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  "markdown": "One company's docs show a full fit.\n\n| Companies, full fit | With a limit | Carry the tag | Share of the category's work | First-hand accounts |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 1 | 11 | 12 | 9 | 3 |\n\n## What counts as done\n\nAfter rotation the next read returns the new value without a restart, the old value stops working within a stated window, and after revocation the identity's next read fails with no cached fallback serving values.\n\nMeasured, for our own tests: the read after revocation fails within 60 seconds.\n\nHow agents ask for it: the key leaked, rotate it; revoke the agent's token now; roll the database password without restarting the agent\n\n## Does the job\n\nThe docs show it meets the test above, and nothing we read says otherwise.\n\n- **HashiCorp Vault + Vault MCP Server (HashiCorp, Inc. (an IBM company))**: Dynamic secrets carry leases; revoking one invalidates it immediately and deletes cloud keys such as AWS ones at revoke. Agent re-renders on change and restarts the supervised process by default.\n\n## Does the job, with a limit\n\nIt does the job, but something in the docs or a user's account will get in an agent's way. The limit is named in each row.\n\n- **1Password service accounts, SDKs and Environments MCP (AgileBits Inc. (doing business as 1Password))**: References resolve at each read, so a changed value arrives on the next read, but op run fixes values at child start. Tokens can be revoked; no page states how long a revoked token keeps reading. No managed rotation.\n- **Akeyless (SecretlessAI and MCP server) (Akeyless Security Ltd.)**: Rotated secrets cover databases, clouds and SaaS, with graceful rotation, and UID tokens can be revoked with a 60-minute default TTL. No page states how long a revoked identity or the Gateway cache keeps serving values.\n- **AWS Secrets Manager (Amazon Web Services, Inc. (Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL and other regional entities by account location))**: Managed rotation covers the RDS family, and other secrets need a Lambda function you write; AWSPREVIOUS keeps the last version readable. Caching clients serve values until their TTL, and no revocation window is stated.\n- **Azure Key Vault (Microsoft Corporation)**: No managed rotation for secrets; a near-expiry event triggers your own Function. Removing a role assignment takes several minutes to refresh, beyond the 60-second bar.\n- **Bitwarden Secrets Manager (Bitwarden Inc. (terms name 8bit Solutions LLC, wholly owned by Bitwarden Inc.))**: Reads are live, so an edited value arrives on the next read, but there is no rotation, and a revoked token keeps reading for up to an hour on authenticated machines, longer through reused state files.\n- **Doppler (Doppler Technologies, Inc.)**: Rotation with a two-secret strategy is Team and Enterprise only, and doppler run fixes values at start. The fallback snapshot can serve values without the API, and no revocation window is stated.\n- **Google Cloud Secret Manager (Google LLC (Google Cloud EMEA Limited and other regional entities by billing address))**: Rotation is a SECRET_ROTATE message to Pub/Sub that your subscriber must act on. Removing an IAM grant typically takes 2 minutes and can take 7 or longer, past the 60-second bar.\n- **Infisical (Infisical, Inc.)**: A revoked Agent Vault session stops getting credentials within one 60-second poll, but the proxy keeps cached session data for five polls if Infisical is unreachable. run --watch restarts the child on change; it does not update in place.\n- **Keeper Secrets Manager (Keeper Security, Inc.)**: Revoking a device configuration cuts access immediately, but the optional SDK cache serves the last secrets when Keeper is unreachable, and rotation needs KeeperPAM with a Gateway.\n- **Phase (Phi Security Inc.)**: Rotating secrets mint a new credential and revoke the old one after a stated revocation delay, picked up on next read. Rotation needs Pro, and how fast a revoked service account token stops reading is not stated.\n- **Pulumi ESC (Pulumi Corporation)**: Rotators keep two valid secrets and each open reads the current one, but rotation runs only on schedule or command and no doc states how fast a revoked token stops opening environments.\n\n## What stops agents finishing\n\n- revoked token keeps working up to an hour on authenticated machines (Bitwarden)\n- CLI fallback file serves values after revocation (Doppler)\n- rotation outside managed databases needs a function the owner writes\n- leak notice lost in an inbox\n\n## Around it\n\nBefore: security-intelligence.leak-alert, email.read-inbox. After: notifications.push.\n\n## Where this comes from\n\nWeight 9 of 100 in Secrets \u0026 credential vaults: 3 of 27 accounts (hosting-provider leak, CI leak, moving off env vars); held up by the category test and the Bitwarden, Doppler and Trigger.dev weaknesses on revocation lag\n\nAs data: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/use-cases/secrets.rotate-revoke.json, or the MCP tool get_use_case with id secrets.rotate-revoke. Draft, read 2026-11-15 from public docs and first-hand accounts, not yet reviewed by a person.\n",
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    "description": "Rotate a key or revoke an identity while agents are running: 1 companies fully do it, 11 with a limit, 12 carry the tag. Every listing in Secrets \u0026 credential vaults with the reason and a source.",
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