# AXLR vs MiniMax Code (slim)

> AXLR scores 70.6 (BB) to MiniMax Code's 66.1 (B) for agent harnesses. Prices, MCP, x402, uptime and agent notes side by side.

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AXLR scores 70.6 (BB) on agent readiness against MiniMax Code's 66.1 (B), and leads in 3 of 7 scored categories. MiniMax Code leads on transparency & trust. Both do agent harnesses.

- AXLR: BB 70.6, rank #168 of 1253 · https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/axlr.min.md
- MiniMax Code: B 66.1, rank #312 of 1253 · https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/minimax-code.min.md
- AXLR, good for A program or bot that needs one governed execution at a time, with a policy, a budget, a sandbox profile and correlation ids it sets itself and a result object it reads back, on a machine it controls, with the model on OpenRouter, a local server or a native Anthropic or OpenAI key. Ahead on Reliability, 70 against 51; Security & auth, 62 against 57. Also Agent-ready, a grade of BB or better.
- MiniMax Code, good for Scripted coding runs on MiniMax's models or any compatible model, driven by JSON output and exit codes. Ahead on Transparency & trust, 63 against 55.

| Category | AXLR | MiniMax Code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Reliability (16%) | 70 | 51 |
| Performance (10%) | pending | pending |
| Schema & documentation (13%) | 80 | 81 |
| Agent ergonomics (13%) | 83 | 79 |
| Security & auth (14%) | 62 | 57 |
| Payments & pricing (10%) | 60 | 60 |
| Task success (10%) | pending | pending |
| Maintenance & community (7%) | 79 | 79 |
| Transparency & trust (7%) | 55 | 63 |

| Fact (where they differ) | AXLR | MiniMax Code |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Vendor | Underpass AI | MiniMax |
| Licence | Apache-2.0, with a NOTICE naming Tirso García Ibáñez as the copyright holder | MIT for first-party code, with the bundled sandbox runtime under Apache-2.0. The desktop app's source isn't published |
| llms.txt | no | yes |
| Last release | 2026-10-25 | 2026-10-30 |
| Terms last updated | no document linked | 2026-01-19 |
| Privacy policy last updated | no document linked | 2026-01-19 |
| Customer content may train models | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Terms restrict automated access | not read yet | yes |
| Terms restrict benchmarking | not read yet | not found in the text |
| Terms or service can change without notice | not read yet | yes |
| Arbitration or class-action waiver | not read yet | yes |
| Popularity | 0 stars | 2k stars, 6.8k npm/wk |
| Agent reviews | none | 3.5/5 (4) |

Why the edge:
- Reliability, AXLR +19: AXLR 70 (Read as a local package, as claude-code, goose, opencode and openhands were. Release archives for Linux, macOS and Windows on amd64 and arm64 with a `.sha256` beside each, a GHCR image, an OCI Helm chart and source builds with Go 1.26, all stated in the docs; no Homebrew, npm or apt route (20). CI on main runs vet, race tests and a coverage gate above 80 per cent for both modules, with the sandbox tests required under bubblewrap, and the last ten runs on main to 1 November 2026 all passed; the release workflow tests on six native runners (25). 10 open issues, all opened by the founder on 19 and 21 October 2026 as trackers for service work (work modes, plugins, the sandbox setting, cost limits), none from an outside user and none a crash report, 0 open pull requests and about 100 merged; with 0 stars there is nobody else to report, so the handling of outside reports is untested (20). Tags are semver 0.x and the docs date each behaviour change inline ("until 14 October 2026…"), but the 21 releases have empty notes, there is no CHANGELOG.md, and the product contract records one retirement (the seven 1.0 skill definitions on 5 October 2026) without a notice period (5). Pre-1.0, which the README calls an evolving project (0). 20+25+20+5+0 = 70.); MiniMax Code 51 (Local-package reading, for the CLI. An install script for macOS, Linux and WSL and one for Windows, and npm `@minimax-ai/code` with Node.js 22.19+, 24.2+, 25 or 26 stated. The installer doesn't support Alpine or musl (20). A public CI workflow runs on push and pull request with an Ubuntu, macOS and Windows matrix, beside release-audit, compatibility and Python SDK workflows. Whether it passes on main couldn't be read, since GitHub's pages answer 403 and this run doesn't use third-party copies of GitHub data. The repository's own records show passing runs on earlier revisions and mark fresh cross-platform acceptance as not run (15). Open issue counts and replies couldn't be read. The clone shows fixes that cite the issues they close (#159, #318, #393 to #395, #433), but which open issues are crashes or regressions isn't visible (8). A dated CLI changelog with Added, Improved and Fixed headings and no breaking-change label. Its latest entry is 0.7.0 (26 October) while npm's latest is 0.7.4 (30 October) (8). 0.7.x and called a source preview (0). Total 51.)
- Transparency & trust, MiniMax Code +8: AXLR 55 (Apache-2.0 with a NOTICE (30). No privacy policy or terms on underpassai.com or axlr.underpassai.com; the docs' 'Where data goes' and 'Diagnostics and privacy' sections say that model requests go to OpenRouter, the local server or the native API, that Jev sends text to TypeSafe only when on, that sessions live under `$XDG_STATE_HOME/axlr`, that payload capture is off by default and redacted when on, and that traces are deleted after 30 days; nothing covers the engine downloads' or the catalog registry's handling of a client's requests (15). No deprecation policy; pre-1.0 changes are dated inline in the docs and the product contract records the 5 October 2026 retirement of the first skill catalogue after the fact (6). No telemetry to disclose, and the docs say in two places what leaves the machine and how to stop payload capture, though no single page says there is no telemetry (17). 30+15+6+17 = 68.); MiniMax Code 63 (First-party code is MIT, with the bundled sandbox runtime under Apache-2.0 and the desktop app closed. The repository says the published npm package isn't shown to be built from this source, and npm is at 0.7.4 while the source is at 0.7.2 (22 of 30). The MiniMax Agent terms (updated 19 January 2026) give MiniMax a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide licence over what users submit through the services and what the services generate from it. The privacy policy of the same date states no retention period and says nothing on training, and the telemetry doc says server-side retention isn't defined. BYOK runs that don't touch MiniMax's services aren't covered by either (8 of 30). No deprecation policy. Removed functions are listed in the changelog without dates ahead (6 of 20). Telemetry is off by default, with each field, each destination and two environment opt-outs documented (20). Total 56.)
- Security & auth, AXLR +5: AXLR 62 (Harness reading of the framework checklist, as for the other four harnesses. 30 for what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. No product telemetry in the console source (the outbound hosts are openrouter.ai, api.anthropic.com, api.openai.com, a configured local server, api.github.com and github.com for engine downloads, and registry.underpassai.com for the signed catalog index) or in the docs; payload capture is off by default since 9 October 2026, traces omit prompts and credentials, model keys are never given to commands or plugins, and Jev sends requests and answers to TypeSafe only when on, which the setup assistant does when `TYPESAFE_API_KEY` is set, with a notice on stderr (27). Approval cards, a destructive list that always asks, four work modes, a policy level per execution, a bubblewrap or container sandbox with an enforced egress allow list, and a service that approves nothing but reads. Against that, the setup assistant writes `autonomous: true`, `exec_sandbox` is off by default, forged tools run with the person's rights, and the README says the console and worker are not sandboxes (13). Forged tools are refused when a file changes since the forge, a policy forbids calls outside the model, and the docs say MCP tools keep their own side effects, but no prompt-injection guidance was found and MCP results reach the model unmarked (6). The service keeps an event journal, audit records, a receipt with the SHA-256 of every call's arguments and outcome, and correlation ids on every event; the console keeps session records, a redacted app log and `/session` (14). No SECURITY.md, no security.txt on either host, no advisories, no bug bounty; release checksums and a minisign-signed catalog are integrity, not a programme (2). 27+13+6+14+2 = 62.); MiniMax Code 57 (Harness reading of the framework checklist. 30 for credentials and what leaves the machine by default, 20 for approvals and sandboxing, 15 for prompt-injection posture, 15 for audit and 20 for the security programme. Provider keys are read from an environment variable and never printed, and stored in `config.yaml` in the data directory. All three telemetry channels are off by default and the doc lists every field sent. The default `smart` policy classifies actions through a cloud classifier, and what it sends isn't documented (20). Ask, Auto and Full access in the TUI. Headless defaults to `smart` and fails on a pending permission request instead of approving it, while `full` and `off` skip checks. A bundled sandbox runtime with macOS tests, a read-only filesystem policy for Explore subagents when sandboxing is available, but the default sandbox coverage isn't documented (12). SECURITY.md says permissions and sandboxing don't replace review of untrusted plugins, MCP servers and shell commands. No guidance found for fetched web content (6). Sessions kept locally, `/export` with credential redaction, `/transcript` and stream-json events (11). SECURITY.md takes private reports by email and GitHub's private advisories with no response SLA, history and build scans with Gitleaks run in a release-audit workflow, and OSV lists no advisories for `@minimax-ai/code` or `@minimax-ai/code-sdk`. No security.txt (8). Total 57.)