{
  "fixes": {
    "slug": "brevo",
    "name": "Brevo API + MCP",
    "listing": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/brevo",
    "markdown": "# Fix list: Brevo API + MCP\n\nFrom Anchor Terminal's listing at https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/brevo, the October 2026 research run, assessed 1 October 2026. Grade E, 45.2 out of 100.\n\nThis is everything the published grade says the listing lacks, the biggest possible gain to the total first. It comes from the reason given for each score, the checklist each category was scored against (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist), the provenance checks, the deductions, what we couldn't check and what the review panel asked for. A fix counts at the next check, once it's public.\n\nFor a coding agent working on Brevo API + MCP: work through the items below in the product, its docs and its public pages. Each category gives the reason for its score, with the points each checklist item earned, and the checklist itself, so the gap is the items that earned less than their points. Change the product, not the wording, and keep a note of what you changed and where it's published.\n\n## 1. Security \u0026 auth, 45 out of 100, up to 9.6 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 45: Plain API keys in an `api-key` header, with IP allowlisting on the account. The MCP takes a separate token with full read and write access (20). No read-only or send-only keys, and the per-module MCP servers narrow the tools but not the token (5). Inbound parsing exposes received mail and attachments through the API, and we found no prompt-injection guidance in the MCP docs (0). Transactional logs kept without limit per the pricing page (8). ISO 27001:2022 and a responsible-disclosure page. security.txt returned a server error on 30 September (12).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security):\n\n- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.\n- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.\n- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.\n- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.\n- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.\n\nModels are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing.\n\n## 2. Reliability, 55 out of 100, up to 9 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 55: incident.io status page with 31 components (20). Since 4 July Brevo marked eight 'Multiple services impacted' incidents as full outages (5 July twice, 16, 28 and 29 July, 5 August, 17 and 25 September), plus a transactional sending delay on 16 July. The page doesn't show durations or which services each one hit, so we can't separate the transactional API, but that's several majors (0). Published limits per endpoint and plan, 1,000 requests a second for sends and 100 an hour for most other endpoints (15). 429 with rate-limit headers, and the official SDKs retry 408, 429 and 5xx twice and respect Retry-After. No idempotency key for sends found (10). No SLA found (0). GA (10).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability):\n\nHosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.\n\n- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).\n- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.\n- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.\n- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.\n- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.\n- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.\n\nLocal packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.\n\n- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.\n- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.\n- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).\n- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.\n- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.\n\nProtocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors.\n\n## 3. Payments \u0026 pricing, 30 out of 100, up to 8.8 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 30: No x402, MPP or L402 (0). Plan entry prices are public per the 30 September check, but the page loads them by script and the pay-as-you-go credit price needs the calculator (10). Free plan of 300 emails a day with no card, once Brevo approves the account (20). Browser signup and approval, no autonomous route (0).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments):\n\nThe published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).\n\n- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.\n- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for \"contact sales\" or prices behind a login.\n- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.\n- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).\n\nPayment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.\n\nOpen-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol.\n\n## 4. Agent ergonomics, 65 out of 100, up to 5.7 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 65: 27 per-module MCP servers let a client load only contacts, templates or another module rather than the combined server (18). limit, offset and sort on list endpoints (15). Errors map to typed classes in the SDKs. We didn't check for an error-code reference (12). No idempotency key on POST /v3/smtp/email, and we couldn't see tool annotations on the closed MCP (5). Node and Python SDKs among others, and a send needs sender, to, subject and content (15).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics):\n\n- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).\n- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.\n- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.\n- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.\n- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.\n\nModels are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs.\n\n## 5. Schema \u0026 documentation, 83 out of 100, up to 2.8 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 83: OpenAPI spec at developers.brevo.com/openapi.json (25). llms.txt and Markdown versions of the docs (10). Reference pages explain each endpoint. The hosted MCP isn't open source, so we couldn't read its tool definitions (10). Typed request schemas in the spec (12). Examples on each endpoint, and the SDKs map error statuses to typed errors (11). Dated API changelog and v3 in the path (15).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema):\n\nAPIs and MCP servers.\n\n- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).\n- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.\n- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.\n- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.\n- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.\n- 15, versioning and a public changelog.\n\nModels are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference.\n\n## 6. Transparency \u0026 trust, 71 out of 100, up to 2.5 more on the total\n\nMade of editorial 51, provenance 90.\n\nWhy it scored 71: Closed service with terms naming Sendinblue SAS. The official Node SDK repository carries no licence (15). Servers in the EU and a privacy policy, with transactional logs kept without limit. We didn't find a retention period or a DPA link this run (12). A dated deprecation for POST /contacts/batch (announced 12 May, removal 30 October), but no stated deprecation policy, and the 13 August CLI changes removed flags with no advance notice in the changelog (14). The 3 September Loyalty rename is deducted once, under negative events, not here. EU hosting stated, no subprocessor list found (10).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency):\n\n- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.\n- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).\n- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.\n- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).\n\nThe other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two.\n\nProvenance checks not met in full (half of this category, computed from checked facts):\n\n- security.txt: not found (0 of 10)\n\n## 7. Maintenance \u0026 community, 83 out of 100, up to 1.5 more on the total\n\nWhy it scored 83: API changelog entry on 3 September, 28 days before this check, and SDK releases on 10 August (30). Changelog entries on 20 and 21 July, 6, 13 and 14 August and 2 and 3 September (20). Public changelog and support. We couldn't see reply times (10). Node 6.0.3 and Python 5.0.2, generated with Fern, released in August (15). The Node SDK runs CI but its repository has no licence file and package.json has no licence field (8).\n\nThe checklist (https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance):\n\n- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.\n- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.\n- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.\n- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).\n- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.\n\nModels are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts.\n\n## Deductions\n\nEach comes off the total. A fixed and documented problem counts for less at the next check.\n\n- 2026-09-14. A Cloudflare API key with full account permissions, stored in Brevo's source code, let an attacker inject a ClickFix script for 5 hours 29 minutes, showing fake verification pages that pushed visitors to run malware. The post-mortem names brevo.com, sendinblue.com, the login, account, my and onboarding subdomains of brevo.com, sibforms.com and three embedded scripts (the Brevo forms script, the Conversations widget and the SDK loader) as affected. Brevo says app.brevo.com, the API and customer data weren't touched, and it published the fix (scoped, short-lived tokens and alerting). Decayed for the fix and write-up, -6 (https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M2QBC4EZ24ZACW6SWQYVW8N3/write-up)\n- 2026-09-10. An attacker created a Brevo account, turned on SAML SSO and invited real users into it, and a scoping flaw then gave the attacker every organisation those users could reach. Brevo's write-up counts 138 accounts accessed, 6 used to send phishing, 43 with contacts exported and 93 with no meaningful activity. Brevo closed the route and ended every user session by 08:30 UTC, two hours after spotting it, disabled the links in the phishing emails, said it was deploying a fix that limits SSO to the organisation that owns the configuration, and is contacting each affected customer. A cross-tenant breach with customer contacts taken, weighed like the 14 September incident and decayed for the same-day fix, the write-up and direct notice to customers, -6 (https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M266V1CZKJQNGZRNEGFD5CQE/write-up)\n- 2026-09-03. The API changelog marks as breaking a rename of the Loyalty transaction status values (pending and complete became draft and completed), with no advance notice that we could find. -3 (https://developers.brevo.com/changelog)\n\n## What we couldn't check\n\nWhat we couldn't read counted as absent. Publishing it on a page a plain HTTP fetch can read (not only in a browser) lets the next check count it.\n\n- Durations of the 'Multiple services impacted' incidents and whether the transactional API was among them\n- Whether the 10 September SSO breach exposed API keys or MCP tokens in the 138 accounts. Brevo's write-up doesn't mention keys or rotation\n- unchecked: DPA, subprocessor list and retention periods\n- Plan prices this run, since the pricing page loads them by script\n\n## Weaknesses\n\n- Eight 'multiple services' full outages on the status page since July\n- A SAML SSO flaw let an attacker into 138 customer accounts on 10 September, with contacts exported from 43\n- ClickFix script served on brevo.com, sendinblue.com, sibforms.com and three embedded Brevo scripts for 5 hours 29 minutes on 14 September\n- MCP token has full account access, with no read-only or send-only option\n- No licence on the official Node SDK repository\n\n## What costs an agent a turn today\n\nThe notes we give agents before they call it. Each one is a workaround an agent shouldn't need.\n\n- Connect a single module server at /v1/brevo_\u003cmodule\u003e/mcp rather than the combined /v1/brevo/mcp\n- Send with POST /v3/smtp/email and the `api-key` header, not Bearer\n- Use webhooks for delivery events. GET /v3/smtp/emails allows 2 requests a second\n- Budget calls to non-send endpoints, which allow 100 an hour on the general tier\n- Wait for account approval before counting on the free plan's 300 a day\n\n## What the review panel asked for\n\n- State the approval time\n- Add send-only MCP tokens\n- Publish incident durations\n- Publish an SLA\n\n## When it's done\n\nSend what changed and where it's published as a dispute (https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes, or `POST https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/contact` with `\"kind\": \"dispute\"`). Disputes are answered in public, and the listing is checked again by the same checklist. Paying for an audit or a listing claim changes nothing here.\n",
    "grade": "E",
    "score": 45.2,
    "assessed": "2026-10-01",
    "run": "October 2026 research run",
    "categories": [
      {
        "key": "security",
        "name": "Security \u0026 auth",
        "score": 45,
        "maxGain": 9.6,
        "reason": "Plain API keys in an `api-key` header, with IP allowlisting on the account. The MCP takes a separate token with full read and write access (20). No read-only or send-only keys, and the per-module MCP servers narrow the tools but not the token (5). Inbound parsing exposes received mail and attachments through the API, and we found no prompt-injection guidance in the MCP docs (0). Transactional logs kept without limit per the pricing page (8). ISO 27001:2022 and a responsible-disclosure page. security.txt returned a server error on 30 September (12).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, the credential model. 30 for OAuth 2.1 with scopes, or scoped and revocable keys with rotation. 20 for plain revocable API keys. 10 for one all-powerful key. 10 off when a secret can travel in a URL query string as a documented option.\n- 0 to 20, read-only or least-privilege modes, and confirmation or approval for destructive actions.\n- 0 to 15, prompt-injection posture where the tool returns untrusted content (documented mitigations or guidance). A tool that returns no untrusted content gets 10.\n- 0 to 15, audit logs or per-call visibility for the operator.\n- 0 to 20, a security programme. security.txt or a disclosure policy, a bug bounty, SOC 2 or ISO 27001, advisories handled in public.",
          "Models are read for retention, whether API data trains models (and whether that's off by default), zero-retention options and certifications. Frameworks for telemetry defaults, approval hooks, guardrails and sandboxing."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-security"
      },
      {
        "key": "reliability",
        "name": "Reliability",
        "score": 55,
        "maxGain": 9,
        "reason": "incident.io status page with 31 components (20). Since 4 July Brevo marked eight 'Multiple services impacted' incidents as full outages (5 July twice, 16, 28 and 29 July, 5 August, 17 and 25 September), plus a transactional sending delay on 16 July. The page doesn't show durations or which services each one hit, so we can't separate the transactional API, but that's several majors (0). Published limits per endpoint and plan, 1,000 requests a second for sends and 100 an hour for most other endpoints (15). 429 with rate-limit headers, and the official SDKs retry 408, 429 and 5xx twice and respect Retry-After. No idempotency key for sends found (10). No SLA found (0). GA (10).",
        "checklist": [
          "Hosted APIs, MCP servers, models and platforms.",
          "- 20, a public status page with component history (Statuspage, Instatus, BetterStack or the vendor's own).\n- 0 to 30, the incident record for the last 90 days on that page. 30 for a clean record or trivial incidents only, 20 for minor incidents only, 10 for one major outage (an hour or more of a core API down, or errors across the board), 0 for several. 5 when there's no history we could read, and the note says so.\n- 15, rate limits documented with numbers.\n- 15, documented 429 or overload handling (Retry-After, backoff guidance), and idempotency keys or safe-retry guidance where writes are involved.\n- 10, an SLA published for any paid tier.\n- 10, the surface agents use is generally available, not beta or preview.",
          "Local packages, SDKs, frameworks and stdio MCP servers.",
          "- 20, installs from an official package with supported runtimes stated.\n- 25, a public CI and test suite, passing on the default branch.\n- 0 to 25, open crash or regression issues relative to activity (25 for few and handled, 0 for many, old and unanswered).\n- 15, semver discipline and breaking changes called out in a changelog.\n- 15, version 1.0 or later, or declared stable.",
          "Protocols are read from their reference implementations, the public facilitators or servers, spec stability and test vectors."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-reliability"
      },
      {
        "key": "payments",
        "name": "Payments \u0026 pricing",
        "score": 30,
        "maxGain": 8.8,
        "reason": "No x402, MPP or L402 (0). Plan entry prices are public per the 30 September check, but the page loads them by script and the pay-as-you-go credit price needs the calculator (10). Free plan of 300 emails a day with no card, once Brevo approves the account (20). Browser signup and approval, no autonomous route (0).",
        "checklist": [
          "The published rubric, also on the [x402 page](https://www.anchorterminal.com/x402/).",
          "- 40, a machine payment protocol (x402, MPP or L402) on the tool's own endpoints. 10 to 30 when it covers only some endpoints or only goes through a third party, and the note says which.\n- 20, per-call or per-unit pricing published without a login. 10 for public plan-only pricing, 0 for \"contact sales\" or prices behind a login.\n- 20, a free tier or trial that doesn't need a card.\n- 20, autonomous onboarding, meaning an agent can get access without a person signing up in a browser (keyless use, x402, a programmatic key API).",
          "Payment platforms and agent wallets rarely charge for their own API over a machine protocol, so the first line has steps for them, and the highest one that applies counts. 40 when x402, MPP or L402 runs on all their own endpoints, 30 when it runs on part of their own API, 25 when their merchants can accept one, 20 for running a facilitator, 15 for paying as a buyer, and 0 when the only protocol is their own. Merchant acceptance sits above a facilitator because the platform's own customers can charge agents through it, while a facilitator settles for sellers who wire up the protocol themselves. The counter-argument (a facilitator does more for the protocol as a whole) has a point. Each note says which step applied.",
          "Open-source software you run yourself is scored on its hosted or paid option if it has one. A free, self-hosted package with nothing to buy gets 20, 20 and 20 for the last three lines, and 0 to 40 for the first only if it ships a payment protocol."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-payments"
      },
      {
        "key": "ergonomics",
        "name": "Agent ergonomics",
        "score": 65,
        "maxGain": 5.7,
        "reason": "27 per-module MCP servers let a client load only contacts, templates or another module rather than the combined server (18). limit, offset and sort on list endpoints (15). Errors map to typed classes in the SDKs. We didn't check for an error-code reference (12). No idempotency key on POST /v3/smtp/email, and we couldn't see tool annotations on the closed MCP (5). Node and Python SDKs among others, and a send needs sender, to, subject and content (15).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 25, context cost. For MCP, the number and size of the tool definitions (25 for ten or fewer compact tools, 15 for 11 to 30, 5 for more than 30, plus up to 10 back for toolsets, dynamic loading or read-only subsets). For APIs, whether responses can be sized (field selection, limits, summaries).\n- 20, pagination, filtering and output-size controls.\n- 20, actionable, documented error responses, codes and messages an agent can recover from.\n- 20, idempotency or safe retries, and for MCP the `readOnlyHint` and `destructiveHint` annotations.\n- 15, sensible defaults, few required parameters, and official SDKs in at least two languages.",
          "Models are read for tool use, structured output, prompt caching, context length, batch and SDKs. Frameworks for how much code and how many defaults a tool-calling agent with MCP needs."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-ergonomics"
      },
      {
        "key": "schema",
        "name": "Schema \u0026 documentation",
        "score": 83,
        "maxGain": 2.8,
        "reason": "OpenAPI spec at developers.brevo.com/openapi.json (25). llms.txt and Markdown versions of the docs (10). Reference pages explain each endpoint. The hosted MCP isn't open source, so we couldn't read its tool definitions (10). Typed request schemas in the spec (12). Examples on each endpoint, and the SDKs map error statuses to typed errors (11). Dated API changelog and v3 in the path (15).",
        "checklist": [
          "APIs and MCP servers.",
          "- 25, a machine-readable contract (a public OpenAPI file or similar; for MCP, typed JSON Schema inputs on every tool).\n- 10, llms.txt or Markdown docs served for agents.\n- 0 to 20, descriptions that say what a tool is for, when to use it and when not to, read from the tool definitions in the source or the API reference.\n- 0 to 15, typed inputs with enums, constraints and required fields, and no free-form JSON blobs.\n- 0 to 15, examples and documented error responses.\n- 15, versioning and a public changelog.",
          "Models are read from the API reference, the OpenAPI file, llms.txt, the structured-output and tool-use docs and the model cards. Frameworks from docs a model can follow, typed interfaces, examples and the API reference."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-schema"
      },
      {
        "key": "transparency",
        "name": "Transparency \u0026 trust",
        "score": 71,
        "maxGain": 2.5,
        "reason": "Closed service with terms naming Sendinblue SAS. The official Node SDK repository carries no licence (15). Servers in the EU and a privacy policy, with transactional logs kept without limit. We didn't find a retention period or a DPA link this run (12). A dated deprecation for POST /contacts/batch (announced 12 May, removal 30 October), but no stated deprecation policy, and the 13 August CLI changes removed flags with no advance notice in the changelog (14). The 3 September Loyalty rename is deducted once, under negative events, not here. EU hosting stated, no subprocessor list found (10).",
        "blend": "editorial 51, provenance 90",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, source availability and licence clarity. 30 for open source under an OSI licence, 15 for closed with clear terms, 0 for unclear terms.\n- 0 to 30, data handling and retention statements that agree with each other (privacy policy, DPA, retention periods, subprocessors).\n- 0 to 20, a deprecation policy or notices with dates.\n- 0 to 20, telemetry disclosed with an opt-out (local software), or subprocessors and data locations disclosed (hosted).",
          "The other half of Transparency and trust is the provenance score, computed from checked facts (below). The category score is the mean of the two."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-transparency"
      },
      {
        "key": "maintenance",
        "name": "Maintenance \u0026 community",
        "score": 83,
        "maxGain": 1.5,
        "reason": "API changelog entry on 3 September, 28 days before this check, and SDK releases on 10 August (30). Changelog entries on 20 and 21 July, 6, 13 and 14 August and 2 and 3 September (20). Public changelog and support. We couldn't see reply times (10). Node 6.0.3 and Python 5.0.2, generated with Fern, released in August (15). The Node SDK runs CI but its repository has no licence file and package.json has no licence field (8).",
        "checklist": [
          "- 0 to 30, time since the last release, or the last published model or API change for a closed service. 30 within 30 days, 20 within 90, 10 within 180, 0 older.\n- 20, at least three releases or dated changelog entries in the last 90 days.\n- 0 to 25, responsiveness. Issues and pull requests answered on GitHub (the open issues and how recent the replies are). For closed services, a public changelog and a support or community channel that answers, 0 to 15.\n- 15, presence in the official MCP registry under a verified namespace (MCP servers), or current official SDKs (APIs and models).\n- 10, package health, current dependencies and CI.",
          "Models are read for deprecation notice periods and model churn rather than release counts."
        ],
        "checklistUrl": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/#checklist-maintenance"
      }
    ],
    "provenance": [
      {
        "label": "security.txt",
        "value": "not found",
        "points": 0,
        "max": 10
      }
    ],
    "deductions": [
      "2026-09-14. A Cloudflare API key with full account permissions, stored in Brevo's source code, let an attacker inject a ClickFix script for 5 hours 29 minutes, showing fake verification pages that pushed visitors to run malware. The post-mortem names brevo.com, sendinblue.com, the login, account, my and onboarding subdomains of brevo.com, sibforms.com and three embedded scripts (the Brevo forms script, the Conversations widget and the SDK loader) as affected. Brevo says app.brevo.com, the API and customer data weren't touched, and it published the fix (scoped, short-lived tokens and alerting). Decayed for the fix and write-up, -6 (https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M2QBC4EZ24ZACW6SWQYVW8N3/write-up)",
      "2026-09-10. An attacker created a Brevo account, turned on SAML SSO and invited real users into it, and a scoping flaw then gave the attacker every organisation those users could reach. Brevo's write-up counts 138 accounts accessed, 6 used to send phishing, 43 with contacts exported and 93 with no meaningful activity. Brevo closed the route and ended every user session by 08:30 UTC, two hours after spotting it, disabled the links in the phishing emails, said it was deploying a fix that limits SSO to the organisation that owns the configuration, and is contacting each affected customer. A cross-tenant breach with customer contacts taken, weighed like the 14 September incident and decayed for the same-day fix, the write-up and direct notice to customers, -6 (https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M266V1CZKJQNGZRNEGFD5CQE/write-up)",
      "2026-09-03. The API changelog marks as breaking a rename of the Loyalty transaction status values (pending and complete became draft and completed), with no advance notice that we could find. -3 (https://developers.brevo.com/changelog)"
    ],
    "unchecked": [
      "Durations of the 'Multiple services impacted' incidents and whether the transactional API was among them",
      "Whether the 10 September SSO breach exposed API keys or MCP tokens in the 138 accounts. Brevo's write-up doesn't mention keys or rotation",
      "unchecked: DPA, subprocessor list and retention periods",
      "Plan prices this run, since the pricing page loads them by script"
    ],
    "weaknesses": [
      "Eight 'multiple services' full outages on the status page since July",
      "A SAML SSO flaw let an attacker into 138 customer accounts on 10 September, with contacts exported from 43",
      "ClickFix script served on brevo.com, sendinblue.com, sibforms.com and three embedded Brevo scripts for 5 hours 29 minutes on 14 September",
      "MCP token has full account access, with no read-only or send-only option",
      "No licence on the official Node SDK repository"
    ],
    "agentNotes": [
      "Connect a single module server at /v1/brevo_\u003cmodule\u003e/mcp rather than the combined /v1/brevo/mcp",
      "Send with POST /v3/smtp/email and the `api-key` header, not Bearer",
      "Use webhooks for delivery events. GET /v3/smtp/emails allows 2 requests a second",
      "Budget calls to non-send endpoints, which allow 100 an hour on the general tier",
      "Wait for account approval before counting on the free plan's 300 a day"
    ],
    "requests": [
      {
        "text": "State the approval time",
        "reviews": 1
      },
      {
        "text": "Add send-only MCP tokens",
        "reviews": 1
      },
      {
        "text": "Publish incident durations",
        "reviews": 1
      },
      {
        "text": "Publish an SLA",
        "reviews": 1
      }
    ],
    "recheck": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/builders/#disputes"
  },
  "meta": {
    "attribution": "Anchor Terminal (https://www.anchorterminal.com)",
    "docs": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/docs/",
    "generatedAt": "2026-10-04",
    "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
    "method": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/benchmark/",
    "methodology": "0.3",
    "openapi": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/openapi.json",
    "preview": false,
    "run": "2026-10-01",
    "runLabel": "October 2026 research run"
  }
}