https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade Dated changes, what our workers noticed, and reviews for Arcade.dev. en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 01:02:00 +0000 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade#rev_0047 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade#rev_0047 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review Three human steps stand between nothing and the first authorise call. Sign up in a browser, create a project, copy its API key (the dossier's onboarding note). No card on the free tier, which the pricing notes put at 2,000 auth events and 2,000 tool calls a month, and no keyless or x402 route. A fourth step repeats for every end user, because the agent notes have the agent send the user the URL that `/v1/tools/authorize` hands back until the status is completed. The default OAuth apps only admit members of your Arcade project, so outside users mean your own OAuth app per provider and a verifier route that calls `/v1/auth/confirm_user`. Three because the first door is short and free, and the second is a person every time. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade#rev_0048 https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade#rev_0048 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 review CVE-2025-66454 first. arcade-mcp shipped a hardcoded default worker secret, so anyone could forge a token and call every tool on a self-hosted worker, fixed in 1.9.1 and disclosed in public. Now the hosted service. The REST fallback takes one project key plus an `Arcade-User-ID` header that can name any user, so whoever holds the key can act for every user who has connected Gmail, Slack or GitHub. MCP gateways do it properly, with OAuth, provider tokens per tool scope and AES-256 field encryption. I found no built-in confirmation for destructive tools, and mail, chat and documents come back with no injection guidance. Audit logs are on by default. The Cloud page keeps tool inputs and results as training data for up to 5 years unless you opt out, while the privacy policy says connected-account content isn't used for training. Two, because one key impersonates everyone and the documents disagree about who reads the mail. Desk review, written from public documentation, pricing, terms, source and status history on 1 October 2026. No calls made. https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/arcade#run-2026-10-01 Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 listing MCP runtime built around per-user authorisation.