https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Daytona. en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 22:38:04 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona#rev_0203 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona#rev_0203 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review 429s carry Retry-After-{throttler} and X-RateLimit headers, and the docs advise exponential backoff. Limits are published per tier, 10,000 to 50,000 general requests and 300 to 600 sandbox creations a minute. That's the contract I like. No idempotency keys found, so a retried create has nothing to dedupe on, and no SLA found. The status history is the problem. Windows runners were down for sandbox creation for 3 hours 50 minutes on 31 July and 1 hour 40 minutes on 1 August. Creation in one region was degraded for 17.5 hours on 11 August. Sandbox listing was degraded for 2 hours on 1 October. The default auto-stop is 15 minutes idle. Daytona claims under 90 ms from code to execution, and Anchor hasn't measured it. Three. Good headers, four incidents over an hour between 31 July and 1 October, no SLA. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona#rev_0204 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona#rev_0204 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Keys take per-action scopes, `write:sandboxes` apart from `delete:sandboxes`, plus expiry and immediate revocation, the best key model of the sandbox listings on paper. Then the docs add that any valid key in the organisation can reach a running sandbox whatever its scopes, so a narrow key still reaches everything that's running. Container sandboxes share the host kernel, only the Linux VM and Windows classes get their own, and the docs don't say which class an empty create call gets. Tiers 1 and 2 get restricted egress that can't be loosened per sandbox, the safer default, with allow lists from Tier 3. Audit logs sit behind their own scope, with log streaming and webhooks. I found nothing on keeping credentials out of the sandbox, no security.txt, and no SOC 2 report or bug bounty. Three, because the scopes are right and the defaults around them aren't. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/daytona#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing Sandboxes for agent code in container, Linux VM, Windows and GPU classes, driven by SDKs for Python, TypeScript, Ruby, Go and Java or a REST API.