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  "markdown": "Four or more companies' docs show a full fit.\n\n| Companies, full fit | With a limit | Carry the tag | Share of the category's work | First-hand accounts |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 5 | 15 | 39 | 20 | 16 |\n\n## What counts as done\n\nThe agent reaches the signed-in page and completes the action with the credential values never appearing in the model's context or logs, and a human is asked for at most one code.\n\nHow agents ask for it: log in to my Zoho and reconcile these invoices; change my password on these sites; download last month's statement from the portal; post this to my WordPress; review the applications in the admin panel\n\n## Does the job\n\nThe docs show it meets the test above, and nothing we read says otherwise.\n\n- **Anchor Browser (Anchor Forge Inc.)**: Identities store credentials and re-authenticate before a session, with email OTP, TOTP, 1Password and custom MFA through signal and wait event endpoints. create_reauth_link hands a person a sign-in link, and secretValues are typed without being logged or shown to the model.\n- **Browser Use (Browser Use, Inc.)**: V4 secretBindings with allowedDomains and the library's sensitive_data with type_secret keep values out of the model, TOTP seeds type the current code, profiles carry logins and a human can take over at the 2FA screen through live_view_url with keepAlive. acc-21 confirmed credentials never entered the model.\n- **Browserless (browserless.io, Inc.)**: Authenticated profiles restore cookies, localStorage and IndexedDB with ?profile=, loadSecret types a 1Password op:// reference server-side so the value never enters the model, and a hybrid Live URL hands a 2FA or captcha step to a person with instructions and a Done button.\n- **Notte (Notte Labs Inc.)**: Vault placeholders are swapped outside the model context during fill, with 2FA support and secret proxies for one-time codes; profiles and Managed Auth connections start sessions signed in. Live view is watch-only, so a human code goes through the Managed Auth connect flow.\n- **Pomerado (Pomerado AI, Inc.)**: A job that needs a login pauses with an answer_url where the person types it on a protected page, never in chat; saved authenticator keys, recovery codes or a Pomerado phone number finish two-step sign-in, and otherwise the job asks once for the code.\n\n## Does the job, with a limit\n\nIt does the job, but something in the docs or a user's account will get in an agent's way. The limit is named in each row.\n\n- **agent-browser (Vercel Inc.)**: --profile copies the person's Chrome profile, state save/load reuses auth state and the auth vault types passwords the model never sees. No handoff link for a 2FA code beyond running --headed, and cross-origin iframes that block tree access are silently omitted.\n- **Airtop (Switchboard Visual Technologies, Inc. (dba Airtop))**: Profiles save cookies and local storage after a one-time login, and an interactive Live View with a navigation bar lets a person type a 2FA code. No secret placeholder or vault exists, so credential values travel through the agent's own type calls.\n- **Browserbase (Browserbase, Inc.)**: Contexts persist cookies across sessions, the live view lets a person log in or enter a code (acc-34 on LinkedIn), and Agents pause with pauseWhen. Keeping the value out of the model needs 1Password Agentic Autofill and a 1Password Business OAuth client; acc-21 found the MCP had no credential handling.\n- **BxPlaywright (Ortus Solutions, Corp.)**: A login is scripted with page.visit and fill in BoxLang code, so the credential sits in the script or its environment, not in a vault; a 2FA code needs a person at the headed browser the CLI opens.\n- **Chrome DevTools MCP (Google LLC)**: --autoConnect attaches to the person's running Chrome 144+ with its logins after one permission dialog (acc-42 closed completed), and --userDataDir persists a profile. No secret mechanism: fill takes the value in the model's context, and a 2FA code needs the person at the headed browser.\n- **Functionize MCP server (Functionize, Inc.)**: Credentials go in masked variables hidden from logs and screenshots, email codes are read from an @functionizeapp.com mailbox, SMS needs a provisioned number and TOTP works only through a login component. Built for test accounts, not a person's own account with hardware 2FA.\n- **Hyperbrowser (S2 Labs Inc.)**: Profiles persist cookies and storage, credential fill types stored secrets and TOTP codes without the LLM seeing them, and the live view is interactive for a person. Credential fill is in public preview and enabled per team on request.\n- **Kane CLI (TestMu AI (formerly LambdaTest))**: Named chrome_profile directories, cookie and localStorage seeding and secret: true variables that go to HyperExecute Secrets keep logins and credentials out of the objective text. No 2FA handoff is documented beyond the person acting in the headed local Chrome.\n- **Kernel (Kernel Technologies, Inc.)**: Profiles persist logins with save_changes, Managed Auth refreshes them, and vault fill types credentials and TOTP without the value passing through the controller or model. acc-21 found Kernel's auth paywalled in March 2026, and the vault docs say fill is not isolation from a browser the agent fully controls.\n- **Lightpanda (Selecy SAS)**: Credentials pass as $LP_* placeholders the model never resolves and a login tool picks the fields, with getCookies for state. No saved profile or storage state between runs is documented, and acc-67's SAML login left the DOM unchanged after submit (closed completed).\n- **Playwright MCP (Microsoft Corporation)**: --storage-state and --user-data-dir start signed in, --extension drives the person's running Chrome with its logins and --background keeps focus. --secrets only redacts matching text in responses, so a 2FA code and any unredacted value still pass through the model. acc-06's agent gave up on walled sites.\n- **Puppeteer (Google LLC)**: browser.setCookie and userDataDir restore a login, and puppeteer.connect attaches to a Chrome started with a debugging endpoint. No secret mechanism beyond the script reading env vars, and a 2FA code needs a person at a headed browser.\n- **Selenium (Software Freedom Conservancy)**: The authentication guide logs in once, adds the session cookie through the cookie API and reloads, and BiDi answers basic-auth challenges. No secret mechanism beyond the script's own env vars, and 2FA needs a person. acc-60 reused the default browser's cookies in a 250-line script.\n- **Skyvern (Ikonomos Inc.)**: Credentials reach the model as placeholders and Skyvern types the value, 2FA runs through TOTP, email, SMS or magic links, Bitwarden, 1Password and Azure vaults connect, profiles save signed-in state and Take control hands the live browser to a person. acc-49's cookies-not-persisting issue is still open.\n- **Steel (Nen Labs, Inc.)**: The Credentials API injects stored logins and TOTP codes into the page with blurFields and exactOrigin, profiles and contexts carry state between sessions, and an interactive debug URL lets a person type a code. Credentials are in beta, and acc-70 saw a self-hosted timeout ignored.\n- **TinyFish (Tiny Fish, Inc.)**: Vault credentials from a connected password manager are filled without the agent seeing them, and Browser Context Profiles reuse a logged-in state. No live takeover or code input is documented; the streaming_url is a view.\n\n- not this job: CurlShot (MEDIAPRONET SRL): REST accepts cookies, headers and authorization to render a page behind a login, but there is no action after the render, so no task inside the account can be completed.\n\n## What stops agents finishing\n\n- a 2FA prompt with no way to pass a code in (acc-28, acc-50)\n- a vendor's own safety rule that refuses to type a password (acc-21)\n- a sign-in form inside a cross-origin iframe the snapshot cannot see (acc-45, acc-55)\n- cookies that do not survive between runs despite a persistent session id (acc-49, acc-57)\n- credential functions behind a paywall or an early-access product (acc-21)\n\n## Around it\n\nBefore: secrets.store, personal-assistants.always-on-assistant. After: document-extraction.table-from-text, messaging.send.\n\n## Where this comes from\n\nWeight 20 of 100 in Browser automation: 16 of 61 accounts; the largest cluster of GitHub issues across six listings is about keeping or injecting a login (acc-21, acc-22, acc-28, acc-29, acc-31, acc-34, acc-35, acc-42, acc-44, acc-45, acc-47, acc-49, acc-50, acc-52, acc-55, acc-57)\n\nAs data: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/use-cases/browser.signed-in-task.json, or the MCP tool get_use_case with id browser.signed-in-task. Draft, read 2026-11-12 from public docs and first-hand accounts, not yet reviewed by a person.\n",
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    "description": "Do a task inside an account the person is signed in to: 5 companies fully do it, 15 with a limit, 39 carry the tag. Every listing in Browser automation with the reason and a source.",
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