated change to the agent surface found is the MCP repository github.com/spearisa/fone-me-mcp, created 5 October 2026 with server.json version 1.0.0, 31 days ago (20). The comparison page marked 'Checked October 28, 2026' and the profile lastmods in the sitemap are content, not releases. No changelog, release notes or three dated changes in 90 days (0 of 20). The support page and FAQ draw by script and no support email, forum or community channel was found; responsiveness unchecked (3 of 15). server.json names the server me.fone.www/agents, a namespace that needs proof of the domain, but the official MCP registry could not be read, so presence is scored absent (0 of 15). No package, public code or CI (0 of 10). 20+0+3+0+0 = 23.

Vocily AI 61

The latest dated API change is 30 October 2026 (send_whatsapp_template moved to the dashboard), 5 days before this check (30). Nine dated entries since 6 August: 23, 25, 27 and 30 September and 10, 15, 17, 20 and 30 October (20). A public change log, a Discord server and a founder email address are the channels found, and we didn't test whether they answer (8 of 15 for a closed service). No official SDK found; the developer page now says to generate a typed client from the OpenAPI file (0 of 15). There is no package to assess. The OpenAPI file was last modified on 31 October 2026 (3 of 10, carried). 30 + 20 + 8 + 0 + 3 = 61.

fone.me 15

Hosted reading, for the MCP server and A2A endpoints and the service behind them. No status page is linked from llms.txt, the home page or any guide page read, and https://www.fone.me/status failed to load (0). No readable incident history, so the floor (5). No request rate limit for the MCP server, the search API or A2A is published; the only limits are on the agent's own outbound calls (8 am to 9 pm in the callee's time zone, 'limited per day' with no number), which are not request limits (0 of 15). No 429, overload or retry guidance and no idempotency key for message_agent or message/send (0 of 15). No SLA (0). Nothing on the MCP server, the agent cards or llms.txt is marked beta or preview, and the MCP repository's server.json is version 1.0.0 (10). 0+5+0+0+0+10 = 15.

Vocily AI 40

Graded on the public REST API at api.vocily.ai, read as a hosted service. No status page found: status.vocily.ai gave no answer on 4 November and neither the site nor the docs link one (0). No readable incident history (5). The limit is published as 300 requests a minute per key (moving window), with ten concurrent calls per organisation included (15). A 429 carries Retry-After and X-RateLimit headers, and POST /v1/calls, the write that places a billed call, requires an Idempotency-Key and returns the original call on a retry (15). No SLA found. The terms say availability isn't guaranteed (0). The docs don't label the API beta, but nine dated changes from 23 September to 30 October 2026 changed the /v1 contract, seven of them with removals, changed error codes or changed meanings, and the terms still allow for beta and pre-launch service; the 8 October reading of the API root's version is struck (a request to the product's own endpoint), and the partial is carried (5 of 10). 0 + 5 + 15 + 15 + 0 + 5 = 40.

fone.me 23

Closed service. Terms of service exist at /terms but draw by script, so their content, governing law and the company they name are unchecked; no company, address or country of incorporation appears on any page read, llms.txt says San Francisco, and the MCP repository has no licence (5 of 30). Data handling was read only from guide pages, which say only the owner sees their calls and messages, calls are transcribed and callers told so, and private categories are withheld. The privacy policy and data-deletion page draw by script, so no retention period, recording statement, DPA or AI-training statement was read (8 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notices (0). No subprocessors, telephony, model or hosting providers or data locations are named on any page read; the demo agent card's icon is served from Cloudinary (0 of 20). 5+8+0+0 = 13.

Vocily AI 48

A closed service. The terms (10 June 2026) name no legal entity or governing law, still describe a possible beta, and say paid plans may come later while prices are live (10 of 30). The privacy policy (3 September 2026) is written mainly around WhatsApp data and gives no retention period. The compliance page says recordings are kept for the life of the account and deleted on request, and audio and transcript storage are per-agent settings. No DPA found (12 of 30). The reference promises additive changes within /v1, but removals shipped on 23 and 25 September and 10 and 30 October 2026 with same-day notes and migration tables and no notice period (6 of 20). The privacy policy mentions vetted providers without naming them. The compliance page now says call records, transcripts and recordings are stored on AWS in Mumbai (ap-south-1), that model providers process in their own regions and that Plivo carries calls; no sub-processor list was found, so the partial is carried (6 of 20). 10 + 12 + 6 + 6 = 34.

fone.me 30

No credential exists for callers. llms.txt gives auth 'none', the README says the server is 'public, like the links themselves', and the two agent cards read declare no security scheme. There is nothing to leak or rotate, but fone.me and an owner can tell callers apart only by the name they give ('Maria via ChatGPT' in the README) and by traffic, and no caller identity or verification is documented (10 of 30). Three of four MCP tools are lookups; message_agent and A2A message/send reach any owner's agent. On the owner's side the vendor says the agent asks before agreeing to anything or spending money, the owner approves what it will say before a call, outbound calls run only 8 am to 9 pm local, pause when reported and stop permanently on request, and the owner can take over any chat. No read-only mode and no confirmation on the caller's side (8 of 20). message_agent returns text generated from what the owner taught the agent, and every agent on the platform reads messages from anyone; the only guidance is the how-it-works statement that the agent keeps relationship status, health, money and address private, with no documented prompt-injection or spam handling for the open channel, and the call-screening page says it does not promise to block calls (4 of 15). Owners see every call and chat with a transcript in one inbox; nothing is logged for the calling agent (8 of 15). /.well-known/security.txt answers with the app shell, and no disclosure policy, bug bounty or certification appears on any page read (0 of 20). 10+8+4+8+0 = 30.

Vocily AI 46

Bearer keys are shown once, revocable in the dashboard and bound to one workspace, and they can't reach billing, members or key management. There are no scopes to set and no rotation route, and webhooks are HMAC-signed with a timestamp and a rotation overlap (22 of 30). No read-only key. Spending and contractual actions stay in the dashboard, a version answers calls only after publish and make-live, and the memory erase previews by default (10 of 20). Transcripts and caller speech are untrusted content, and the API docs have no prompt-injection guidance. The site describes topic fencing and an empty-knowledge-base guard (4 of 15). Each call keeps a record with cost and version, webhooks have a delivery log and every response a request id, but we found no audit log of account or key actions (8 of 15). No security.txt (404 on 4 November), disclosure policy, bug bounty or certification. The compliance page says Vocily doesn't claim certification, and the privacy policy states encryption in transit and at rest (2 of 20). 22 + 10 + 4 + 8 + 2 = 46.