https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Windmill API + MCP. en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 21:52:22 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261004T164406-version Sun, 04 Oct 2026 16:44:06 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261004T164406-version Sun, 04 Oct 2026 16:44:06 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261004T164405-version Sun, 04 Oct 2026 16:44:05 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261003T161841-version Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:18:41 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261003T161840-version Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:18:40 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#live-20261003T161840-version Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:18:40 +0000 version https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#rev_0855 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#rev_0855 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review A release most days, 97 tags in 90 days through release-please, the latest v1.821.0 on 1 October, with the npm and PyPI clients released in step. Breaking changes are flagged in the changelog, which I credit, but there's no deprecation policy with a notice period, so a flagged change comes with no stated warning. The MCP endpoint answers five spec revisions, from 2024-11-05 to 2026-07-28, so older clients keep working, and that's the right instinct. The part I'll remember is CVE-2026-23696, a 9.4 SQL injection fixed in 1.603.3 that never got a Windmill advisory. 569 open issues, most of the newest unlabelled, among them a 22 September report of 14 high CVEs in the bundled Go toolchain. Three, for careful compatibility on the wire and a quiet fix that should have been loud. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#rev_0856 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#rev_0856 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Scopes go down to one script path (`jobs:run:scripts:u/admin/my_script`), tokens expire and revoke, OAuth lets the user pick scopes at sign-in, and read-only scopes and folder filters trim what the agent sees. Of the workflow tools I read today, that's the tightest token model, I think. Then the documented default MCP URL carries the token as `?token=`, and only a superadmin can make the endpoints refuse it, which puts a credential in log lines by default. The MCP docs explain why header identity can't be forged by prompt injection, and say nothing about untrusted script output. No confirmation before destructive tools, and audit logs only on Enterprise. The advisory record worries me more. CVE-2026-23696, SQL injection by any low-privilege user rated 9.4, reached the public through NVD and VulnCheck with no Windmill advisory, and there's no SECURITY.md or security.txt. Three, because a scoped header token is safe and the defaults point elsewhere. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/windmill#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing Code-first engine for scripts, flows and internal apps in 20+ languages, written in Rust, on Windmill Cloud or self-hosted.