# Crush vs Verdent (slim)

> Crush scores 49.8 (D) to Verdent's 39.7 (E) for agent harnesses. Prices, MCP, x402, uptime and agent notes side by side.

- Full: https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/crush-vs-verdent.md (~6,650 tokens) · this version ~3,130 tokens · JSON https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/crush-vs-verdent.json · canonical https://www.anchorterminal.com/compare/crush-vs-verdent
- Index: https://www.anchorterminal.com/llms.txt · API: https://www.anchorterminal.com/api/v1/index.json · MCP: https://www.anchorterminal.com/mcp · Updated: 2026-11-07
- Licence: CC BY 4.0, credit Anchor Terminal and link this page (https://www.anchorterminal.com/terms/#data)

Crush scores 49.8 (D) on agent readiness against Verdent's 39.7 (E), and leads in every scored category. Both do agent harnesses.

- Crush: D 49.8, rank #1072 of 1486 · https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/crush.min.md
- Verdent: E 39.7, rank #1317 of 1486 · https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/verdent.min.md
- Crush, good for Developers who want a Go terminal agent with a wide provider list, local models and Claude Code-compatible hooks. Ahead on Reliability, 52 against 43; Schema & documentation, 65 against 55; Agent ergonomics, 52 against 35; Security & auth, 41 against 33; Payments & pricing, 55 against 20; Maintenance & community, 82 against 61. Also Free to start without a card.
- Verdent, good for A person who wants a desktop app to plan and run several coding tasks at once, possibly on their own Claude Code or Codex.

| Category | Crush | Verdent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Reliability (16%) | 52 | 43 |
| Performance (10%) | pending | pending |
| Schema & documentation (13%) | 65 | 55 |
| Agent ergonomics (13%) | 52 | 35 |
| Security & auth (14%) | 41 | 33 |
| Payments & pricing (10%) | 55 | 20 |
| Task success (10%) | pending | pending |
| Maintenance & community (7%) | 82 | 61 |
| Transparency & trust (7%) | 59 | 55 |

| Fact (where they differ) | Crush | Verdent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Vendor | Charm | Verdent AI, Inc. |
| Pricing | Freemium | Paid |
| Licence | FSL-1.1-MIT (source-available, each release converts to MIT two years after it is made available) | Proprietary. The terms of use from Verdent AI, Inc. forbid reverse engineering or copying any component, and no source is published |
| Read-only variant documented | no | yes |
| Terms last updated | no document linked | 2026-05-25 |
| Privacy policy last updated | no document linked | 2026-05-26 |
| Customer content may train models | not read yet | yes |
| Terms restrict automated access | not read yet | yes |
| Terms restrict benchmarking | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Terms or service can change without notice | not read yet | yes |
| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Popularity | 29k stars, 5.6k npm/wk | none |
| Agent reviews | 2.3/5 (4) | none |

Why the edge:
- Payments & pricing, Crush +35: Crush 55 (No payment protocol (0). Scored on Charm's Hyper provider. Its public provider file at hyper.charm.land/v1/provider lists per-million-token figures for 22 models without a login, but no pricing page confirms them as billed rates, and plan prices sit in a script-rendered app (15). The CLI is free to use and runs with your own provider key or a local model, so nothing needs a card (20). A local model through Ollama, llama.cpp or LM Studio, or an existing provider key in the environment, works with no Charm account, so an agent can install it and run a task without a person signing up (20).); Verdent 20 (Harness reading of the published rubric, scored on the Verdent subscription the agent needs. No payment protocol (0). Plan prices from $5 a month, top-up prices and the credit value of about $0.059 are public without a login (20). Free Mode and the free trial ended on 29 October 2026, so there is no free tier (0). A person signs up in a browser (0). 0+20+0+0 = 20.)
- Maintenance & community, Crush +21: Crush 82 (v0.99.0 tagged on 29 October 2026 (6 days, 30). 21 release tags from 7 August to 29 October, v0.88.1 to v0.99.0, besides a moving `nightly` tag that isn't counted (20). The 18 October shields.io counts are struck. The repository's refs show 147 merges into main and 438 commits in the 90 days to 4 November, with 272 open pull requests carrying a merge ref, and new contributors signing the CLA most days. Reply times couldn't be read (12). No SDK, as with other harnesses. npm, Homebrew, Winget, Scoop, apt, yum and NUR builds come from the release workflow (12, held partial). Dependabot, a `go mod tidy` check in CI and nightly security scans, with CI results unread (8). 30 + 20 + 12 + 12 + 8 = 82.); Verdent 61 (Closed service. v2.18.0 on 29 October 2026, eight days before this check (30). More than three dated releases in the 90 days from 8 August, among them 2.10.0 to 2.18.0 (20). A dated public changelog, a support address, Discord and a subreddit, with no public tracker to read reply times (8). No official SDK or MCP server to keep current (0). No public packages or CI to judge (3). 30+20+8+0+3 = 61.)
- Agent ergonomics, Crush +17: Crush 52 (Harness reading, scored on what an agent or pipeline driving `crush run` has to supply. About 20 built-in tools, any of which `permissions deny` hides, MCP servers take per-server `disabled_tools`, and skills can be turned off or kept out of the model's list. No lazy loading of MCP tools found (17). No turn, time or cost limit on `crush run`, and the only output controls are `--quiet` and `--verbose` (6). Errors come back as plain messages with a non-zero exit, such as the one for an unconfigured provider, with no documented codes and no JSON error record (8). `--session` and `--continue` resume a run, and `crush session list`, `show`, `last`, `rename` and `delete` take `--json` (13). One argument starts a run and environment keys are picked up, but there's no SDK, and the HTTP API needs `CRUSH_CLIENT_SERVER=1` and is described only in one README section (8).); Verdent 35 (Harness reading. MCP servers per project or globally, subagents, skills and rules, but no per-tool disabling or deferred loading found (10). No output-size, turn-limit or budget controls for a run were found beyond credit balances (5). No exit codes or error format, since there is no headless mode (3). Parallel workers in git worktrees and a review column make runs reviewable and reversible, with no resume by ID documented (10). No CLI, API or SDK. A pipeline can only reach Manager through a paired Telegram, Slack or Feishu bot (7). 10+5+3+10+7 = 35.)
- Schema & documentation, Crush +10: Crush 65 (Harness reading of the framework line. A JSON Schema for the config at https://charm.land/crush.json (also printed by `crush schema`), `--json` on the session commands, and an OpenAPI document that `crush server` generates from its endpoint list and serves at `/v1/docs/openapi.json`, which isn't published anywhere we could fetch. `crush run` output has no typed form (20). No llms.txt (charm.land/llms.txt is a not-found page). The docs are Markdown in the repository and the hooks guide says it was written for humans and agents (5). The README and config docs explain when to allow, deny or hook a tool and warn that configs run as code (12). The schema carries enums and defaults, such as the attribution trailer style, while permissions take bare tool names with no command patterns (11). Many examples for providers, MCP, hooks and local models, with no reference for error messages or exit codes (9). Version tags and GitHub releases with generated notes, which we couldn't open, and no changelog file (8).); Verdent 55 (Framework reading for a harness. No schema for settings or output, only mcp.json examples in the standard mcpServers shape (5). Every current docs page has a Markdown twin at the same path with .md, though no llms.txt (10). The docs say when to use Agent Mode or Plan Mode and what Plan Mode can't do, but the Agent Mode page lists the actions that need approval only as "certain tool executions" and "destructive operations" (12). Modes and BYOA agent types are enumerated, permissions are not (5). Examples on the MCP, BYOA and messaging pages, and a recovery page, with no error codes (8). Version numbers and a dated public changelog (15). The archived 1.0 docs are still served beside the current ones. 5+10+12+5+8+15 = 55.)
- Reliability, Crush +9: Crush 52 (Local-package reading. `@charmland/crush` on npm, a Homebrew tap, Winget, Scoop, AUR, Nix, FreeBSD pkg, Charm's apt and yum repositories and release binaries, with supported platforms named in the README (20). The public build workflow runs `go test -race -failfast ./...` on Linux, macOS and Windows for every push to main and every pull request, but GitHub pages and the API answer 403 to us, so results are unread (15). The 18 October issue and pull request counts came from shields.io badges, a third-party copy of GitHub data, and are struck. The repository's own refs show 2,574 pull requests to #4224, 272 of them open with a merge ref, and 147 merges into main in the 90 days to 4 November. Crash and regression issues couldn't be read (10). Release notes are generated from commit messages, with no CHANGELOG file and no breaking-change headings found. The legacy JSON config is deprecated in favour of `crushrc` while still loading (7, held partial). v0.99.0, before 1.0, with no stability statement (0). 20 + 15 + 10 + 7 + 0 = 52.); Verdent 43 (Local-package reading, as for the other closed-source harnesses. The desktop app installs from verdent.ai with macOS 11 or later and 64-bit Windows 10 and 11 stated, and the extension from the editor marketplaces, but not from a package registry (15). No public CI or test suite, since the source isn't published (0). No public issue tracker, every task runs through Verdent's servers, and no status page was found, so there is no readable record (5). A dated changelog by version, with the end of Free Mode called out in v2.18.0, but no breaking-change sections (8). 2.18.0, generally available (15). 15+0+5+8+15 = 43.)
- Security & auth, Crush +8: Crush 41 (Harness reading of the framework checklist, as for the other harnesses. 30 for what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. Usage metrics go to PostHog through data.charm.land by default, keyed to a hashed machine ID, aliased to the Hyper user ID after a Hyper login, and including error messages. The README says prompts and responses are never collected and names two opt-outs (`CRUSH_DISABLE_METRICS=1` and `DO_NOT_TRACK=1`). The provider list is fetched from Catwalk at startup unless turned off, the update check only notifies, and provider keys stay local (15). The TUI asks before bash, edit, write, fetch, download and MCP calls, `permissions deny` hides tools and PreToolUse hooks can block calls. But `crush run` approves every permission request in its session automatically (internal/app/app.go in v0.99.0), `--yolo` skips all prompts, and there's no sandbox, only a refusal list for curl, wget, ssh, sudo, package managers and similar commands (7). No prompt-injection guidance found, and a project's `.crushrc` and `$(...)` in `crush.json` run as code at startup, which the README warns about (3). Logs in `./.crush/logs/crush.log` with `crush logs`, sessions in a local database readable as JSON, and `crush stats`, with no OpenTelemetry export (9). The organisation's SECURITY.md is a disclosure policy with a reporting address (vt100@charm.sh) and no response time. CI runs CodeQL, Grype and govulncheck nightly and releases are cosign-signed. OSV lists no advisory for the npm package or the Go module. No security.txt and no bug bounty. A disclosure route with no stated time is this run's 7 (was 10). 15 + 7 + 3 + 9 + 7 = 41.); Verdent 33 (Framework reading (telemetry defaults, approvals, guardrails, sandboxing). Conversation history and tool results go to Verdent's US servers and on to Azure, Bedrock or Vertex, with zero data retention stated for Vertex and Bedrock only. Event logging to log.verdent.ai has no documented opt-out. BYOA keys stay on the machine (10). Plan Mode is read-only, Agent Mode asks before destructive commands and edits outside scope, and workers are isolated by git worktree, but there is no sandbox or network control and the approval list isn't enumerated (9). No prompt-injection guidance found, while web search and fetch results enter the context (2). Usage history in the dashboard, no audit log found (5). A security page with a disclosure address and a five-day acknowledgement, SOC 2 and ISO/IEC 42001 being pursued rather than held, no security.txt and no bug bounty (7). 10+9+2+5+7 = 33.)