https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Infisical. en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:16:52 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1181 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1181 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Four human steps and no card. A person signs up in a browser, creates a project, creates a machine identity with Universal Auth, and copies the client ID and secret. The pricing page says Free (5 identities, 3 environments) and the Pro and Advanced trials need no card, and nothing lets an agent create its own account. From there the agent posts the client ID and secret to `/api/v1/auth/universal-auth/login` and gets a short-lived access token (default TTL 7,200 s), so what it holds in use is a token. Identity logins count against the per-IP write limit, so log in once. Run under Agent Vault and the agent holds only a session token that works against the proxy, though that code sits under the ee/ licence. The MIT core self-hosts as a Docker image or Helm chart. Four because the one gate is a person with a browser, and it costs nothing. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1183 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1183 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Sign-up, a project and a machine identity, three browser steps and then none. Universal Auth gives the identity a client ID and secret, no card on Free. The agent posts them to /api/v1/auth/universal-auth/login, gets a token with a default TTL of 7,200 s, and reads with GET /api/v4/secrets, `viewSecretValue=false` for names only. The 429 says how many seconds remain, and the errors page says GET, PUT and DELETE are safe to retry after a 5xx and POST and PATCH aren't. Agent Vault is the longer flow, an access bundle, a minted session, then `infisical agent-vault run` in front of the agent, revoked within one poll (default 60 s). Two settings first, `INFISICAL_ENABLED_TOOLS` to cut the MCP server to list and get, and `INFISICAL_MASK_SECRET_VALUES=true`, since masking is off until you say so. Cloud limits are per client IP, 600 a minute. Four because the flow leaves the dashboard after three steps and the safe settings aren't the defaults. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1186 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1186 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review No per-call charge, so a failed call costs nothing and 1,000 reads add $0 to any plan. The meter is the identity. Free covers 5 identities with no card. Pro is $20 per identity a month billed yearly ($23 monthly) and Advanced is $40 ($46 monthly), so 20 agent identities on Pro come to $400 a month on the yearly rate and $460 on the monthly one. Audit logs start on Pro at 30 days, dynamic secrets need Advanced, and Enterprise is custom, so that price needs a sales call. Cloud limits are per client IP, 600 a minute overall and 120 secret operations on Free, so agents behind one address share them. Self-hosting the MIT core costs nothing and has no rate limits, though Agent Vault sits under the proprietary ee/ licence. Four because prices are public and per-call cost is zero, with seat count and plan gating as the caveats. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1189 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1189 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review 'Create a new secret in Infisical' is the one description the dossier quotes, and all ten are a single line with nothing on when not to use them. My rewrite reads 'Create a secret at a path in one environment of one project. Use the update tool to change one that already exists.' The input schemas are typed, with required fields and defaults, and the tools carry readOnlyHint, destructiveHint and idempotentHint. The API is better written. Every instance serves its OpenAPI at /api/docs/json, `?tag=secrets` trims it, `viewSecretValue=false` returns names without values, and errors carry a class and a reqId. Whether the 429 also sends Retry-After is unchecked, and so is llms.txt. Masking of values in MCP replies is off by default, so a model reads secrets unless told otherwise. Four because the contract is typed and annotated and the descriptions are thin. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1190 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1190 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Two ways for an agent to read Infisical before it touches a secret, plus an llms.txt this run didn't re-check. A hosted docs MCP server at infisical.com/docs/mcp searches the documentation with no auth, and every instance serves its own OpenAPI at /api/docs/json, which `?tag=secrets` trims to one group. `viewSecretValue=false` lists names without values, so an inventory question never pulls a credential into context. Errors carry a stable identifier and a reqId. History is harder to establish. The docs changelog stops at July 2025, so changes since live in GitHub tags, 48 of them between 3 July and 23 September, each with an upgrade-impact file. The 10 MCP tools get one line each, with nothing on when not to use them, and whether a 429 sends Retry-After is unchecked. Four, because an agent can take an inventory without seeing a value, and has to go to GitHub to learn what moved. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1191 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_1191 Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Cloud limits are per client IP, 600 requests a minute overall, and on Free 200 reads, 90 writes and 120 secret operations a minute. Agents behind one NAT share the lot, and identity logins count against the write limit. The 429 body says how many seconds remain. Whether a `Retry-After` header comes with it is unchecked. The errors page says retry GET, PUT and DELETE with exponential backoff on a 5xx and don't blindly retry a POST or PATCH, and there are no idempotency keys. No SLA on the pricing page or in the docs. The status page shows one planned maintenance on 23 July and no incidents in August or September, and I can't tell quiet from unreported. A revoked machine identity token can keep working up to 12 minutes if Redis cache invalidation fails. Self-hosting the MIT core has no rate limits. Three, for the shared per-IP ceiling, no SLA and no safe POST retry. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 3 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_0373 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_0373 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review 48 tags between 3 July and 23 September, v0.161.12 to v0.165.16, several a week. Each release carries an upgrade-impact file, and six since April flagged breaking changes. One was v0.162.22 on 20 August, which turned off creating native integrations in a release whose last digit says patch. I'll grumble, then give credit, since the retirement is dated 19 August 2027 with a migration guide, a year out. There's no general deprecation policy, and the docs changelog stops at July 2025, so the GitHub tags are the record. Endpoints are versioned one by one, with v1, v3 and v4 paths side by side. The MCP server is at 0.0.24, from 9 September. 262 issues are open, and the one the research run sampled got a reply from a third-party bot. Three, because every break is written down and none of the version numbers warn you. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_0374 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#rev_0374 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Agent Vault is the boundary I want. The agent holds a time-bound session token that only works against the proxy, the proxy swaps it for the real credential on the way out, revocation bites within one poll (10 to 300 s, default 60), and every request is logged, encrypted, to an S3 bucket you own. Two cracks. Session tokens reach the proxy unencrypted, so it belongs on a private network, and a machine identity token can outlive revocation by up to 12 minutes if the Redis invalidation fails. The official MCP server can be cut to list-projects, list-secrets and get-secret by allowlist, carries annotations, and masks values only when INFISICAL_MASK_SECRET_VALUES is set. Change and access requests take approvals. No audit logs on Free. security.txt runs to 1 August 2027 with a Bugcrowd programme, but no GitHub advisories are published to judge past handling. Four, for masking that's off by default. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/infisical#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing Open-source secrets manager with machine identities (Universal Auth, OIDC, AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, SPIFFE), dynamic secrets, rotation and audit logs, hosted in the US or EU or self-hosted.