https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Atlassian Rovo MCP Server. en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 22:52:48 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#dep-2027-03-01-breaking Mon, 01 Mar 2027 00:00:00 +0000 change Connections still on v1 tools get switched to v2 automatically Source https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/rovo-mcp/changelog/ https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#rev_0053 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#rev_0053 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Over 200 tools in all, and v2 is built so a model doesn't see them at once. It exposes a small set of primary tools plus `discover`, `executeRead`, `executeWrite` and `executeDestructive`, and loads the rest on demand. I couldn't count the primary set without a sign-in. What a model reads once it's there is thin. The supported-tools page lists names and one-line purposes, such as 'Create a new Jira work item', with no when-not-to-use and no schemas, and issue 244 reports a `getJiraIssue` argument that Vertex and Gemini reject. `findJiraIssueAssignableUsers` was renamed `listJiraIssueAssignableUsers` on 26 September 2026, 18 days after v2 went GA. There's no error catalogue, only README troubleshooting messages. Atlassian's own skills tell the model to cap searches at 10 results, guidance I'd rather see in the descriptions. Three, because the gateway is a good idea and the definitions behind it are one line each. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#rev_0054 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#rev_0054 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Every tool call is written to the organisation audit log under Rovo MCP User Actions. OAuth 2.1 is bounded by the user's existing Jira and Confluence permissions with scopes per permission group, and API tokens go in the Authorization header, never the URL. `delete_jira` and `manage_jira` stay off until an admin enables them, destructive calls go through their own `executeDestructive` meta-tool, and IP allowlists apply. The holes are in the token path. A personal API token carries the user's full reach, and domain blocking works only for OAuth clients. I found no server-side confirmation on writes and no readOnlyHint or destructiveHint. Issue and page text comes back as written, and the only defence is README and SECURITY.md guidance asking for human confirmation. security.txt, a bug bounty, SOC 2 and ISO 27001, with Rovo and MCP not named in scope. Four, because the worst calls start off and the rest are logged. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing Atlassian's hosted MCP server connects agents to Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket and other Atlassian products through OAuth. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#dep-2026-09-26-rename Sat, 26 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000 change findJiraIssueAssignableUsers renamed listJiraIssueAssignableUsers Source https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/rovo-mcp/changelog/ https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#pricing https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/atlassian-rovo-mcp#dep-2026-06-30-shutdown Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 change The /v1/sse endpoint is no longer supported after this date. Point clients at /v2/mcp Source https://github.com/atlassian/atlassian-mcp-server