# Fix list: Privy Wallets (server wallets, agent wallets, policy engine) From Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/privy, the October 2026 research run, assessed 1 October 2026. Grade BB, 70.1 out of 100. This is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public. For a coding agent working on Privy Wallets (server wallets, agent wallets, policy engine): work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published. ## 1. Reliability, 48 out of 100, up to 10.4 more on the total Why it scored 48: Status page at status.privy.io with components and an RSS history back to July 2025 (20). Since 3 July 2026 it lists 13 incidents. Database problems took down API endpoints for 71 minutes on 18 September, wallet actions and finality were delayed for 1 hour 59 minutes the same day, and /api/v1/sessions failed for 78 minutes on 3 August; the rest were webhook, Solana, gas-sponsorship and OAuth delays of 30 minutes to 3 hours, several from upstream providers (5 of 30). Rate limits are enforced per app with 429s, but no numbers are published (0). Idempotency keys on state-changing POSTs such as `/rpc`, `/transfer` and `/wallets`, honoured for 24 hours, and the error guide says when a retry is safe; no 429 or backoff guidance found (10 of 15). The pricing page lists "premium SLAs" on Enterprise without publishing terms (5 of 10). The wallet API is generally available; the Agent CLI is 0.3.6 (8 of 10). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability): Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms. - 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own). - 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so. - 15, rate limits documented with numbers. - 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved. - 10, an SLA published for any paid tier. - 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview. Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers. - 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated. - 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch. - 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered). - 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog. - 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable. Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors. ## 2. Payments & pricing, 55 out of 100, up to 5.6 more on the total Why it scored 55: Payment platforms and wallets take the highest step that applies on the 40-point protocol line. 40 for x402, MPP or L402 on all their own endpoints, 30 on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, 0 for only a protocol of their own. Privy ships x402 and MPP payer clients and has accepted x402 from gas-sponsored wallets since July 2026, but its own API isn't paid over either, so the buyer step (15 of 40). Plans are public and overages are priced per unit, $0.01 per signature and $0.05 per MAU, though the base tiers are per-MAU plans (15 of 20). A free Developer plan up to 499 MAU, 50,000 signatures and $1M volume a month, with no card requirement stated (20). The Agent CLI needs a person to approve a device login in a browser once, after which the agent creates its own wallets; the API needs a dashboard app (5 of 20). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments): The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/). - 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which. - 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for "contact sales" or prices behind a login. - 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card. - 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API). Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied. Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol. ## 3. Agent ergonomics, 73 out of 100, up to 4.4 more on the total Why it scored 73: No MCP server, so an agent works through the API, SDKs or the Agent CLI, and response sizing is ordinary REST (15 of 25). We didn't confirm paging and filter parameters on list endpoints this run (10 of 20). Errors such as `policy_violation`, `insufficient_funds` and `transaction_broadcast_failure` come with recovery steps, and the guide says a failed broadcast is safe to retry (16 of 20). Idempotency keys on every state-changing wallet route, 24-hour window, 400 on a changed body (20). SDKs for Node (0.35.0), Python, React and Flutter plus the Agent CLI, but requests on key-owned wallets also need an authorisation signature (12 of 15). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics): - 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries). - 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls. - 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from. - 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations. - 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages. Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs. ## 4. Schema & documentation, 83 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total Why it scored 83: A public OpenAPI 3.1 document at api.privy.io/v1/openapi.json, though its `info.version` is 0.0.1 (25). llms.txt with 400+ links and Markdown twins (10). The docs explain what each wallet action and policy field is for; we didn't read every reference page (14 of 20). Policy conditions are typed by field source and operator, with a `chain_type` on every policy (13 of 15). Ten named API error codes, each with troubleshooting steps, and examples in the docs, but no table of HTTP statuses (11 of 15). `/v1` paths and monthly product updates, but the OpenAPI version has never moved off 0.0.1 (10 of 15). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema): APIs and MCP servers. - 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool). - 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents. - 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference. - 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs. - 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses. - 15, versioning and a public changelog. Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference. ## 5. Security & auth, 85 out of 100, up to 2.6 more on the total Why it scored 85: The app secret on Basic auth can do anything in the app, but wallets owned by an authorisation key or a key quorum also need that key's signature on each request, delegated signers on user wallets can be revoked, and the Agent CLI uses a device flow with short-lived signing keys and sessions of up to 30 days with rotation (27 of 30). Policies deny by default, DENY beats ALLOW, and rules cover recipients, values, contracts, decoded calldata, typed data and time windows, enforced inside AWS Nitro Enclaves before signing; key quorums add m-of-n approval and the x402 and MPP clients cap each request with `maxValue`. Rolling caps are EVM only and update after signing, per the 30 September check (19 of 20). We found no prompt-injection guidance for agents reading wallet or token data (8 of 15). Activity logs and webhooks (13 of 15). SOC 2 Type I and Type II, audits by Cure53, Zellic and Doyensec, a HackerOne bug bounty and a disclosure page at privy.io/vulnerability-disclosure; no security.txt (18 of 20). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security): - 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option. - 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions. - 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10. - 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator. - 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public. Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing. ## 6. Transparency & trust, 73 out of 100, up to 2.4 more on the total Made of editorial 60, provenance 86. Why it scored 73: Closed service under developer terms; the Agent CLI is Apache-2.0 and the Shamir secret-sharing library is open source (18 of 30). The privacy policy, updated 20 May 2026, names Horkos, LLC d/b/a Privy with Stripe as parent, separates controller and service-provider roles, has a DPA with standard clauses and says Privy can never rebuild users' keys, which matches the architecture docs; it gives no retention periods (20 of 30). Monthly updates, but no dated deprecation notices found (6 of 20). Subprocessors listed in a linked trust centre, and hosting stated as the United States (16 of 20). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency): - 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms. - 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors). - 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates. - 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted). The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two. Provenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts): - Domain age: privy.io, registered 2018-10-07 (7 years) (11 of 15) - security.txt: not found (0 of 10) ## 7. Maintenance & community, 80 out of 100, up to 1.8 more on the total Why it scored 80: @privy-io/node is at 0.35.0, released 28 September per the 30 September check, and the Agent CLI shipped 0.3.6 on 31 August (30). Agent CLI 0.3.3, 0.3.4, 0.3.5 and 0.3.6 between 23 July and 31 August, plus beta builds (20). Monthly product updates through August 2026; we didn't test a support channel (10 of 15). Current official SDKs in four languages (15). The CLI is pre-1.0 and CI isn't public (5 of 10). The checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance): - 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older. - 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days. - 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15. - 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models). - 10, package health, current dependencies and CI. Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts. ## What we couldn't check What we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it. - unchecked: paging and filter parameters on list endpoints - unchecked: whether the 30 September note that rolling caps overshoot under concurrency still matches the stateful-policies page - Rate-limit numbers; none published - Whether a September 2026 product update is coming; the latest entry we found is August ## Weaknesses - Database problems took API endpoints down for 71 minutes on 18 September 2026, one of 13 incidents since July - Rate limits aren't published as numbers - Rolling caps are EVM only and update after signing, so parallel requests can exceed them - The app secret can do anything in the app; the limits come from authorisation keys and policies - No MCP server, and the Agent CLI needs a person to approve its login in a browser ## What costs an agent a turn today The notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need. - Add a rule for every RPC method the agent needs; a wallet with a policy denies anything unlisted - Pair a rolling cap with a lower per-transaction cap, since aggregations update only after signing - Send an idempotency key on `/rpc`, `/transfer` and `/wallets` calls; reusing one with a changed body returns 400 - Set `maxValue` on the x402 or MPP client for every request - Retry a `transaction_broadcast_failure`; don't retry a `policy_violation` ## What the review panel asked for - State free-plan card rules - caps enforced before signing - scoped app credentials ## When it's done Send what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `"kind": "dispute"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.