Bland AI API + MCP vs fone.me

Bland AI API + MCP 65

Atlassian Statuspage at status.bland.ai with US, Asia Pacific and Canada components and an incident history back to 20 October 2025, read on 2 November through its history feed (20). Six incidents in the 90 days from 4 August. Five were partial and read as minor, latency of 30 minutes on 27 August and 35 minutes on 14 September, delayed or missing audio on BTTS V3 voices for about two hours on 25 September (some calls, one voice family), variable extraction failing for some customers for about an hour on 5 October, and inbound calls in the US region failing for 8 minutes on 19 October with outbound unaffected. On 14 October, from about 3:00 to 4:10 PM PT, an upstream outage took down the language model every agent uses in conversation, live calls went silent or slow and outbound dispatch was paused, which we count as one major (10). Numeric limits are published, 10 concurrent, 100 an hour and 100 a day on Start, 50, 1,000 and 2,000 on Build, 120 MCP requests a minute and one call per number every 10 seconds (15). The call API documents 429 responses with messages, but we found no Retry-After, backoff or idempotency guidance (5 of 15). The pricing page claims a 99.9 per cent uptime SLA on every plan, while the terms of 28 August 2026 give no uptime commitment and no credits, so we give half (5). The API is generally available (10). 20 + 10 + 15 + 5 + 5 + 10 = 65.

fone.me 15

Hosted reading, for the MCP server and A2A endpoints and the service behind them. No status page is linked from llms.txt, the home page or any guide page read, and https://www.fone.me/status failed to load (0). No readable incident history, so the floor (5). No request rate limit for the MCP server, the search API or A2A is published; the only limits are on the agent's own outbound calls (8 am to 9 pm in the callee's time zone, 'limited per day' with no number), which are not request limits (0 of 15). No 429, overload or retry guidance and no idempotency key for message_agent or message/send (0 of 15). No SLA (0). Nothing on the MCP server, the agent cards or llms.txt is marked beta or preview, and the MCP repository's server.json is version 1.0.0 (10). 0+5+0+0+0+10 = 15.

Bland AI API + MCP 79

Organisation API keys, several per organisation and each revocable on its own, and since the 1 October check restricted keys with per-resource scopes (calls:read, calls:create, agents:write and others) and OAuth client credentials with the same permissions for short-lived tokens (an organisation that doesn't see OAuth clients in its dashboard is told to contact support). Restricted keys are rolling out by organisation and aren't available on pinned deployments, credited as conditional availability elsewhere in this run (30). A key can now be limited to read scopes, sign-in connections to the MCP server take mcp:read or mcp:write scopes, and destructive tools carry an annotation for the client's approval prompt. The server no longer asks for confirmation itself, and personas, numbers and tools stay full-access only (15 of 20). Agents read caller speech and transcripts, which are untrusted, and we found guard rails mentioned in the CLI but no prompt-injection guidance (5 of 15). Audit logs exist but are an enterprise function and don't record API key use, and every call has a log; the key list shows who created each key (12 of 15). security.txt valid until 2027-04-05 (re-read on 2 November), a trust portal, SOC 2 Type II and a PCI DSS assessment by a QSA per the vendor, and a disclosure address. No bug bounty found (17 of 20). 30 + 15 + 5 + 12 + 17 = 79.

fone.me 30

No credential exists for callers. llms.txt gives auth 'none', the README says the server is 'public, like the links themselves', and the two agent cards read declare no security scheme. There is nothing to leak or rotate, but fone.me and an owner can tell callers apart only by the name they give ('Maria via ChatGPT' in the README) and by traffic, and no caller identity or verification is documented (10 of 30). Three of four MCP tools are lookups; message_agent and A2A message/send reach any owner's agent. On the owner's side the vendor says the agent asks before agreeing to anything or spending money, the owner approves what it will say before a call, outbound calls run only 8 am to 9 pm local, pause when reported and stop permanently on request, and the owner can take over any chat. No read-only mode and no confirmation on the caller's side (8 of 20). message_agent returns text generated from what the owner taught the agent, and every agent on the platform reads messages from anyone; the only guidance is the how-it-works statement that the agent keeps relationship status, health, money and address private, with no documented prompt-injection or spam handling for the open channel, and the call-screening page says it does not promise to block calls (4 of 15). Owners see every call and chat with a transcript in one inbox; nothing is logged for the calling agent (8 of 15). /.well-known/security.txt answers with the app shell, and no disclosure policy, bug bounty or certification appears on any page read (0 of 20). 10+8+4+8+0 = 30.

Bland AI API + MCP 72

Closed source with clear terms (15). The privacy policy (last updated 23 June 2026) keeps data 'as long as necessary' with no periods for recordings or transcripts, and the trust page says zero-retention processing is available. The terms and the privacy policy both name Intelliga Corporation, doing business as Bland AI (12 of 30). The December 2025 price change was announced with a date and transition credits, and the migration from pathways and personas to agents carries a 15 November 2026 deadline in the docs, but we found no deprecation policy (8 of 20). A subprocessor list of 17 entries with locations, updated 8 September 2026, per the 1 October check, not re-read on 2 November (20). 15 + 12 + 8 + 20 = 55.

fone.me 23

Closed service. Terms of service exist at /terms but draw by script, so their content, governing law and the company they name are unchecked; no company, address or country of incorporation appears on any page read, llms.txt says San Francisco, and the MCP repository has no licence (5 of 30). Data handling was read only from guide pages, which say only the owner sees their calls and messages, calls are transcribed and callers told so, and private categories are withheld. The privacy policy and data-deletion page draw by script, so no retention period, recording statement, DPA or AI-training statement was read (8 of 30). No deprecation policy or dated notices (0). No subprocessors, telephony, model or hosting providers or data locations are named on any page read; the demo agent card's icon is served from Cloudinary (0 of 20). 5+8+0+0 = 13.

Bland AI API + MCP 70

The newest entry in the product changelog is still 3 August 2026, 91 days before 2 November. Bland's official plugin for its hosted MCP server and Norm agent builder (CINTELLILABS/bland-plugins, MIT, linked from the docs) keeps a dated changelog, with bland 2.2.1 and norm 1.11.1 on 20 October 2026 (30). In the 90 days from 4 August, that changelog has 30 dated releases on 13 days from 8 September to 20 October, and the migration guide dates the agent architecture change to September 2026, while the product changelog's 6 July, 21 July and 3 August entries have left the window; the CLI's npm dates couldn't be read (20). Public changelog, no public issue tracker, and we didn't test support (8 of 15 for a closed service). Official tooling is the bland-cli npm package (Node 18 or later), a web SDK and a TTS Node library, with no server SDK in a second language (8 of 15). No public repository or CI for the CLI (4 of 10). 30 + 20 + 8 + 8 + 4 = 70.

fone.me 23

Closed service. The newest dated change to the agent surface found is the MCP repository github.com/spearisa/fone-me-mcp, created 5 October 2026 with server.json version 1.0.0, 31 days ago (20). The comparison page marked 'Checked October 28, 2026' and the profile lastmods in the sitemap are content, not releases. No changelog, release notes or three dated changes in 90 days (0 of 20). The support page and FAQ draw by script and no support email, forum or community channel was found; responsiveness unchecked (3 of 15). server.json names the server me.fone.www/agents, a namespace that needs proof of the domain, but the official MCP registry could not be read, so presence is scored absent (0 of 15). No package, public code or CI (0 of 10). 20+0+3+0+0 = 23.

Bland AI API + MCP 68

No OpenAPI document found. The MCP server's dedicated tools take typed inputs and its API Reference tools take each reference page's parameters, but no machine-readable contract is published (5 of 25). llms.txt with 551 entries, each page served as Markdown (10). MCP tool descriptions say when to use a tool, for example the reference tells agents to use send_call and to choose one of agent_id, persona_id, pathway_id or task (14 of 20). The REST reference types every parameter with enums and defaults, though pathways travel as a raw graph and call_bland_api is a free-form passthrough (11 of 15). Errors for 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 429 and 500 are documented with example messages (13 of 15). Versioned v1 and v2 APIs, agent versions and environments, and a dated changelog (15). 5 + 10 + 14 + 11 + 13 + 15 = 68.

fone.me 31

MCP reading, since the MCP server is what an outside agent calls. No tool arguments or input schemas are published in llms.txt, the guide pages or the GitHub README, and robots.txt disallows /mcp, so no session was opened and tools/list was not read. Per-link A2A agent cards are machine-readable JSON (protocol 0.3.0, JSONRPC, input and output modes, skills with examples) and server.json names the remote, but neither types the MCP tools (8 of 25). llms.txt is a real document for agents covering the MCP server, A2A, the search API and the widget (10). Each tool has a one-line purpose in llms.txt and the README, and the how-it-works page states what the agent will and won't do; nothing says when not to use a tool (6 of 20). No typed inputs, enums, constraints or required fields published (0 of 15). Example prompts in the README, per-skill examples in agent cards and widget code for eight site builders; no error response is documented (4 of 15). server.json and the agent cards carry version 1.0.0 and the cards a protocol version; no changelog (3 of 15). 8+10+6+0+4+3 = 31.

Bland AI API + MCP 53

The hosted MCP server lists 62 dedicated tools and 282 API Reference tools, one per reference page, plus 3 prompts on key connections. Sign-in connections see a smaller allowlist, but there are no toolsets or dynamic loading (5 of 25). List endpoints such as audit logs and knowledge bases page and filter, but we found no field selection on call logs (14 of 20). Errors carry codes and readable messages, and a restricted key's 403 names the permission it lacks (16 of 20). Every MCP tool carries a read, write or destructive annotation, but there are no idempotency keys on call creation (10 of 20). A call needs only phone_number and a task, agent_id, persona_id or pathway_id, with defaults for voice and temperature. Official tooling is the Node CLI, a web SDK and a TTS Node library, and we found no Python SDK (8 of 15). 5 + 14 + 16 + 10 + 8 = 53.

fone.me 29

MCP reading. Four tools named in llms.txt, a small set, but their definitions were not read, so short of full marks (18 of 25). find_agents searches by what someone does and the search API takes a query; no limit, paging or output-size controls are documented (3 of 20). No error codes or messages documented for the MCP server, the search API or A2A (0 of 20). No readOnlyHint or destructiveHint seen and no idempotency key; the three lookups are read-only by name and description, while message_agent writes to a real person's inbox and continues the conversation across calls (2 of 20). No credentials, no configuration beyond the URL, and few stated inputs; no SDK in any language (6 of 15). 18+3+0+2+6 = 29.