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  "markdown": "No company's docs show a full fit yet. The listings below do the job with a limit, or not at all.\n\n| Companies, full fit | With a limit | Carry the tag | Share of the category's work | First-hand accounts |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 0 | 12 | 20 | 5 | 2 |\n\n## What counts as done\n\nAfter revocation the agent's next call fails with a typed revoked error, the stored refresh token is gone, and the grant is also revoked at the provider where it has an endpoint.\n\nMeasured, for our own tests: the next call fails within 60 seconds of revocation.\n\nHow agents ask for it: cut off the agent's access to my Drive; revoke everything this agent was given; disconnect my account\n\n## Does the job, with a limit\n\nIt does the job, but something in the docs or a user's account will get in an agent's way. The limit is named in each row.\n\n- **Aembit (Aembit, Inc.)**: Revoking a session stops its refresh tokens and denies requests within about a minute, logged as McpSessionExpiredOrRevoked. It does not revoke the user's grants at the MCP server, and the access token is still accepted by the gateway until expiry.\n- **Arcade.dev (Arcade AI, Inc.)**: DELETE /v1/admin/user_connections/{id} removes one user's connection. The docs read say nothing about revoking at the provider or how quickly a running tool stops.\n- **Auth0 for AI Agents (Token Vault) (Okta, Inc.)**: Deleting a connected account removes its tokens from Token Vault, but Auth0 says this does not revoke at the provider and the refresh token could still mint access tokens until revoked there.\n- **Cloudflare Workers OAuth Provider (Cloudflare, Inc.)**: RFC 7009 revocation works on the token endpoint and deleting a client revokes its grants, but an open issue of 28 October reports revocation is not final under KV eventual consistency and can resurrect a deleted grant.\n- **Descope Agentic Identity Hub (Descope, Inc.)**: Revoking an agentic identity, in the console or by API, invalidates its current tokens and ends its sessions without deleting the client. Timing and revocation at the third-party provider are not stated.\n- **Keycard (Keycard Labs, Inc.)**: Revoking a grant in the Console or API stops the next credential, but there is no per-token kill switch, and for brokered providers the last token keeps working at the provider, about 8 hours for GitHub.\n- **Microsoft Entra Agent ID (Microsoft Corporation)**: Agent identities can be deleted through Graph, separately from users. Revoking one user's delegated grant, and how long issued tokens keep working, is not covered in the Agent ID pages.\n- **Nango (Nango Inc)**: Terminating an agent session makes its MCP server answer 401 at once, and connections can be deleted by API. The docs read do not say whether deleting a connection revokes the grant at the provider.\n- **Scalekit AgentKit (ScaleKit, Inc.)**: delete_connected_account removes a user's connected account, and DISCONNECTED is a typed status. The docs read do not say whether deletion revokes at the provider or how fast running calls stop.\n- **Stytch Connected Apps (Twilio Inc.)**: Deleting a consent grant revokes every access and refresh token issued to that app for the user, and org settings can deny all connected apps. How quickly a revoked access token stops working at the MCP server is not stated.\n- **Vercel Connect (Vercel Inc.)**: revokeToken, the CLI and dashboard call the provider's revocation endpoint where one exists; otherwise the token is deleted from Connect's store but may keep working at the provider until expiry. The SDK's in-process cache can also hold it.\n- **WorkOS Pipes and Agents (WorkOS, Inc.)**: Deleting a connected account removes stored access and refresh tokens, but WorkOS says it does not revoke access on the provider side; the user may need to disconnect at the provider.\n\n- not this job: Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity (Amazon Web Services, Inc.): No operation revokes one user's stored grant; forceAuthentication clears a refresh token on the next request, and AWS says it cannot detect revocation at the provider.\n- not this job: Clerk MCP server (Clerk, Inc.): No revoke or disconnect call is documented beyond signing out in the client.\n\n## What stops agents finishing\n\n- revocation endpoint advertised but not implemented\n- no per-token kill switch, so a revoked grant lives until expiry\n- deleting the connection does not revoke at the provider\n- eventually consistent store keeps a revoked token working briefly\n\n## Around it\n\nBefore: agent-auth.connect-user-account. After: agent-auth.audit-agent-actions.\n\n## Where this comes from\n\nWeight 5 of 100 in Agent auth \u0026 delegated access: 2 of 33 accounts (Cloudflare revocation endpoint and refresh rotation); held up because the category test and buyer check 4 rest on it and several listing weaknesses (Keycard, WorkOS, AgentCore, Vercel) concern it\n\nAs data: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/use-cases/agent-auth.revoke-access.json, or the MCP tool get_use_case with id agent-auth.revoke-access. Draft, read 2026-11-15 from public docs and first-hand accounts, not yet reviewed by a person.\n",
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    "description": "Revoke an agent's access and have it stop: 0 companies fully do it, 12 with a limit, 20 carry the tag. Every listing in Agent auth \u0026 delegated access with the reason and a source.",
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