{
  "fixes": {
    "slug": "ntfy",
    "name": "ntfy",
    "listing": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/ntfy",
    "markdown": "# Fix list: ntfy\n\nFrom Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/ntfy, the October 2026 research run, assessed 1 October 2026. Grade C, 61.6 out of 100.\n\nThis is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.\n\nFor a coding agent working on ntfy: work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published.\n\n## 1. Security \u0026 auth, 38 out of 100, up to 10.9 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 38: Access tokens as `Authorization: Bearer`, revocable and with optional expiry, plus per-topic ACLs on accounts. On ntfy.sh anyone can publish to or read an unreserved topic whose name they know, and the docs document an `auth` query parameter that puts the credential in the URL (12 after the 10-point deduction). ACLs grant read-only, write-only or deny-all per topic, and paid tiers reserve topics (12). Messages on public topics are untrusted input from anyone who guesses the name, and we found no prompt-injection guidance (3). Tokens record last access time and IP, with no per-call log (3). SECURITY.md with a private email and GitHub private reporting. Fixes such as the template CPU denial of service in v2.26.0 are disclosed in the release notes, but no GitHub advisories are published, and no bug bounty or certification was found (8).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security):\n\n- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.\n- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.\n- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.\n- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.\n- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.\n\nModels are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing.\n\n## 2. Schema \u0026 documentation, 53 out of 100, up to 7.6 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 53: No OpenAPI or other machine-readable contract (0). No llms.txt (docs.ntfy.sh/llms.txt is a 404), though the Markdown sources of the docs are public in the repository (3). Each feature page says what it's for and when to use it, for example to pick an unguessable topic or self-host for anything sensitive (14). Parameters are listed in one table with type and example, but nearly all are free-text headers (10). Examples in curl, the CLI, HTTP, JavaScript, Go, PowerShell, Python and PHP. Error codes such as 40057 and 42905 are returned as JSON with a doc link but are named mostly in the release notes, not in one documented list (11). Semver tags and a dated release notes page (15).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema):\n\nAPIs and MCP servers.\n\n- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).\n- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.\n- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.\n- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.\n- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.\n- 15, versioning and a public changelog.\n\nModels are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference.\n\n## 3. Payments \u0026 pricing, 50 out of 100, up to 6.3 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 50: No x402, MPP or L402 (0). Plan prices are public at ntfy.sh/v1/tiers, $6, $12 and $25 a month, but there's no per-message price (10). Free use with no account and no card, 250 messages a day per IP (20). An agent can publish with no signup at all (20).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments):\n\nThe published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).\n\n- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.\n- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for \"contact sales\" or prices behind a login.\n- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.\n- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).\n\nPayment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.\n\nOpen-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol.\n\n## 4. Agent ergonomics, 66 out of 100, up to 5.5 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 66: Publish returns one small JSON object, and subscribe takes `poll=1`, `since` and filters on id, message, title, priority and tags, so an agent reads only what it asks for (20). Filtering and a `since` cursor but no paging, and since v2.28.0 a replay is capped at 10 MB with an `X-Messages-Truncated` header (14). Errors come back as JSON with a numeric code, the HTTP status, a message and a link to the relevant doc (17). No idempotency key, so a retried POST sends twice. A `sequence_id` lets a later message replace or delete an earlier one (5). One required value, the topic, and every option is a header. No official SDKs beyond the Go client package inside the server repository (10).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics):\n\n- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).\n- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.\n- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.\n- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.\n- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.\n\nModels are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs.\n\n## 5. Reliability, 83 out of 100, up to 3.4 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 83: Statuspage at ntfy.statuspage.io (20). Its incident feed lists nothing after 31 March 2026, so the last 90 days are clean (30). The older two were a 17-hour signup failure in February that lost about 90 free accounts and a two-day email outage in March when the AWS SES account was paused. Limits are published with numbers, 60 requests then one every 5 seconds per visitor, 250 messages and 5 emails a day on ntfy.sh (15). Over-limit calls get HTTP 429 with codes 42901 to 42905 and a link to the limits table, and the bucket refill rate tells a client how long to wait, but there's no Retry-After header and no backoff guidance (8). No SLA, and the terms say best effort with no uptime promise (0). The publish API is stable and generally available (10).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability):\n\nHosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.\n\n- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).\n- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.\n- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.\n- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.\n- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.\n- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.\n\nLocal packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.\n\n- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.\n- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.\n- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).\n- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.\n- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.\n\nProtocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors.\n\n## 6. Maintenance \u0026 community, 67 out of 100, up to 2.9 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 67: v2.28.0 on 27 August 2026, 35 days before this check (20). Six server releases since 9 July, v2.26.0 to v2.28.0 (20). 105 commits since 1 July, mostly from the maintainer, and 17 merged pull requests, but 325 open issues and several August bug reports (iOS delivery, a CLI client losing messages) without a visible reply (14). No official MCP server and no SDKs beyond a Go client package (3). A test workflow runs `make checkv` and coverage on every push to main, Dependabot is on, and the Go toolchain is current (10).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance):\n\n- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.\n- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.\n- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.\n- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).\n- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.\n\nModels are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts.\n\n## 7. Transparency \u0026 trust, 79 out of 100, up to 1.8 more on the total\n\nMade of editorial 82, provenance 75.\n\nWhy it scored 79: Apache-2.0 and GPL-2.0 dual licence (30). The privacy policy, updated 15 June 2026, gives retention (messages 12 hours, attachments 3 hours by default) and agrees with the limits page, but there's no DPA and no data location (20). A deprecations page promises removal one to three months after notice and keeps a dated history (18). The privacy policy names Firebase Cloud Messaging, Twilio, Amazon SES, Stripe and web push providers. No telemetry found in the server source (14).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency):\n\n- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.\n- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).\n- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.\n- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).\n\nThe other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two.\n\nProvenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts):\n\n- Domain age: ntfy.sh, no registry record we could read (0 of 15)\n- security.txt: not found (0 of 10)\n\n## What we couldn't check\n\nWhat we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it.\n\n- Whether the August 2026 bug reports (#1900 iOS delivery, #1895 CLI client losing messages) have had a maintainer reply, since the issues list didn't show comment counts\n- Where ntfy.sh's servers and message cache are located, which the privacy policy doesn't say\n\n## Weaknesses\n\n- Unreserved topics on ntfy.sh can be read and written by anyone who knows the name\n- No idempotency key, so a retried publish arrives twice\n- No OpenAPI spec, llms.txt, official MCP server or SDKs\n- The terms promise no uptime or delivery, and there's no Retry-After on 429\n- 325 open GitHub issues against one main maintainer\n\n## What costs an agent a turn today\n\nThe notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need.\n\n- Use a long random topic name, or a reserved topic with a Bearer token\n- Keep the body under 4,096 bytes, the title under 1 KB and all tags under 512 bytes, or you get a 400\n- Don't blind-retry a publish. There's no idempotency key, so the person gets it twice\n- Send the token in the Authorization header, not the `auth` query parameter, so it stays out of logs\n- Poll with `since=\u003cid\u003e` rather than `poll=1` alone, which replays the whole cache and counts against the bandwidth limit\n\n## What the review panel asked for\n\n- Reserve topics without a browser\n- deprecation notice for limits\n\n## When it's done\n\nSend what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `\"kind\": \"dispute\"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.\n",
    "grade": "C",
    "score": 61.6,
    "assessed": "2026-10-01",
    "run": "October 2026 research run",
    "categories": [
      {
        "key": "security",
        "name": "Security \u0026 auth",
        "score": 38,
        "maxGain": 10.9,
        "reason": "Access tokens as `Authorization: Bearer`, revocable and with optional expiry, plus per-topic ACLs on accounts. On ntfy.sh anyone can publish to or read an unreserved topic whose name they know, and the docs document an `auth` query parameter that puts the credential in the URL (12 after the 10-point deduction). ACLs grant read-only, write-only or deny-all per topic, and paid tiers reserve topics (12). Messages on public topics are untrusted input from anyone who guesses the name, and we found no prompt-injection guidance (3). Tokens record last access time and IP, with no per-call log (3). SECURITY.md with a private email and GitHub private reporting. Fixes such as the template CPU denial of service in v2.26.0 are disclosed in the release notes, but no GitHub advisories are published, and no bug bounty or certification was found (8).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.\n- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.\n- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.\n- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.\n- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.",
          "Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security"
      },
      {
        "key": "schema",
        "name": "Schema \u0026 documentation",
        "score": 53,
        "maxGain": 7.6,
        "reason": "No OpenAPI or other machine-readable contract (0). No llms.txt (docs.ntfy.sh/llms.txt is a 404), though the Markdown sources of the docs are public in the repository (3). Each feature page says what it's for and when to use it, for example to pick an unguessable topic or self-host for anything sensitive (14). Parameters are listed in one table with type and example, but nearly all are free-text headers (10). Examples in curl, the CLI, HTTP, JavaScript, Go, PowerShell, Python and PHP. Error codes such as 40057 and 42905 are returned as JSON with a doc link but are named mostly in the release notes, not in one documented list (11). Semver tags and a dated release notes page (15).",
        "checklist": [
          "APIs and MCP servers.",
          "- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).\n- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.\n- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.\n- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.\n- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.\n- 15, versioning and a public changelog.",
          "Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema"
      },
      {
        "key": "payments",
        "name": "Payments \u0026 pricing",
        "score": 50,
        "maxGain": 6.3,
        "reason": "No x402, MPP or L402 (0). Plan prices are public at ntfy.sh/v1/tiers, $6, $12 and $25 a month, but there's no per-message price (10). Free use with no account and no card, 250 messages a day per IP (20). An agent can publish with no signup at all (20).",
        "checklist": [
          "The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).",
          "- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.\n- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for \"contact sales\" or prices behind a login.\n- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.\n- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).",
          "Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.",
          "Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments"
      },
      {
        "key": "ergonomics",
        "name": "Agent ergonomics",
        "score": 66,
        "maxGain": 5.5,
        "reason": "Publish returns one small JSON object, and subscribe takes `poll=1`, `since` and filters on id, message, title, priority and tags, so an agent reads only what it asks for (20). Filtering and a `since` cursor but no paging, and since v2.28.0 a replay is capped at 10 MB with an `X-Messages-Truncated` header (14). Errors come back as JSON with a numeric code, the HTTP status, a message and a link to the relevant doc (17). No idempotency key, so a retried POST sends twice. A `sequence_id` lets a later message replace or delete an earlier one (5). One required value, the topic, and every option is a header. No official SDKs beyond the Go client package inside the server repository (10).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).\n- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.\n- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.\n- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.\n- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.",
          "Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics"
      },
      {
        "key": "reliability",
        "name": "Reliability",
        "score": 83,
        "maxGain": 3.4,
        "reason": "Statuspage at ntfy.statuspage.io (20). Its incident feed lists nothing after 31 March 2026, so the last 90 days are clean (30). The older two were a 17-hour signup failure in February that lost about 90 free accounts and a two-day email outage in March when the AWS SES account was paused. Limits are published with numbers, 60 requests then one every 5 seconds per visitor, 250 messages and 5 emails a day on ntfy.sh (15). Over-limit calls get HTTP 429 with codes 42901 to 42905 and a link to the limits table, and the bucket refill rate tells a client how long to wait, but there's no Retry-After header and no backoff guidance (8). No SLA, and the terms say best effort with no uptime promise (0). The publish API is stable and generally available (10).",
        "checklist": [
          "Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.",
          "- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).\n- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.\n- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.\n- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.\n- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.\n- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.",
          "Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.",
          "- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.\n- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.\n- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).\n- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.\n- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.",
          "Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability"
      },
      {
        "key": "maintenance",
        "name": "Maintenance \u0026 community",
        "score": 67,
        "maxGain": 2.9,
        "reason": "v2.28.0 on 27 August 2026, 35 days before this check (20). Six server releases since 9 July, v2.26.0 to v2.28.0 (20). 105 commits since 1 July, mostly from the maintainer, and 17 merged pull requests, but 325 open issues and several August bug reports (iOS delivery, a CLI client losing messages) without a visible reply (14). No official MCP server and no SDKs beyond a Go client package (3). A test workflow runs `make checkv` and coverage on every push to main, Dependabot is on, and the Go toolchain is current (10).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.\n- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.\n- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.\n- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).\n- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.",
          "Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance"
      },
      {
        "key": "transparency",
        "name": "Transparency \u0026 trust",
        "score": 79,
        "maxGain": 1.8,
        "reason": "Apache-2.0 and GPL-2.0 dual licence (30). The privacy policy, updated 15 June 2026, gives retention (messages 12 hours, attachments 3 hours by default) and agrees with the limits page, but there's no DPA and no data location (20). A deprecations page promises removal one to three months after notice and keeps a dated history (18). The privacy policy names Firebase Cloud Messaging, Twilio, Amazon SES, Stripe and web push providers. No telemetry found in the server source (14).",
        "blend": "editorial 82, provenance 75",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.\n- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).\n- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.\n- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).",
          "The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency"
      }
    ],
    "provenance": [
      {
        "label": "Domain age",
        "value": "ntfy.sh, no registry record we could read",
        "points": 0,
        "max": 15
      },
      {
        "label": "security.txt",
        "value": "not found",
        "points": 0,
        "max": 10
      }
    ],
    "unchecked": [
      "Whether the August 2026 bug reports (#1900 iOS delivery, #1895 CLI client losing messages) have had a maintainer reply, since the issues list didn't show comment counts",
      "Where ntfy.sh's servers and message cache are located, which the privacy policy doesn't say"
    ],
    "weaknesses": [
      "Unreserved topics on ntfy.sh can be read and written by anyone who knows the name",
      "No idempotency key, so a retried publish arrives twice",
      "No OpenAPI spec, llms.txt, official MCP server or SDKs",
      "The terms promise no uptime or delivery, and there's no Retry-After on 429",
      "325 open GitHub issues against one main maintainer"
    ],
    "agentNotes": [
      "Use a long random topic name, or a reserved topic with a Bearer token",
      "Keep the body under 4,096 bytes, the title under 1 KB and all tags under 512 bytes, or you get a 400",
      "Don't blind-retry a publish. There's no idempotency key, so the person gets it twice",
      "Send the token in the Authorization header, not the `auth` query parameter, so it stays out of logs",
      "Poll with `since=\u003cid\u003e` rather than `poll=1` alone, which replays the whole cache and counts against the bandwidth limit"
    ],
    "requests": [
      {
        "text": "Reserve topics without a browser",
        "reviews": 1
      },
      {
        "text": "deprecation notice for limits",
        "reviews": 1
      }
    ],
    "recheck": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes"
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