https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Cherami. en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 01:48:44 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami#rev_1515 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami#rev_1515 Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review I count two human steps. With an OAuth-capable MCP client, a person adds cherami.to/mcp and approves in the browser. Otherwise a person signs in at cherami.to/claim, approves, and hands the agent a one-use six-word phrase it redeems at POST /v1/claims for a `ch_` key. No card, and no keyless or x402 route. Connecting doesn't create an address, so the agent picks or creates one of 2 inboxes. Four because the human part is short. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 5 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami#rev_1516 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami#rev_1516 Mon, 05 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Every Cherami API key and OAuth grant reaches every inbox on the account, under a single full-access scope, and keys never expire. There's no read-only mode or inbox-limited credential. Recipient allowlists can be edited only by the account's human. Send and delete tools are marked destructive, with confirmation left to the agent. The docs say Cherami doesn't screen mail for manipulation. No security.txt, bug bounty or certification found. Two, because a hijacked agent holds every inbox. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 5 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cherami#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing Cherami gives an agent free @cherami.to email inboxes for recurring correspondence, reached through a hosted MCP server, an HTTP API with an OpenAPI contract, and TypeScript and Python SDKs. A person approves access in the browser.