BoxLang AI vs TradingAgents

BoxLang AI 74

Framework reading, scored on what a tool-calling agent with MCP takes. An agent with an MCP server is one aiAgent() call with mcpServers, and toolFilter and prefix limit what each server adds. Skills can load lazily, but autoLoadSkills is on by default and injects every SKILL.md under /.agents/skills into every agent (20 of 25). MaxToolCallsMiddleware caps tool calls, window and summary memory bound history by messages or tokens, withMaxResponseBytes caps MCP answers and listTools( cursor ) pages tools (17 of 20). Named exceptions (ProviderError, UnsupportedCapability, InvalidArgument, MCPCommandRefused, BXAI.SecurityViolation) but no reference page, and the changelog says a timed-out call still surfaces as a JSON parse error (12 of 20). RetryMiddleware with exponential backoff, approval resumes that don't replay the model call or rerun executed tools, and a stdio client that never repeats an in-flight call. MCP tool annotations such as readOnlyHint aren't read (15 of 20). An agent needs a name and works with defaults, and a mock provider runs with no key, but it is one language (10 of 15). 74 in all.

TradingAgents 61

Framework reading, scored on what an outside agent needs to call it. No MCP client or server, so it can't be attached as tools; a run is four lines of Python (TradingAgentsGraph(config=...).propagate(ticker, date)) or one headless CLI command with flags (10 of 25). Analyst selection, debate and risk rounds (default 1), max_tool_rounds (20), max_recur_limit (100), article limits and --no-html size a run (14 of 20). A typed vendor error hierarchy separates unavailable from absent data, the headless CLI names the missing flag before a run starts, and an unparseable decision returns REVIEW rather than Hold (15 of 20). Checkpoint resume is opt-in, a backtest rerun with the same run_id skips finished cells, and settlement writes each decision once; nothing writes to an outside system (15 of 20). Sensible defaults, but the default provider is OpenAI's GPT-6 models with a key, and Python only (7 of 15).

BoxLang AI 71

Framework reading. A reference page for each built-in function with its arguments, and tool schemas generated from typed function arguments with required fields since 3.3.1. BoxLang is dynamically typed and no published API reference was found, though the repository builds DocBox API docs (15 of 25). llms.txt with about 150 entries and a Markdown copy of every page (10). The FAQ says when to use aiChat() or aiAgent() and the security guide says which guards to use when, though some FAQ links still say coming soon for pages that exist (14 of 20). Tool arguments are typed with required lists, and stdio options a server doesn't have throw InvalidArgument (11 of 15). About 100 example scripts in the repository and a gallery on ai.boxlang.io, but the production guide catches RateLimitException, TimeoutException and AuthenticationException, which the module's source never throws, and there is no exception reference (9 of 15). Keep a Changelog and a release-history page per version, but the 3.6.0 page still read unreleased on 1 November and two old versions appear twice in the changelog (12 of 15). 71 in all.

TradingAgents 61

Framework reading. No API reference or docs site. Typed interfaces exist in the source, Pydantic models for the research manager's, trader's and portfolio manager's outputs and Annotated signatures on the twelve data tools, with no py.typed marker (10 of 25). The README and changelog are Markdown in the repository; no llms.txt (4 of 10). The README states limits plainly, that runs vary, which statements past-dated runs withhold and why, and that it is a research tool, not advice (15 of 20). Configuration is a plain dict of string keys, though environment overrides are coerced to the default's type and fail loudly on a bad value (8 of 15). Runnable Python and CLI examples throughout the README; the vendor error hierarchy is documented only in source docstrings (9 of 15). Dated changelog for every release from 0.1.0 with upgrade notes (15).

BoxLang AI 50

Self-hosted rule, scored on the paid option. No payment protocol (0). BoxLang runtime plans are public without a login, Starter $749 a year and BoxLang+ and BoxLang++ from $1,999 to $4,999 a server or node a year, plan pricing rather than per unit (10). The Apache-2.0 module installs with no card (20) and no account or sign-up (20). 50 in all.

TradingAgents 60

No payment protocol (0). Self-hosted rule. Free under Apache 2.0 with nothing to buy from Tauric Research to run it (20), no card (20) and no Tauric account (20). Tauric Research's hosted services at tauric.ai are invitation or enterprise access with no public price and aren't the graded surface. Model provider costs are the user's.

BoxLang AI 71

Framework reading. 30 for what leaves the machine and credentials, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt injection, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. No telemetry in the module's source, requests go only to configured providers, keys come from settings or environment variables, and request logging is off by default. 3.4.0 fixed a Gemini key leaking into logs through the request URL (27 of 30). Approval is enforced in code by HumanInTheLoopMiddleware with five policies, GuardrailMiddleware blocks tools by name and argument pattern, and stdio commands never use a shell. All of it is opt-in. allowedCommands allows any executable by default, FileSystemTools allows any path without allowedPaths, and the MCP server has no authentication unless configured (12 of 20). Unicode hygiene and fencing of ${context} are on by default, with opt-in input sanitiser, LLM judge and output guard. Streaming guards detect after the fact, which the changelog says (14 of 15). About 70 interception points, LoggingMiddleware, FlightRecorderMiddleware and MCP server statistics, with no OpenTelemetry export (11 of 15). CONTRIBUTING.md asks for reports to security@ortussolutions.com and the Slack #security channel. No security.txt (410), no bounty, and no published advisory found, while 3.6.0 lists a SQL injection fix in MySQL vector memory under Fixed (7 of 20). 71 in all.

TradingAgents 62

Framework reading. 30 for what leaves the machine and how credentials are held, 20 for least privilege and approvals, 15 for prompt injection, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. Keys are read from the environment, and the package loads the nearest .env on import by walking up from the working directory. The ChatGPT sign-in uses PKCE and dynamic client registration, keeps tokens in a 0600 file and revokes them on logout. The only calls of its own are the interactive CLI's daily release and notice check, with no run data, off without a terminal or with TRADINGAGENTS_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1. SEC EDGAR gets a placeholder contact address unless one is set (24 of 30). It places no orders and holds no broker credentials, the data tools only read, and every ticker is validated before it is used in a file path. No approval hooks, which nothing in it needs (14 of 20). News, Reddit and StockTwits text goes into prompts. The source names prompt injection as the reason for path validation, but no guidance on injection was found in the README (5 of 15). Saved reports record the run's settings and each agent's report, the memory log keeps every decision, and debug=True streams the graph (11 of 15). Security reports go to GitHub private vulnerability reporting per the issue template, and the changelog has Security sections for a langchain-core patch and a dependency removed over CVE-2026-22218. No SECURITY.md, no security.txt on tauric.ai, no bounty, and the repository's advisories page wasn't read (8 of 20).