{
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      "slug": "agentgate",
      "name": "AgentGate",
      "company": "Mohit Singh (individual)",
      "grade": "D",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "POST /v1/assess scores tool name and arguments before execution and returns allow, deny or ask with reason_codes, and on_model_error defaults to ask; but secret or PII detection in arguments is not a head, and the classifier has no published accuracy.",
      "source": "https://github.com/mohitdebian/AgentGate/blob/main/docs/API_REFERENCE.md",
      "confidence": "medium",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/agentgate"
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    {
      "slug": "cisco-ai-defense-inspection",
      "name": "Cisco AI Defense Inspection API",
      "company": "Cisco Systems, Inc.",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "MCP inspection covers call_tool and list_tools messages before they run and returns is_safe with the triggered rules, but there is no ask-a-person verdict.",
      "source": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisco-ai-defense/ai-defense-python-sdk/main/README.md",
      "confidence": "medium",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/cisco-ai-defense-inspection"
    },
    {
      "slug": "granite-guardian",
      "name": "Granite Guardian",
      "company": "International Business Machines Corporation",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "available_tools and the function calling hallucination criterion check a call against the declared tools, and custom criteria can state a rule, but the verdict is yes or no with no ask outcome and secrets are not a pre-baked target.",
      "source": "https://huggingface.co/ibm-granite/granite-guardian-4.1-8b",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/granite-guardian"
    },
    {
      "slug": "lakera-guard",
      "name": "Lakera Guard (Check Point AI Guardrails)",
      "company": "Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "tool_calls are screened as the agent's actions with a Tool Allow/Deny List and a beta Dangerous Deviation detector, but the verdict is flagged or not, with no ask-a-person outcome.",
      "source": "https://docs.lakera.ai/docs/agent-behavior-defense.md",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/lakera-guard"
    },
    {
      "slug": "llamafirewall",
      "name": "LlamaFirewall",
      "company": "Meta Platforms, Inc.",
      "grade": "D",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "AlignmentCheck audits the trace and assistant tool_calls against the user's goal, and ScanDecision has allow, block and human_in_the_loop_required; but it calls Together AI by default and nothing targets secrets in arguments.",
      "source": "https://meta-llama.github.io/PurpleLlama/LlamaFirewall/docs/documentation/scanners/alignment-check",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/llamafirewall"
    },
    {
      "slug": "nemo-guardrails",
      "name": "NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails",
      "company": "NVIDIA Corporation",
      "grade": "BB",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "Tool call validation blocks undeclared tools and schema-violating arguments, fails closed and names the reason, but it is structural only: no secret or PII screening of arguments and no ask-a-person verdict.",
      "source": "https://docs.nvidia.com/nemo/guardrails/latest/configure-guardrails/guardrail-catalog/tool-calling.md",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/nemo-guardrails"
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    {
      "slug": "openai-guardrails",
      "name": "OpenAI Guardrails",
      "company": "OpenAI (as named in the LICENSE copyright line and the PyPI author field)",
      "grade": "BB",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "Before tool calls run, the check tests whether the requested function fits the user's goal and trips a block, but there is no ask-a-person verdict and secrets in arguments are not named as a target.",
      "source": "https://openai.github.io/openai-guardrails-python/ref/checks/prompt_injection_detection/",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/openai-guardrails"
    },
    {
      "slug": "prisma-airs",
      "name": "Prisma AIRS AI Runtime Security API",
      "company": "Palo Alto Networks, Inc.",
      "grade": "C",
      "fit": "caveat",
      "why": "tool_event takes the raw JSON input of an MCP or function call and tool_detected reports findings with an allow or block action, but there is no ask-a-person verdict.",
      "source": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PaloAltoNetworks/pan.dev/master/openapi-specs/prisma-airs/scan/scan-service_latest.yaml",
      "confidence": "medium",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/prisma-airs"
    },
    {
      "slug": "guardrails-ai",
      "name": "Guardrails AI",
      "company": "Guardrails AI, Inc.",
      "grade": "D",
      "fit": "unchecked",
      "why": "Issue 1601 on validating tool calls with on=\"tools:...\" is closed, but no shipped docs or release note confirming it were read.",
      "confidence": "low",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/guardrails-ai"
    },
    {
      "slug": "amazon-bedrock-guardrails",
      "name": "Amazon Bedrock Guardrails",
      "company": "Amazon Web Services, Inc.",
      "grade": "A",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "The docs state that in tool-use workloads tool-call arguments, tool results and tool definitions are not evaluated, and acc-18 saw tool-call-only turns never sent; there is no allow, deny or ask verdict on an action.",
      "source": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/guardrails-sensitive-filters.html",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/amazon-bedrock-guardrails"
    },
    {
      "slug": "azure-ai-content-safety",
      "name": "Azure AI Content Safety (Prompt Shields)",
      "company": "Microsoft Corporation",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "Prompt Shields scan user input and, in preview for agents, tool responses; nothing read screens tool-call names and arguments or returns an allow, deny or ask verdict.",
      "source": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-services/content-safety/concepts/jailbreak-detection",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/azure-ai-content-safety"
    },
    {
      "slug": "google-model-armor",
      "name": "Google Cloud Model Armor",
      "company": "Google LLC",
      "grade": "BB",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "The sanitize calls take a user prompt or a model response; the overview names no tool-call field, tool definition screening or allow, deny or ask verdict.",
      "source": "https://docs.cloud.google.com/model-armor/overview.md.txt",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/google-model-armor"
    },
    {
      "slug": "llama-guard",
      "name": "Llama Guard 4",
      "company": "Meta Platforms, Inc.",
      "grade": "D",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "S14 Code Interpreter Abuse covers text only; there is no tool-call input or allow, deny or ask verdict.",
      "source": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/meta-llama/PurpleLlama/main/Llama-Guard4/12B/MODEL_CARD.md",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/llama-guard"
    },
    {
      "slug": "microsoft-presidio",
      "name": "Presidio",
      "company": "Data Privacy Stack (community organisation, no legal entity stated)",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "It can find PII in argument text a caller passes, but returns entities, not an allow, deny or ask verdict on a tool call.",
      "source": "https://presidio.dataprivacystack.org/anonymizer/",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/microsoft-presidio"
    },
    {
      "slug": "mistral-moderation",
      "name": "Mistral Moderation API",
      "company": "Mistral AI (RCS Paris 952 418 325)",
      "grade": "B",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "Moderation classifies text or the last conversation turn; no tool-call argument screening or allow, deny or ask verdict is documented.",
      "source": "https://docs.mistral.ai/studio/safety-moderation.md",
      "confidence": "medium",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/mistral-moderation"
    },
    {
      "slug": "openai-moderation",
      "name": "OpenAI Moderation API",
      "company": "OpenAI OpCo, LLC",
      "grade": "BB",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "Classifies text and images; no tool-call input or allow, deny or ask verdict.",
      "source": "https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/moderation",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/openai-moderation"
    },
    {
      "slug": "shieldgemma",
      "name": "ShieldGemma",
      "company": "Google LLC (RDAP registrant of gemma.ai; the Gemma Terms of Use are Google's and the cards name Google as author)",
      "grade": "C",
      "fit": "no",
      "why": "Takes a prompt or a prompt and response; no tool-call input or verdict.",
      "source": "https://gemma.ai/models/shieldgemma/model-card-v1.md",
      "confidence": "high",
      "url": "https://www.anchorterminal.com/tools/shieldgemma"
    }
  ],
  "marks": "yes: the docs show it does the job as the success test says. caveat: it does the job with a limit an agent should know. no: it doesn't do this job. unchecked: we couldn't read it.",
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    "credit": "CC BY 4.0, credit Anchor Terminal and link the page or API address you took it from (https://www.anchorterminal.com/terms/#data)",
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    "generatedAt": "2026-11-16",
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    "asks": [
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      "check this tool call before executing it",
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    "blockers": [
      "guardrail screens message text only, so tool-call-only turns pass unchecked",
      "ask verdict needs a human with no channel to reach them"
    ],
    "capabilities": [
      "guard.policy",
      "guard.tool-call",
      "guard.pii"
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    "categoryName": "Guardrails \u0026 safety filters",
    "checked": "2026-11-15",
    "companies": {
      "fit": 0,
      "fitWithLimit": 8,
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    "fits": null,
    "fitsWithLimit": [
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      "cisco-ai-defense-inspection",
      "granite-guardian",
      "lakera-guard",
      "llamafirewall",
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      "openai-guardrails",
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    "status": "draft",
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    "weight": 9,
    "weightBasis": "5 of 50 accounts, two of them from builders of competing tools (acc-41, acc-42) and one a vendor-run benchmark; the job is named often but few users report doing it with a listed tool"
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