# Give an agent access to one bucket or folder and nothing else

> Give an agent access to one bucket or folder and nothing else: 6 companies fully do it, 6 with a limit, 9 carry the tag. Every listing in File storage & sharing with the reason and a source.

- Canonical: https://www.anchorterminal.com/niches/file-storage.scoped-access/
- Markdown: https://www.anchorterminal.com/niches/file-storage.scoped-access/index.md (~1,550 tokens)
- Slim: https://www.anchorterminal.com/niches/file-storage.scoped-access/index.min.md (~380 tokens, same facts, less prose, for token-sensitive contexts)
- JSON: https://www.anchorterminal.com/niches/file-storage.scoped-access/index.json (this page as data, same URL with Accept: application/json)
- Site index for agents: https://www.anchorterminal.com/llms.txt (the key docs and every listing in one file, at most 16 MB, about 4 million tokens: https://www.anchorterminal.com/llms-full.txt)
- API: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/index.json
- MCP: https://www.anchorterminal.com/mcp (the whole catalogue as tools, no key)
- DNS: dig +short TXT <slug>.grade.anchorterminal.com (the grade as a DNS TXT record, for a sandbox with no HTTP where names still resolve; also top., best.<category>. and <a>.vs.<b>. under the zone, and the same under grade.letme.dev)
- Licence: CC BY 4.0, credit Anchor Terminal and link this page (https://www.anchorterminal.com/terms/#data)
- Updated: 2026-11-15

Four or more companies' docs show a full fit.

| Companies, full fit | With a limit | Carry the tag | Share of the category's work | First-hand accounts |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 6 | 6 | 9 | 19 | 7 |

## What counts as done

A credential limited to one bucket, prefix or folder with chosen verbs (read, write without delete), created, rotated and revoked through the API, and deletes recoverable for a set period.

How agents ask for it: let the agent write to the uploads bucket only; give it read-only access to the cache; make sure it can't delete anything; rotate the leaked key

## Does the job

The docs show it meets the test above, and nothing we read says otherwise.

- **Amazon S3 (Amazon Web Services, Inc.)**: Bucket and IAM policies scope by prefix and action, so PutObject can be allowed without DeleteObject. IAM CreateAccessKey manages keys by API, and versioning keeps deleted objects with noncurrent-expiry rules.
- **Azure Blob Storage (Microsoft Corporation)**: RBAC on one container with ABAC conditions on blob path, blobs/write separate from blobs/delete, key regeneration through the management REST API, and soft delete retention of 1 to 365 days.
- **Backblaze B2 (Backblaze, Inc.)**: Standard application keys limit to one bucket and a name prefix with chosen capabilities (writeFiles without deleteFiles) and an expiry, made by b2_create_key; deleted files stay as hidden versions until a lifecycle rule removes them.
- **Box API + MCP (Box, Inc.)**: POST /oauth2/token downscopes a token to chosen scopes and one item's URL, so upload can be granted without delete. Tokens can be revoked by API, and trashed items stay restorable until the purge window.
- **Google Cloud Storage (Google LLC (Google Cloud EMEA Limited and other regional entities by billing address))**: IAM on a bucket or managed folder, HMAC keys created and deleted through the API for a service account, and soft delete keeps deleted objects for 7 to 90 days.
- **Wasabi Hot Cloud Storage (Wasabi Technologies LLC)**: Sub-users take IAM policies limited to one bucket and chosen S3 actions, STS AssumeRole issues temporary credentials with inline policies, each user holds two rotatable keys, and versioning or Object Lock makes deletes recoverable.

## Does the job, with a limit

It does the job, but something in the docs or a user's account will get in an agent's way. The limit is named in each row.

- **Cloudflare R2 (Cloudflare, Inc.)**: Tokens scope to buckets, and temporary credentials narrow to prefixes and a list of S3 actions, so write without delete is possible. With no versioning, deleted objects can't be recovered; bucket locks only block deletion.
- **DigitalOcean Spaces (DigitalOcean, LLC)**: Limited keys grant Read or Read/Write/Delete per bucket, with no prefix and no write-without-delete (a named blocker). POST /v2/spaces/keys manages keys by API, but acc-29 couldn't rotate one from an agent session without a DigitalOcean token.
- **Dropbox API + MCP (Dropbox, Inc.)**: App Folder access roots an app in one folder, and deleted files can be restored. The pages read show no scope for write without delete, and key rotation is OAuth token revocation rather than storage keys.
- **Fastio (VividEngine, LLC (doing business as Fast Technologies))**: API keys and service-account keys can be scoped to one workspace with r or rw and an expiry, created by API, and a trash folder exists. There is no write-without-delete grant.
- **Google Drive API + MCP (Google LLC)**: drive.file limits an app to files it made or the user picked, which can't reach existing files (acc-19); sharing one folder to a service account is the folder-level option. No write-without-trash role; trash is recoverable.
- **OneDrive and SharePoint files (Microsoft Graph) (Microsoft Corporation)**: Sites.Selected and Files.SelectedOperations.Selected let an admin grant an app access to one site, library, folder or file with read or write roles. No write-without-delete role was found, and recycle-bin retention wasn't read.
- **Tigris (Tigris Data Inc.)**: Access keys take per-bucket roles, but Editor is read, write and delete and ReadOnly reads only, so write-without-delete needs an IAM policy, which I didn't read. Keys are deleted to revoke, and snapshot-enabled buckets recover deleted files.

- not this job: Bunny Storage (BunnyWay d.o.o.): The only storage credential is a zone password, read-write or read-only, with no prefix scope or write-without-delete; acc-21 found the account API key doesn't reach storage.
- not this job: ONLYOFFICE Apps MCP Server (Ascensio System SIA): The hosted server's OAuth proxy hands every client one shared OAuth application and changes scope handling, and toolsets limit tools rather than the credential; no folder-scoped key is offered.

## What stops agents finishing

- keys are per account, or rotation needs a console sign-in
- no write-without-delete verb
- the drive's narrow scope breaks the tools the agent needs

## Around it

Before: secrets.store. After: file-storage.agent-upload.

## Where this comes from

Weight 19 of 100 in File storage & sharing: 7 of 36 links; issues where operators narrow an agent's reach or found they could not

As data: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/use-cases/file-storage.scoped-access.json, or the MCP tool get_use_case with id file-storage.scoped-access. Draft, read 2026-11-15 from public docs and first-hand accounts, not yet reviewed by a person.

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Query this catalogue directly over MCP: https://www.anchorterminal.com/mcp (Streamable HTTP, no key). How: https://www.anchorterminal.com/agents/#mcp
